THE MOROCCAN WAR.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 19802, 29 May 1926, Page 10

THE MOROCCAN WAR.

The surrender of Abd-el-Krim to the French should signalise the virtual termination of the protracted and somewhat inglorious war in Morocco in which latterly both France apd Spain have been involved. During the past year or two the resistance of the leader of the Riffs had been so effectually broken on more than one occasion, according to official communiques from Madrid or Paris, that the outside world had reason for accepting with considerable reserve reports as to the successful progress of the Franco-Spanish campaign. But now that Abd-el-Krira is actually a refugee and a prisoner in the French camp no further room exists for doubt respecting the issue of the conflict. The leader of the Riffs, in their later struggles against the forces of occupation in Morocco, certainly established an extraordinary reputation for military prowess in the face of overwhelming odds, and his achievement in withstanding the combined might of two European Powers for a considerable period will give his name a definite place in the pages of history. Exactly what Abd-el-Krim’s surrender signifies in respect to the prospects for peace in a country that has known no peace for many years, at least so far as the Spanish sphere of occupation is concerned, can scarcely be judged at present. The Spanish Government has dedared that the Moroccan operations must bo continued relentlessly until the Sultan’s authority is fully established throughout the Riff territory. What that may imply depends presumably upon the possibility of sporadic resistance on the part of certain of the tribesmen under some new leader. Over Abd-el-Krim’s capitulation, however, there will naturally be rejoicings both in Paris and Madrid. The Riff leader had succeeded in making the Spanish military dictatorship look distinctly foolish, and his name and prestige we.ra becoming a very disturbing topic of political discussion in the French Chambup.

Viewed in retrospect, the Moroccan war has been dramatic in its characteristics. It has been carried on by Spain at an enormous cost in blood and treasure. In 1921, it may be recalled, the second of Spain’s long wars against Raisuli was nearing its close. Then came news that the Riffs had attacked the great Spanish army of the East, and hurled the remnants of it back to the coast. The rout was so complete, and the losses so appalling, that General Silvestre blew out his brains. The Riffs, under Abd-el-Krim’* brother, took about 20,000 prisoners, including General Novarrc, and captured a vast booty in military supplies. By September, 1923, the Spanish Government had so disgraced itself that a clique of officers under General de Rivera was able to set up a military dictatorship. Peace had been made with Raisuli in 1922, a peace born of necessities on both sides. Raisuli, old and sick, managed none the less to keep the Jebala tribes out of Abd-el-Krim’s camp. Spain’s final withdrawal from the Jebala country, not accomplished without a disaster with enormous losses in men and materials due to Riff pressure in the summer of 1924, was hardly completed ere Abd-el-Krim swept down upon Raisuli, as it is recorded, like a hawk upon a mouse. After this new victory, Riffian prestige, numbers, stores, and wealth were even equal to a contest with France. Abd-el-Krim, the son of a petty chief, had now consolidated the self-governing clan's in Morocco into a single nation, armed them by capturing the guns, rifles, stores, and clothing of their foes, and financed them by seizing the person and hoards of his principal rival at the moment when Raisuli had received the latest Spanish subsidy. Fortune was no doubt kind to Abd-ei-Krim at that stage, A curious light is thrown upon certain aspects of the Moroccan struggle in the following passage from an article by Sir Charles Hobhouse: “It is not given to every patriot to be opposed to a foe at once so venal and so stupid as to sell wholesale to their opponents the very weapons by which they themselves will shortly be opposed and destroyed. ... It was reserved to the Spanish soldier to devise a system of bartering his own weapons with his opponent in the field. Abd-el-Krim was also fortunate in finding two great European nations with depleted treasuries and bulging arsenals, ready to supply for cash all that he needed to make war on their co-signatories to th* partition of his country, and Hamburg and Marseilles can alike claim the honour and profit of keeping alight the torch of patriotism in Northern Africa.” Prior to being involved herself in the Moroccan struggle, France had ridiculed the Spanish'army, and attributed Abd-el-Krim’s victories entirely to its shortcomings. The French were not long in discovering, to their ’own cost, the quality of their Riff opponents. The decision of the French and Spanish Governments to co-operate against Abd-el-Krim indicated their realisation of the seriousness of the situation. And, in the hour of victory, the shadow of the enormens costs of their Moroccan campaign* cannot bo lifted.