THE IMPERISHABLE STORY.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 19019, 15 November 1923, Page 8

THE IMPERISHABLE STORY.

“IMPENDING FALL OF CONSTANTINOPLE. RUSSIA SMASHES THE SCHEME. THE SECOND VOLUME OF WINSTON CHURCHILL’S MEMOIRS. Copyright. Eights of Production Acquired by the Otago Daily Times. IX. In the Balkans the effect of the naval operations was electrical. The altitude ol Bulgaria changed witn lightning swiftness. Within a fortnight our Intelligence Reports showed that the Turks were being forced to move back to Adrianople and develop their front against Bulgaria. General Paget, the head of a special mission then at Sofia, telegraphed to Lord Kitchener on March 17 that after an audience with the King he was convinced that “the operations in the Dardanelles have made a deep impression, that all possibility of Bulgaria attacking any Balkan State that might side with the Entente is now over and there is some reason to think that shortly the Bulgarian army will move against Turkey to co-operate in the Dardanelles operations.” The attitude of Roumania also became one of extreme and friendly vigilance. Russia, although she nad not previously been able to spare more than 1000 Cossacks for action in the Balkans now offered the fullest naval co-operation and began to concentrate an army corps under General Islomine at Batoum to parlicipatc in what was believed to te the impending fall of Constantinople. On March 2 our Minister at Bucharest telegraphed that the Roumanian Prime Minister had said that his conviction that Italy “would move soon” had become stronger. **M,v Russian colleague has twic- seen the Italian Minister and while the latter had often before spoken to him about. . . Italy . . . joining us in the war, bis language on the last two occasions was more precise than ever before and was Indeed almost pressing. He spoke of acquisitions on the Adriatic coast and a share in the eventual partition of Turkey. Italy would have in a month s time an’army of 1.800,000 men ready to move .” Other similar indications flowed ’"‘Most important of all were, the effects uocui Greece. On March 1 the J3ntl A Minister in Athens telegraphed that M. Venizelos had put forward a proposal that a Greek army corps of three divisions chould be sent to Gallipoli. Sir Edward Grey promptly replied that H.M. Government would gladly accept this aid. and added that the Admiralty were very anxious that the Greeks should assist with ships as well as troops in the Dardanelles. the British Minister replied on March <2: “M. Venizelos hopes In be m a position to make us a definite offer to-morrow. . He had already approached the King, who. added the Minister, “I learn from another sourne. is in favour of war . Thus at the moment we had within our reach or on the way not only the 25.000 Anzaes and all the other troops in Egypt, the Royal Naval Division, and a French division, wc had also at least a Greek army corps of'three divisions and possibly mom. while a Russian armv corps was assembling at Batoum. It would have been quite easy, in addition to have sent the 29th Division and one or two territorial divisions from England. Thqre was surely a reasonable prospect that with all these forces playing their respective parts in a general scheme, the Gallipoli Peninsula could have been seized and Constantinople taken before the end of April. ‘‘A TERRIBLE FATALITY.” But now a terrible fatality intervened. Russia —failing, reeling backward under the German hammer, with her munitions running short, cut off from her allies—Russia was" the power which ruptured irretrievably this brilliant and decisive combination. On March 5 the Russian Foreign Minister informed our Ambassador that.; * The , Russian Government could not consent to 'Greece participating in operations in the Dardanelles, as it would be sure to lead to complications. . . • The Emperor, ’ M. de Sazonoff added, “in an audience which he 1 ' had had with his Majesty yesterday, declared be, could not under any circumstances consent to Greek co-operation in the Dardanelles.” This was a hard saying. Was there no finger to write upon the wall, was there no ancestral spirit to conjure up before this unfortunate prince the downfall of his house, the ruin of his people—the bloody cellar of Ekaterinburg’ In Athens the Russian Minister, under orders from It’s Government, was active to discourage and resist the Greek interception. In particular, the King of Greecewas made aware that in no circumstances would he he allowed to enter Constantinople with his troops. Can one wonder that, with his German consort and German leanings, with every appeal on the one hand and his violent rebuff upon the other. King Constantine was thrown hack and relapsed into his previous attitude of hostile reserve? . Further advices from the French Foreign Office on March 4 stated: —“The Russian Government would not at any price icoeptv the oe-operation of Greece in Constantinople expedition. ... If the Greek Government offer co-operation in the Dardanelles expedition thev should he told that, cooperation of Greece in the war must he entire and she must give active support to Serbia.” Our Minister at Athens, the well-informed and vigilant Elliott, left us in no doubt cf the Greek position. “To insist on Greek support in Serbia.” he telegraphed on the 6fh, “except in the event of '.a Bulgarian attack, would be to wreck the prospect of Greek co-operation with us.” .. . . The British Military Attache telegraphed on the 6th: —“My Russian colleague told me to-day that ho thought Russia would object to presence of King of Greece in Constantinople, and might make a stipulation that he did not come, a condition of acceptance of the present Greek offer. Any such restriction might lead to collapse of tile whole proposal.” Feeling this situation, a s I did, in every nerve, 1 was acutely distressed. In my distress I wrote, later, on the night of the 6th, to Sir Edward Grey: .Mr Churchill to Sir Edward Grey. March 6, 1915. I beseech you at this crisis not to make a mistake in failing below the level of events. Half-hearted measures will ruin all, and a million men will die through . the prolongation of the war. You must he bold and violent. You have a right to be. Our fleet is forcing the Dardanelles. No armies can reach Constantinople but those which we invite, yet we seek nothing here but the victory of the common cause. Tell the Russians that we will meet them in a generous and sympathetic spirit about Constantinople. But, no impediment must be placed in the way of Greek co-operation. Wo must have Greece and Bulgaria, if they will come. I. .am so afraid of your losing Greece, and yet paying all the future into Russian hands. U Russia prevents Greece helping, I will do my utmost to oppose her having Constantinople. She is a broken Rower but for our aid, and has no resource open ■hut to turn traitor—and this she cannot do. If we do not back up this Greece—the Greece of Venizelos—you will have another which will cleave to Germany. IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN! I put this letter aside till the next morning, and in the morning there arrived the following laconic telegram from Athens:— "The King, having refused to agree to M. Venizelos’s proposals, the Cabinet have resigned.” I put my idler away unsent, and print it now not in any reproach of Sir Edward Grey or the Foreign Office. They felt as wc did. They did all in their power. But I print it because it registers a terrible moment in the long struggle to Russia from her foes and from herself. While the attention of the Governments of so many States, great and small, was riveted upon the Dardanelles, and while so many profound and far-reaching reactions which had produced these great efforts began to falter and to flag, from March 3 onwards the progress of Admiral Carden’s attack became continually slower. The operations continued till the I2th with fitful bombardments and tentati' - attempts to sweep the minefields. During these days I began to doubt .whether there was sufficient determination behind the attack. It was clear that a much more vehement effort must be made.

The appointment of a military Comman-der-in-Chief for the forces assembling in the Eastern Mediterranean and his despatch to the scene of operations ivaa long overdue. By the end of the first week in March Lord Kitchener had virtually decided to select Sir lan Hamilton, who was at that lime in command of the Central Forces at Home. Ho did not. however, reveal his purpose to this officer until the morning of the 12th. Waiting for this decision, delayed without reason day after day. while troops and events were swdftiy moving forward, had been very trying to mo and to Lord Fisher. It was not until the 11th that I was sure Lord Kitchener had decided upon Sir lan Hamilton. Accompanied by a small group of staff officers appointed ’during the preceding day, and now meeting for the .first tini >, Sir latx’’Hamilton left Charing Cross for the Dardanelles on the evening of March 13. The 30-knot cruiser Phaeton awaited him under steam at Marseilles, and carried him at, full speed to the Dardanelles by the morning of the 17th. It was difficult to judge the prospects of a military landing at this juncture. No one knew what troops the Turks had on the spot. Vice-admiral Garden had stated in In’s telegram of February 23 that, “the garrison ot the, Gallipoli Peninsula is about 40 000 men.” This was also the working basis assumed bv the War Office. Wc now know that fhe force actually in the Peninsula at this date was under 20,000, scattered along the coast in small parties without supports or reserves. It seems probable that if the 29th Division had been on the spot in fighting order it could have been landed, with whatever troops were sent from Egypt, at this period without severe loss, and could have occupied very important a lid’ probably decisive positions. ,