LITERATURE.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 19009, 3 November 1923, Page 4

LITERATURE.

THE UNREST IN EUROPE.* AH’ HISTORICAL ANALYSIS. Bt Constant Rusn. “The business of history is not to record events, but to interpret them,” is one of many significant sentences employed by Mr Harold Stannard in a penetrative essay on The Fabric of Europe,” described as “An j Historical Survey of International Relation.” Tho thought that has been bestowed jin the making of this book is manifest in vibe author’s statement that it has been ’■twice rewritten. Originally conceived as a “nerve-tonic” on “air-raid nights,” it consisted of “purely historical matter,” and was limited to "a discussion of tho ultimate causes of war in Europe, an investigation of the permanent sources of European unrest.” When the first draft 'of the book was completed—early in 1918—two new circumstances had supervened, in both of which questions of principle were involved: The argument had originally been that Europe was organised into nations, that there existed abiding causes of conflict between these nations, and that national ; feeling had become more and more self- ' assertive until war could no longer ho averted. But as the war progressed towards its climax, the cardinal doctrine of nationality was challenged from two que.rters. On the one hand the Bolshevist revolution had out Europe off from the •whole Western world and was beginning to throw up a now system of political philosophy to which the idea of nationality was anathema. On the other the influence of America had increased with her increasing participation in the war, and America was at this time full of enthusiasm for a League of Nations that was intended to be an authority above nations • —a modern substitute for the medieval '■ Papacy— possessed of powers, material as V.‘ well as moral, to prohibit national wars. - Such were the main considerations leading to the recasting of the essay, which, ready once more for publication, was deliberately delayed in order that the decisions of tho Peace Conference might be taken Into account “A third version of the argument,” writes Mr Stannard, “thus became necessary which should aim at showing how far the Peace had settled the questions which the war had raised”; and this is the semi-final form in which the book now appears. Indeed, Mr Stannard’s successive attempts go to prove that there can be no finality on such a subject, since fresh factors are for ever emerging and .setting at naught previous conclusions. : “Baffled in its attempts to set European affairs on a permanently stable footing, the Paris Conference contented itself with a make-shift treatment of fluctuating circumstances. It gave interim awards and established a final court of appeal. But the court is not yet ready to sit, and meantime issues gravely affecting the future of Europe have been handled in just that temper of crude intolerant nationalism which the League was devised to bridle.” Mr Stannard makes reference to a mere ,subtle difficulty which lurks in the background:— M Jt is one of the commonplaces of history jf-'jthat ancient wars wore fought over land, ’medieval wars over religion, modern wars ■' over trade. As a rough and ready key to history this dogma is of value until late in the eighteenth century. But it is no longer up-to-date. The greatest modern wars have been fought over theories of society, though the belligerents themselves may not have been aware of the fact. The statesmen of Vienna, for example, looked back on their war as a . struggle to suppress French militarism, j Thus viewed, it had ended in a victory ; which the Peace sought to safeguard and ; did actually safeguard until after the 5 Holy Alliance had fallen to pieces. But | war had also been made on the social theories of the French Revolution. It was assumed at Vienna that these theories had collapsed with the fall of Napoleon, and Europe reorganised itself as ♦hough, the revolution had never been. Tho assumption was false, and the reorganisation was in peril almost as soon as it was complete. The revolutionary leaven began to work again at once, and at once attempts were made to repress , its ferment. Hence it was that England 5 live years after tho peace found "itself ; under a more reactionary Government i Hian it had ever known during the war. By 1830 the revolutionary ideas had reasserted themselves, though their triumph in Europe was deferred until 1248. But in England the decisive date was 1833, and the medal which Napoleon struck to commemorate _ his entry into London might appropriately have been issued on the day that the House of Lords accepted the Reform Bill. Mr Stannard employs this Napoleonic parallel to illuminate tho existing European situation. When the war broke out in 1914 the Germans endeavoured to attribute it to envy of Germany’s industrial and commercial achievements. But, while the Allies realised that they were fighting a social system based on the dominance of a military caste, they failed to see tho deeper social question involved. It required the Russian revolution to reveal the Bolshevist pdea that German militarism owed its menace to its alliance with German capitalism, and that all the belligerent States were equally capitalistic. Mr Stannard makes a point of the failure of the successive conferences, including that of Genoa, to get a European settlement on the Versailles basis. “The available instruments,” he writes, “have all broken under the test of events. The Supreme Council has failed because it was divided; tho League of Nations because it was weak; and the European Congress because it was circumscribed. These successive failures have opened the way to piecemeal treatment, from the now manifest dangers of which Europe ran only be saved by a strong assertion of its collective consciousness.” Mr Stannard draws an instructive comparison between the record of history and the record of biography, likening the one to predestination in its inevitability and the other to an exposition of the doctrine of free will. Concerning the inevitability of history he writes:— Viewed too narrowly it appears as a callous art, the parent of pessimism. Men are depicted ns acting under the influence of forces which preceded their birth and will outlast their death. Human endeavour wastes itself in hopeless reconciliations of opposites which at last clash and involve in their struggle those who had vainly sought to master them. Movements sweep on to advanced conclusions across the lives of generations, and man with his ideals seems minute, futile. Above all. war, thus studied in the light of its causes, stripped of the agony and passion which ennoble it for those who wage and inspire them to make the utmost sacrifice for a future they know they wi J I never see—war is displayed as humanity’s last, blind, desperate acknowledgment of its own incompetence. Mr Stannard contends, however, that tho whole truth is not •■evealed in history, but that biography- “the very pontradiction of this aspect of history”— must also be consulted. At the same'time history should not be ignored since “the full import of events is something beyond and more fundamental than tho personalities of the men who shape them.” The study of past history throws wonderful light on the present end the future. The divergence of view in regard to the Treaty of Versailles is inherent in the Treaty itself: On the one hand Britaift, France, Italy, and America have all acted in complete accordance with their traditions. Britain expands overseas to-day no less than when “lie secured the Cape in 1815 and Canada in 1763. She imposes tho freedom of the seas on Germany now as she imposed it on Russia after the Crimea, and on Spain in tho eighteenth century. M. Clomenceau pressing for tho frontier not only of 1870 but of 1814 and insisting that German armies shall . not concentrate in fortresses erected he--1 hind tho barrier of the Rhine translates j the policy of Lewis XIV into the terms iof modern military tactics. Italy ini corporates Germans and Slavs within her ; frontiers in uncompromising pursuit of ' the ideals which have possessed her for a century, and in making her first steps on a foreign policy based on completed unity at once lays claim to the Adriatic Empire of Venice, America is brought into tho struggle by the same moral indignation which armed the North against tho South, and is repudiating the consequences of her own conduct in deference to the caution against foreign entangle- . incuts which Washington bequeathed to •his successors. Nor does historical

analysis merely explain the achievements of the Paris Conference. It also gives the clue to its failures. In its hesitation in dealing with the Turkish question, in its bewilderment when confronted with unparalleled phenomena in Russia, in its caution in allowing for the play of new forces in future politics, the Com ference has proved itself the child ot the past, and were Castlereagh to return to this world to-morrow ho would find himself drawn to President Wilson by sympathetic ties of parallel experiences. On the other hand the Treaty shows that statesmanship has at last sought to master thp lesson forced on it by every crisis since the medieval world was consumed in the flames of the renaissance and the Reformation. All through theMiddle Ages there existed, at least in theory, a supreme tribunal before which even sovereign disputants could appear without loss of dignity. When the judgments of men differed irreconcilably the judgment of God could bo invoiced through mouth of Ills acknowledged Vicar upon earth. But when the sentiment of mankind refused to accept the authority of the Papacy as supreme, appeal was necessarily made to the opinion of mankind itself. Mr Stannard points out that international lawyers in the seventeenth century, historical philosophers in the eighteenth century, and journalists in the nineteenth century successively proclaimed themselves the masterpieces through which the vord’ets of civilisation wore pronounced. “At last.” he continues, “civilisation is to bo equipped with a mouthpiece of its own,” the League of Nations. He insists that the League, as created by the Covenant, is neither a world State, nor a world judge, but it is a world jury. And the initial difficulty which faces the League is how to hear the case and ensure that the right evidence is laid before it. “As a mere prelude,” said Mr Stannard, “it requires a theory. of origin of a war which involved almost all Europe. It must, therefore strive to envisage the whole of European history and to simnlify its multitudinous episodes into two or three main streams of European development. Such is the scheme of Mr_ Stannard’s essay, which is issued in the belief that “the _siiccessful search for the formula of British European policy will simultaneously place the present war in the sequence of general European development, and so leaie the historical instinct satisfied and the practical reason equipped for handling the problems of the hour.” , ~ „. Having thus cleared the ground, Mr btannard, following his scheme of historical analysis, proceeds to inquire into the immediate cause of the war,” and [his leads up to a suggestive review of both the Eastern question and the Western question, first senaratcly and afterwards linked gether ’ A chapter is devoted to discussing the neutrality of Spain and the intervention of Italy; space is also given to the action of Britain and to the Covenant of the League of Nations; and a final section is headed “Latin-Teuton; Latin-Slnv. Tho moral ■writ large-all through Mr Stannards book is that if the fabric of Europe is to be saved for civilisation it can be only by the intervention of America. In one striking passage Mr Stannard says: Tho fact that in spite of her long and obstinate effort to maintain neutrality, the United States was at last inevitably drawn into the war. has shown once and for all that she cannot be indifferent to a disturbance of the world’s peace, and there is no room for doubt as to where the world’s next crisis will arise. It will arise in the Eastern Mediterranean. All Europe knows it, and knows its own past history and present feelings too well for its opinion to be in error. Let not America plead that the Eastern Mediterranean is no concern of hers The Eastern Modifier ranean is the common concern of civilian tion. Out of it cilivised society was born and round its coasts civilised society must now prove its power to control the disruptive tendencies which threaten it? continued existence. Shall the old world advance from order through order to a higher order? Or shall it starve amid the desolation its own quarrels have caused? To such questions there can he but one answer. But the new world must give it, and it can only give it bv consenting to be called in, permanently and irrevocably to redress tho balance of the old.

j Mr Stannard dwells upon the transformation which the war has effected in American national feeling with the result of “a nervousness and vigour about America’s extirpation of Bolshevism.” which is-“rather puzzling to European peoples with their more mature national traditions.” Mr Stannard argues that the challenge to American nationalism contained in Bolshevism will force the United States into the League of Nations. “The League of Nations is the citadel. Once Soviet Russia is admitted and can intrigue freely with the garrison the whole cause is betrayed, and America will be the last nation in the world to countenance its betrayal. For this reason the growth of the Soviet. Power provides its own safeguards. Every stage in its nrogross draws America in‘o more wholehearted championship of the League of Nations and whittles away those reservations in which Europe at first saw the death blow to its hopes. The harmony of the world can only bo secured in one of two wavs—bv the violent destruction of nationalism through the Soviets, or bv its reasonable modification through the League. With the whole energetic influence of America inevitably destined to be thrown on the side of reason, the future of the League should bo secure.”