DISARMAMENT

Otago Daily Times, Issue 18456, 18 January 1922, Page 5

DISARMAMENT

FAR EASTERN PROBLEMS. CHINESE CUSTOMS TARIFF. FUTURE OF KIAO-CHOW. WASHINGTON, January 16. (Received Jan. 17, at 8.30 p.m.) • A communique states that the Far Eastern Committee announces that in passing the Customs resolutions as amended by the Drafting Committee it was additionally resolved: “ That the Government of the United States be requested to Communicate forthwith the terms of the agreement arrived at in regard to tariff to the Governments and Powers not represented at the conference who participated in the agreement of 1918 and to invite them 'to adhere to this convention.”—A. and N.Z. Cable. [At a meeting of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Affairs held on January 5 Mr Underwood presented a report of the Sub-committee on Chinese Customs, recommending a meeting of the Revision Committee at Shanghai forthwith tq revise the present tariff on the basis of 6 per cent., to be effective within four, months, the new duty coming into force two months' after publication without awaiting ratification. This wonld provide ' an additional 17,000,000 dollars (Mexican money). Immediate steps would be taken fob the holding of the special conference to provide for the imposition of a surtax of 2i per cent, ad valorem, securing an additional 27,000,000 dollars, and a special surtax on luxuries not to exceed 5 per cent., providing 2,000,000 dollars, the total additional revenue being 46,000,000 dollars. The conference would also prepare a way for the abolition of the Likin tax, bringing into effect the surtax agreed upon between Japan and the United States for the years 1922-23. With the work of special conference for the application of all surtaxes and ,the abolition of the Likin tax, the additional revenue should amount to 156,000,000 dollars. The present Customs revenue is 64,000,000 dollars, increasing to 110,000,000 dollars immediately the arrangements are completed to make effective the 5 per cent, and the imposition of the 2A per cent, and 5 per cent, surtaxes. The recommendations provided also for periodical revisions and recognition of the principle of uniformity on all the frontiers. The agreement was to override all provisions in the treaty between China and the Powers. China submitted a, communication agreeing not to disturb the present administration of the Chinese Customs. The report was finally lecommended for adoption.] S - ■ - Press Association—By Telegraph—Copyright. WASHINGTON, January 16. (Received Jan. 17, at 8.30 p.m.) The Chinese and Japanese conversations regarding Shantung have resulted in an understanding regarding the transfer of the administration of the former leased territory of Kiao-Chow. The question of mines was discussed, and the meeting adjourned.—A. and N.Z. Cable. PACIFIC FORTIFICATIONS. A JAPANESE CLAIM. TOKIO, January 16. (Received Jan. 17, at 7-30 p.m.) The Japanese Diplomatic Council has approved the Cabinet’s decision to insist firmly that the Bonin and Luchu Island groups shall bo included in the Japanese mainland group when the question of limiting the Pacific Island fortifications is settled at Washington.—A. and N.Z. Cable. WHAT HAS BEEN DONE. LIST OF POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENTS. Governor Coolidge, in a speech at Philadelphia, said that the list of positive achievements at the Washington Conference had been steadily increasing. It included the limitation of capital ships, the Four-Power Pact, a declaration against the use of submarines as commerce destroyers, the prohibition of the use of poison gas, the limitation of the size of armaments for auxiliary craft, a settlement of the Yap question, and the conflicting questions of the North Equator and the mandated islands, an agreement to respect the sovereignty of China and her tariff; and there was a prospect of a settlement of the conflicting claims of China and Japan regarding Shantung.—A. and N.Z. Cable. A GENERAL SUMMARY PACIFIC PEOBLEMS. THE SHANTUNG QUESTION. CHINA’S TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS. (From the Special Representative op the Australian Press Association.) WASHINGTON, January 16. (Received Jan. 17, ht 8.30 p.m.) After .the call to the Naval Committee was issued last night the plans were changed in favour of a meeting of the Far Eastern Committee. There has been much speculation regarding the reason for the change, which is stimulated by advices from Japan to the ©fleet that the metropolitan press there is keenly opposing the agreement in regard to not fortifying the Bonin Islands, which are held to be part of the Japanese mainland far more than Hawaii is a part of the United States. Japanese quarters hear that the matter is being made the subject of home politics, and that opposition is growing against the action of the delegation in acceding too far to the -wishes of the United States and Great Britain on the question of fortifications, especially on the question of the exemption of the South Pacific below the Equator. There is no further light showing on the Naval Treaty except that the American spokesman indicated that Notes are still being exchanged between the Governments. He explained that the resumption of the meeting of the Far Eastern Committee was due to a desire to make the most progress possible without interfering with the Shantung conversations. The Customs resolutions open the door to a question which has occupied some attention. The Twenty-one Demands have not been touched except to decide not to refer to them until the Shantung matter has been settled, because much of the former relates to the latter. Mr Hughes, in regard to “ the' Open Door,” enunciated the attitude of the United States, amplifying Mr W. H. Hays’s definition to the effect that the United States Government would never associate itself with any arrangement seeking to establish special rights and privileges in China which wonld abridge the rights of subiects or citizens of other friendly States. It was the purpose of the Government neither to participate nor a-couicsce in any such arrangements. In respect to economic and commercial matters, it is believed that much diplomacy will be required to bring the Chinese delegation to assent to a postponement of the consideration of the Twenty-one Demands, which they hoped to discuss while the Shantung matters were still in abeyance, thus playing one against the other. The new development means a probable speeding up of the Shantung question. It is rumoured that the Japanese reply to the Chinese presentment of the Twentyone Demands will be that if any nation considers that operation of the demands in-

fringes its rights Japan -will discuss the question -with that nation. This will be in line with the protest of the United States which was sent to Japan and China simultaneously when the demands were first agreed to, and will make it difficult to do anything in Manchuria, where Japan does not want to bo disturbed. While the Bar Eastern Committee was considering the Chinese tariff Senator King introduced a motion in the Senate declaring that any attempt to dictate to China her Customs duties and interior levies would be a contravention of the settled policy of the United States, and there was no warrant for interference in the sovereign rights of the Chinese Government. Senator King is a supporter of the. League of Nations and a close political friend of Dr Wilson, who is evincing a renewed championing of the_ league. These circumstances give his action some significance.—A. and N.Z. Cable. THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS. STORY OF THE TREATY. The “Twenty-one Demands,” which have frequently been mentioned during the Wasnington Conference, were the foundation of a treaty concluded between Japan and China in May, 1915. The event, which attracted little attention at the time, was of the utmost importance in the Far East, representing- a notable triumph for Japan, “Certain it is,” remarks the American Tear Book, “that the treaty negotiations could not have received the full attention of the chancellories of Europe, and that a divided Europe gave Japan a clear field. The farreaching significance of the treaty will be understood only when peace is restored; then the Powers will find that Japan has attained a position of paramountoy in Chinese affairs. The treaty is the natural result of Japan’s position in relation to the continent of Asia. It is the outcome of the geographical and economic forces that obtain m the relations between the two great countries.” Japan’s realisation that she was approaching the limit of her resources, and that she must sock room for her population and wealth for her financial needs elsewhere, all directed her 'policy towards the continent, which means China. 'The treaty,” says the same authority, “is a resume of Japan’s national policy. In it she seeks to correct by convention what geography and economic resources have denied her. Never was her policy given freer scope; never were greater results achieved. A victorious war could not have obtained greater concessions. The result is that Japan has committed herself to the working out of ‘spheres of influence’ in four sections of China—Shantung, South Manchuria, Eastern / Inner Mongolia, and Fukien. In addition, she is assured of invaluable concessions, political and economic, which easily place her in a position of predominance in China," The “Twenty-one Demands” were suddenly placed before China in January, 1916, the occasion being the conquest of the German colony at Kaio-Chow, in Shantung. The negotiations began on February 2, and, though China made a number of concessions, the conference was suspended' by the Japanese in April, and a new set of 24 “revised demands,” embodying the same subject matter, was submitted by them and pressed for immediate acceptance without modification,. These revised demands embodied the points conceded by _ the Chinese at the numerous preceding sittings. China’s reply resisted several of the Japanese claims, and on May 7, Japan delivered an ultimatum demanding by May 9. This document interpreted China’s counter proposals regarding Kiao-Chow aa demands that could not bo tolerated, characterised the statements of the Chinese nego-r tiations as ‘‘empty talk,” and the Chinese Government’s reply as vague and meaningless. One group of the demands, relating to Fukien, was detached for future discussion. China accepted the ultimatum next day. The Chinese Government issued a describing in detail the course of the negotiations and its own attitude as an attempt to maintain its plenary sovereignty, the treaty rights of foreign Powers in China, and the principle of equal opportunity. It also sought to show that China yielded to force majeure in the interests of peace and that she was impelled by a desire to avoid unnecessary suffering by the Chinese people. In accepting the ultimatum China was careful to say that she voluntarily took no part in the revision of existing treaties and conventions with other nations.