“LA BELLE FRANCE.”

Otago Daily Times, Issue 18323, 13 August 1921, Page 10

“LA BELLE FRANCE.”

HER SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS. PRESENT ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. OPTIMISTIC REVIEW BY PROFESSOR PRINGLE. “The Economic Outlook in France Today” was the subject of the lecture delivered by Professor W, Henderson Pringle at the University last night. It was the fourth of the series of six public lectures that Professor Pringle Ts delivering weekly on modern social movements. Again the audience wae large enough to fill the lower Oliver classroom, and its members followed the address with the keenest, interest. Professor Pringle began by recommending certain books on modem French social and political conditions. Two that should be read together were Mr J. E. C. Bodley’s book entitled “France” and Mr Robert Dell’s “My Second Country,” which put the emphasis somewhat differently. He commended also the writings of Miss BethamEdwards. Speaking of the general political development of Franco in the last 100 years, he said we took France as one of the great democracies of the world. Yet French democracy was essentially different from either British or American democracy. This could be understood only by going back in her history. Before 1789 Franco was centralised to a degree not experienced in any other European State. The Revolution brought many changes in the structure of politics and habits of thought of the people, but to this day her system of Government remained highly centralised. This could be seen in the exceedingly important position occupied by Paris in the government of every part of France. In England, on the other iiand, local government was often much more important than the central government. The English police force, for instance, was locally controlled. The control of Whitehall had been growing during the last 50 years, but any extension of its control was viewed with the gravest distrust by the local authorities. In France the president of the department was the prefect, not locally appointed, but appointed by the central government. The councils of the 47 departments could not act in many respects without the sanction of their president, who represented the central government.

The Trench conception of patriotism was sharply marked off from the British. In the first nlace it centred round the State, and in the second round the country The State counted for very little in the Englishmans conception of patriotism. In Trance to be an employee of the State conveyed a certain sense of distinction not enjoyed by other members of the community. A Frenchman felt a love for “La Belle France,'’ for the nation as occupying the soil of France. That was why they felt so bitterly the loss of Alsaceas though the body of the nation had been maimed. The English conception wae very different. The Scottish conception was different again, dwelling much on the individual locality. Tills centralisation of FrAlice had continued through all the differing phases of French life since 1759, during which time she had passed through no fewer than 14 revolutions. A marked feature of French politics to-day was the growth of the power of the executive of the Government. The French President had very different powers from those of the American President. Ho was an elected king after the British type. The real responsibility for the management of the State until recently rested with the Prime Minister. But M. Millerand a year ago insisted on taking much more control, particularly in foreign policy into his own hands. That gave a very lanre measure of the control of French political life to the head of the executive.

This centralisation of government was not greatly reflected in the economic life of France. In many respects France held the premier position in industry. So far as design and technical merit were concerned Paris enjoyed a position of superiority. But there was much less interchange between the different economic districts into which Franco was divided than between those of England, and that want of eonomic unity was another uart cf the heritage of France from the' past. France was then divided into great provinces, each of which had the right to levy duties on the others. In England there had been no interruption of the free passage of goods from one end of the country to the other.

.Franco Had gone through many changes during the nineteenth century. The system of her social life had been profoundly altered, but einceo 1871 France hud gone on wonderfully, without displaying groat economic enterprise and without £nng overwhelmed by events. Both (h.» Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars and the Franco-Prnssian war had profoundly influenced French life She had never recovered Irom the loss oi life during the \ Napoleonic wars. Before them her population was 24,000,000, and now it was only 56,000,000. There was a certain amount of vitality discernible in France. Tito Franco-Prussian war had perhaps a greater effect in modifying in some important particulars the economic and political life of the nation. Tlio great quality that had enabled Franco to survive so much was the thrittiness and steady persistence of purpose of her peasantry. The characteristic catchword in England during the last 150 years had been “lebcrty.” _ France it had been “equality.” French law leaned very much more to equality than did the English law. 'That meant a diffused sense of equality, and with it there went a certain shadiness of purpose. The French per-sai never know clelcat. Franco had not the developed economic and banking institutions that Britain enjoyed. Her banking system did not enable her wealtii to do so hignly concentrated and used at a particular point as British wealth could. Consequently her industries were not so concentrated She I had great technical skill and artistry, but not the mass production characteristic of lirilain, and especially of the United States. In England it was particularly easy for the wage earners to combine, but in France they were not only under legal disabilities that lasted right down to 1885, but their combinations had not been so permanent as the British. After a particular grievance had been remedied the trade union dwindled away. The French workman was swayed by some ideal he could immediately realise, but he had not the solidarity or willingness to submit to the discipline of his class characteristic of the trades unionist of England. The different history of trades unions in Franco was the result of the entirely different social history behind them. Speaking of matters more closely affecting France at the present time, he said that at. the outbreak of the war neither her B” ‘?al nor the economic system was in a ly condition. In French politics the parly system as we knew it did not exist.

Every crisis through which France had passed had left its deposit, as it were, oa uio party system, 'me French Chamber had reflected in a separate party practically every political change through which France had passed. Now the situation was further complicated by the economic factor. The difference in tne parties in the two countries was symbolised by the different arrange-, ment of the two Houses. Every party group in Franco embodied a certain phase of past political life, except those which had been formed -as a result of recent economic movements. A government 'in France was always formed by a coalition of different groups. Hence the fall of a ministry did not necessarily mean the fall of all its ministers. This tended towards continuity, though possibly in fact there had been greater continuity in politics in Britain than in France. The war had effected French- politics .and. life. Franca hod not the economic moans of conducting war that Britain had. Before the outbreak of the war the balance of .trade against France was only some £50,000,000. France had been investing very largely in Europe. ' She hod eight or nine hundred million pounds in Russia and twp thousand million* represented the holdings of French capitalists in foreign countries. France had bod to rely on vast importations and had to make enormous borrowing with the tesuit that the balance of imports over export* in 1919 was £840,000,000. Since 1915 she had imported £3,300,000,000 more than she had exported. These enormous imports had in part 'been paid for by the sale -of French securities. She had practically parted with all her foreign securities. Her holdings in Russia had practically disappeared. At the present time France owed an enormous debt to Great Britaain and to the United States, and she had to meet this in spite of the fact that she had parted with most of her capital abroad, and that not for three or four years yet would Northern France be as productive as it was before the war. Her public indebtedness of £10.000,000,000 was 40 per cent, more than the indebtedness even era Great Britain. They would find in those bore facts an explanation of—he did not say an excuse for—the present obscure and somewhat timid policy of French statesmen. She did not quite know what she had gained by what she had come through, except that she was the first military Power on the Continent. The French people during the last two years had been working hard to make good as for as they could the losses of the war. They were determined to produce and to save os much as possible. The fundamental question in France was not economic, but political. She was still afraid of Germany, Her population was stationary. She was afraid that soon the contest would-have to be renewed. Her political policy 'was to make Germany as weak as possible by encircling her by a number of Powers. This was not a policy that Britain could possibly support. It would leave Germany impotent to pay her debts or to organise her life. Germany must be recognised as a permanent factor in Europe. France was too great a country to be greatly affected in the long run by the mistakes of her politicians, and the habitual outlook of her people would prevent! her from taking an irreparable step. They had not the same sense as we had oi the necessity of living together in an orfanised community, but the future of 'ranee was assured. Without any formal alliance —which he could not help thinking would be disastrous to both countries— Great Britain could not allow Europe to lose so valued and cultured a nation, which had contributed so much to- human thought and the advance of common civilisation.

At the close of his lecture the professor, who was cordially applauded, remarked that he was not going to enter into a newspaper controversy over these lectures. “ I have* neither the time nor the energy nor the inclination for it, but,” he added. “ I am quite prepared to stay here till a quarter to 10 answering questions.” In answering questions for three-quarters of an ho'ir. Professor Pringle said that in many important particulars the British Foreign' Office required reorganisation to meet the needs of the new era. The official ambassadorial class was not a class that should control foreign policy. The duty of the expert was to advise and not to control, and that applied to other walk# of life. He agreed that the land system of the United Kingdom was far from perfect, and that we had much to learn from Franco in this matter. The average French neasmt worked too hard and had none of the social enjoyments and amenities. There was no doubt that before 1914 France had carried the idea of protection to inordinate lengths, and that was .the cause of some of her troubles. He was optimistic about France because of her enormous recuperative power and because he believed that the realities of the situation must sooner or later come home to the people. France had ■ more ooal than she could use at the present tune.