NOTES ON THE WAR CABLES.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 17426, 21 September 1918, Page 8

NOTES ON THE WAR CABLES.

By Shkapnel. KNOCKING AGAINST HINDENBTJRG'S WALLS. Bitter fighting is taking place in front of the Hindenburg line, which runs from the west of St. Quentin northwards along tho ridgo running parallel to the St. QuentinCanibrai Canal to Gonnelieu, and thenco northward through Havrincourt to Queant, where it has been pierccd by the as far north as tho Scarpe. The battle which is now raging extends from Moeuvres, where tho Germans are attacking, to a point south of St. Quentin, where tho French are making laboured progress against the southern end of the so-called Siegfried line, which is simply a scctor of the Hindenburg lino extending from about tho east of Epehy to the Oiso, south of St. Quentin. These heroically-named German lines surmount the crest of .a ridge, tho spurs of which run down to tho St. Quentin Canal, and the purpose of the British attack is to surmount that ridgo, which is the first line of the Hindenburg system of defences. In the attacks made by Marshal Slir Douglas Haig's troops good progress has been mado under very trying circumstances. Both the positions and the weather have militated against the advance of tho British. The Germans aro on the ridge, which is 150 metres liigh, and on the average from 20 to 30 metres higher than the ground from which the British are attacking; and to make matters worse, the ground in most places dips between the British high ground and tho German higher ground. Over the rain-sodden surface of the sticky, chalky ground tho going for the British must have been exasperatingly slow; but in spite of these adverse conditions the British in places have maDaged to reach the outpost defences of the Hindenburg line. Between Havrincourt and St. Quentin they have captured about a dozen villages, and at Villers-Guslain they have probably surmounted a portion of the ridge, which as an accomplishment should be counted a pronounced success, because it will ease the position—a difficult one —between Gouzeaucourt and Gonnelieu, and will also aid the advance eastward of Epehy. At Hargicourt and Villoret the British can look down upon the canal and command a view of Le Gatelet, tho German base across the canal. Pontru and Fresnoy are useful captures, but the Britiah have still to take Pontruet and Grioourt before they can entrench themselves on the crest of the ridge overlooking the depression along which the St. Quentin Canal runs to Cambrai. In the north, to the south-west of Cambrai, the British require to capture Gonnelieu, Le Vacquerie, Marooing, and (opposite Le Catelet) Boiry before they will be able to command generally the view of the German positions across the canal. It is evidently their. intention to do so, and the Germans, being aware of it, have, massed guns on the east side of the canal. They are using long-range high-velocity guns and shells to destroy the British temporary defences and harass the reserves and communications immediately behind the attacking line. In massing so many guns of all calibres behind their lines the Germans have betrayed their anxiety to hold the Hindenburg line, and their intention to hold Cambrai and St. Quentin, if possible, for winter quarters. Such an intention is indicative of tho one-eyed strategy of the German High Command, and to 1 a certain extent its lack of knowledge of the strength of the Allies. It also shows that it underrates the intelligence of Marshal Foch and his staff. The Generalissimo of the Allies must be highly satisfied with the tactics and strategy of the Germans, because not only by their defence and their counter-attacks are they greatly weakening themselves, but the longer they stay where they are in : Picardy and the Artois the more time will > Focli have to prepare and concentrate for a heavy stroke to take the German main forces in the rear. Foch has the power | of initiative, and all the line between | Rheims and the Voges to deliver a telling ; counter blow against the Hindenburg line , and to shatter it from Rheims to the sea. He is surely biding his time and exploitL ing the enemy's .masses for that blow. A GREAT BULGAR DEFEAT. Since the capture of Monastir, and after | a very long period of marking time at t Salonika and in Macedonia, the Allies have > launched an offensive with Franco-Serbian i ' divisions, and are apparently making up as i much as possible for lost time. They have broken the Bulgar line and signally de- ' feated the Bulgarian forces in Macedonian ; Serbia. The Serbian cavalry is through the enemy, and in places behind his forces. , Twenty thousand prisoners have been gaiht ered, as well as much material and many ; guns. In fact, so much booty has been captured that there has not been time to enumerate it and appraise its value. The advance north-east, of Monastir has been ) carried forward 20 miles, and the Bulgarians > are still in full flight. The Serbians aro ' approaching the important position of Prilep, I and have reached the edge of the Cerna r Plain, which stretches away to the Vardar. There appears to be a good chance of the [ Allies reaching Prilep and taking it, the | enemy being too much demoralised and too greatly hustled by the active and avengi ing Serbians to hold it. In all probability 5 the Bulgarians will fall back to tho Babuna [ Defile, about seven miles north of Prilep, - and will endeavour, with Austro-German asJ sistance, to make a stand there. j. Their defeat, however, has been bo de- , cisive, and the retreat so disorganised on a, ! wide front, that they may have given away' ) defensive positions to the eastward of i Prilep, and, if so, the Allies will be able to i outflank the positions along the Babuna ' Defile. If the Allies, who are now being ' assisted by a Greek division, outflank that ~ pass or get through it by the rapidity with ' which they are moving forward, they will j turn the whole line of the Vardar, from !, Veles (Kupruli) to Ghevgeli, and throw > open the Vardar railway, up which the l British will advance. ', No doubt also the advance of the Allies • will have an effect upon the Austrian posi--3 tions in Albania, but there is a high range of mountains which protects to a certain extent the Austrian left. Still, the advance of the Allies, if it reaches beyond ? Prilep, will undoubtedly tend towards throwing the Austrian left flank into the air, r owing to the Austrian front being lengthened and weakened correspondingly by T depth of the salient which the Allies have jl driven into the Bulgar occupied territory, e It certainly seems as if the exploitation of e the defeat of the enemy is far from finn ished.