NOTES ON THE WAR CABLES.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 17328, 30 May 1918, Page 5

NOTES ON THE WAR CABLES.

Bx Shrapnel, the champagne attack. In tneir imua on tno Aiano between Berry-au-iiac aim Vailiy, near bo,spoils, tliu Germans have attacked wiiero tneir artillery mm nut piwiuu.siy maue any great aisi'lay. Beiiiim their lines lacing Luc l<'ren.j!i, oil tho piatoaux nortu ol tnu Aisno, tlio German communications aro good and are well screened lroni observation uy tho rough arid wooded ground liuar La. l< ere. As 110 reierenco has be-jn made to any movements or coiiGuiiM'aUoiLs by tno enemy north of the Aisno and too part attacked, it may be concluded tliat t/ie Germans ably concealed their preparations and that thoy have effected another surprise by striking hard where tho blow was least expected. It seems exceedingly strange that the stroke was not anticipated, and if, as has been stated, the Allied lines wero thinly held, than their Intelligence Department would seem to have been seriously at fault or else tho Allied General Stall' failed to apprea oiato German generalship at its true value, e as the Germans must have been looking for a weakness, and it is certain that, if they found 0110 hearing tactically upon the general positions and strength o"f their opponents, they would strike suddenly and heavily. In nialiing a bid for victory in tho west the Gorman strategists see more than ono opportunity, any of which, seized in tho great phases of the offensive, is valuable. -Moreover, if one of these openings produces a success or even a partial failure, the 3 result is still of importance in the relation it has to the rest of the programme. The - hrst attempt was to drive a wedge between tho British and French. If that had boon > completely successful the Germans would then have had the choice of attempts to destroy the British, capture tlio Channel ports between Nieuport and the mouth of the Sonime, and then favourably renew the submarino campaign, or to hold tho Rritish and turn upon the French and Paris. To separate the Allies would ba an achievement which would paralyse them for a considerable time. As it is impossible to defeat i tho British without a naval victory, and as jffie continuance of operations against tho |r ntish with their backs to the sea would . ,nvolvc T °ry great losses without the attainment of finality to tho war, logical German reasoning made it plain that the main effect should be directed towards destroying tho weaker vessel—that is, the French." Of course, the assumption on the part of tho German military and political strategists would be that the French would be com.'_'d by loss of men and territory to surrender, and that Briton would thereupon consider the advisability of giving up a strugglo whioh would become a much heavier burden than in the past. What the Germans fail to perceive is that, whatever should happen to France, the determination of America and Britain to persevero with the strugglo would be strengthened. Still, the Germans would be right from their point of view in believing that tho stupendous nature of the struggle its duration, and the vast sacrifices m blood and treasuro made, and still to be mac.e, would bring about such a desire for peace in Britain as to lead to a cessation of lighting for France, and oven to the surrender of Belgium to Germany. Tho Germans would also ai'guo that the defeat of the I'rench would render it impossible for Italy to continue in the war, as the struggle on her part would be like trying to chop wood without room to swing the axe. i'or these reason it may not be far wrong to interpret the dreams of Germany in the sense that in her choice of the alternatives, either of attempting to destroy the British or attempting to destroy the French, she has chosen the latter. If the French armies could be quickly put out of action, the American armies would be left without a point d appui from which to launch assaults upon the German forces unless the British increased their hold in Belgium and Northern France. But the great point is: Would the Germans, after their efforts, be strong enough to contain the British, and, with the numbers of Americans and British there are now in France, is it not now too late for them to do so? Trap, the Amencan forces are not yet an effective fighting unit of sufficient size to weigh greatly during these earlier phases of the offensive, but their nghting weakness in the end will be discounted correspondingly as tho German forces become exhausted numerically from tho exertions that are demanded of them The conclusion is, then, that the policy of exhaustion upon which the Allies have decided is the right policy, and that though it is disappointing that the Allies should have to yield ground which it has cost them so much to gain, there is no cause for alarm as long as great bodies of their armies are not enveloped, and as long as these armies remain in touch one with the other. J. his holds good even though Rheims and Soissons may bo lost, and the Frcnch driven out of the angle between the Oise and the Aisno, which is one of tho obje«ts which tho Germans now have in view. The Germans may have Rheims and Soissons and the territory mentioned, provided the Allies exact the maximum losses upon thorn. It is with" M ° W . e - Ver ' whctllcr > m connection with the achievement of General Von "a'" 1 '" T Cr , own Prince of tho Aisne the Allies have made the Germans pay tho price of recovery tliat tho French paid to gain the territory since the Germans settled along the Aisne. If the Allies have not done so, they are pa vine tho penalty of having allowed themselves to be surprised Sectional losses of ground on the great sectors arc not vital. THE OFFENSIVE OR A DIVERSION? Differences of opinion exist as to whether tlio attack on the Aisne is the offensive or a diversion. M. Marcel Hutin, tho Paris critic, says tho G.trmans are now making their supremo effort, and that, as tho Allied lrne was thinly held, retreat was inevitable M. Ciemencoau. the French Premier, is reported to have said that this battle is only a The battle will be exactly what the advantages the Germans gain will enable thorn to make it. It threatens Paris and the communications of the Champagne and tho Mouse, and if the Germans are not ohi.eked they will open out the battle to ono of major importance. If it is a n operation to strengthen their flanks for the continuation of tho first efforts of the offensive begun in March, then one of the purposes, and perhaps the main purpose is to turn tho position of the French on the high ground west of Soissons and the Ailetto between the Oise and the \isne Compiegno would then be the objective, and with tliat point in their possession, the Germans would be in a position to advance down the valley of tho Ourcq towards Paris or to advanco between Montdidier and laris. By clearing the French from tho forest of IVAigle aaid from Compiegno the Germans would be able to bring forward their long range guns, and bombard Paris and thus produce, as they hope, a depressing effect upon the French peonle. What ever the offensive turns out to "be, the attack upon tho Aisne was meant to bo a considerable beginning. What it will be will depend upon General Foch and tho ri-pidity with which either side moves tho neccssary reserves. THE DICKEBUSCH DIVERSION. A fairly heavy portion of the general offensive planned by the Germans has been exerted south of Ypros. Dickebusch is a small village, west of Voormezeele and north of Kemmel, and its distance southa of * pres is a little over two miles A small stream and lake separate it from Voorin.zeeJo. Jiuwecn the lake and Voormezeele is a considerable wood, for which there was some bitter fighting when Voormezeele and Kemmel wero captured in the hrst phases of tile offensive. Finally the Germans reached tho lako through the wood and crossed the stream which runs northward. German artillery on tho heights south of Voormezeele and at Rommel command the positions in the valley and it is with tho help of their artillery that the Germans are striving to tike L>ickebusch. Four divisions, equal to 52 000 I men, were sent forward to take the ploco a part of them operating between Kommei and Voormezeele and a part of them be tween Kemmel and Locre, tho objcct being to soizo Dickebusch and, by cutting the road and ra-1 to Ypres. compel tho British to evacuate that historic road and rail nucleus Thercift-r. the Germans' ph n must be to advanco upon PoperinHie another nodal point for tho defence 0 f the Ysor Canal and remnant of Flanders left to the Bolgians. In this attempt the I

Geimans wore heavily defeated, and as a onrmV- 10 po,l fy of exhausting the 1 ill| f . *' \" l r f S ? rV ?, S ! s ' defeat is a I tic helpful lhe position at Ypres is capture O f that spot, which . -= ured E ? Z'mily in the war, though t is now unimportant strategically would « »»w, fcw-w hy ii, c itJ'JZg p.'' , Jr ' d WOuld rillst! the morale of tho Ynvl aln °r gst whora thc of Yp.es is ti nightmare. Tho attack is also tho mfth" ° th ° B " tisl1 rcsem:s in