OFFICIAL WEEKLY SUMMARY

Otago Daily Times, Issue 17327, 29 May 1918, Page 5

OFFICIAL WEEKLY SUMMARY

FOUR OUTSTANDING FEATURES. ! ACQUISITION OF AMERICAN j STRENGTH, j VALUE OF AVIATORS' WORK. (Pμ Ukitjcd P*m« Association.) WELLINGTON, May 28. Tho following lias beea received by the Governor-general from the Secretary of State for tho Colonies, covering the operations for the week onded May 23:— There are four pointe of special interest in connection with the week's operations on the western front: First, J;he continuous and remarkable success of the Australians in the angle between the Rivers Somme and Ancre; secondly, the very brilliant little operation by -which the French rectified and advanced their line between Schcrpenberg and Kemmel Hills (south-west of Ypres), so as to give themselves the full benefit of several minor actions on that sector which they had successfully carried out during the last few weeks; third, the very marked ascendancy in the air which the Allies have established over the enemy; and, fourth, the almost complete lack of enemy initiative, their few undertakings being confined to local counter-attacks, all of which were unsuccessful. While there may be considerable connection between the two latter points, the general impression produced is that the enemy are GATHERING THEMSELVES TOGETHER for a renewal of their offensive on a grand scale. It is now seven weeks 6ince the Somme offensive came to a standstill and four weeks since that , of Lys—or for the latter five weeks, if the taking of Kemmel Hill is regarded as a separate operation. This i 6 possibly time enough for the enemy to restore their men and ammunition • dumps to a sufficient standard ; but it is very doubtful if they can have satisfactorily established the necessary transport arrangements. It is probable that the Royal Air Force contributed to the delay of the enemy in this matter. »The Americans are steadily arriving, and Mr Baker has announced that half a million men are already in France, and the rate will be increased. But the enemy know that there must of necessity be an interval before the troops now arriving from America can be ~--nt in the firing line —a consideration -which does not apply to tho trained men which they themselves are constantly transporting from the eastern front. They may therefore conclude that the present superiority is jn immediate danger of being disturbed; and, besides, since the next attack may be their last, they will not launch it until they are absolutely ready. If, however, the enemy should open an attack in the immediate future, it will be at a disadvantage of too hastily-made preparations, and under the force of other than purely military considerations. As regards the prospects of the campaign, it has already been frequently pointed out that they are entirely A QUESTION OF RESERVES. Reserves may include not merely manpower, but also time and space, for every week's delay brings to the Allies an acquisition of American strength, vrhil*. every yard of ground exchanged for enemy casualties may also be put to the credit cf reserves. Apart from American aid, the manpower situation is more 'n the Allies' favour than when the German offensive began on March 21. This is due to two causes. At that time the enemy were able to concentrate a numerically greatly superior force opposite the British front, thereby leaving parts of the French front comparatively lightly held. This could be countered either by the French attacking at some such part of their own front, or by the French army correspondingly concentrating divisions to form a general reserve. For a number of reasons the latter course was adopted, but, since the initiative was with the enemy and they on the interior lines, the French could not move nor commit an equal number of divisions to those moved by the Germans. On this next occasion the Allies will have to make the same choice in the matter, but with the added advantage of unity of command. Secondly, the enemy losees in the first part of the campaign have been greater than those of the Allies. The casualties they have incurred in fighting very nearly equal their reserves in the depots. Thus, on now replacing casualties from the depots, they will have A VERY SMALL .RESERVE LEFT. On the other hand, the Allies' reserve is at least equal to that of the enemy, and the Allies' tactics on defence are such as to reduce our own losses to a minimum, while inflicting the maximum on the enemy. Then, again, time is -with tho Allies. The Air Ministry reports • Improved weather conditions on the western front in the past week led to greater activity by the aircraft,, an exceptional amount of work being accomplished. Approximately 186 tons of bombs were dropped in the battle zone and in the neighbourhood of Bruges, Zeebrugge, and Ostend, nearly 137,C00 rounds of email-arm ammunition were fired, with excellent results, at different ground targets, while over 15,000 photographs were taken. The air fighting generally was severe, and hostile scouts made PERSISTENT BUT UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS to deny our bombers and reconnaissance machines access to their objectives, or, failing this, to interecpt them when returning. The most notable results of these, tactics has been a heavy increase in the German casualty list, 148 enemy aircraft being brought down in air fighting or by other means, and 39 driven do#n out of control. Fifty-four of our machines failed to return during the week, which is a relatively small figure when considered in tho light of the number of hours flown, and the amount of bombing, photographic, and reconnaissance work accomplished. The enemy naval basee on the Belgian coast, Zeebrugge and Ostend, and the important centre of Bruges, with the interconnecting canal system, were again subjected to incessant air attacks, hits being secured on the quays, docks, and enemy chipping. Reports received state that most' important material damage was caused. The weather allowed the resumption of long-distance operations into Germany. The Royal Air Force took full advantage of the, improved conditions, and raids were carried out into Germany on. five days out of the seven. Important railway communications at Diedenhofen and Thionville were bombed on three occasions, while the station and sidinge at Metz were twice attacked. Raids- were also carried out against important military objectives at Saarbrucken, Cologne, and' Landau (northwest of Karlsruhe), good bursts being observed in the course of these raids, and a number of fires and explosions being caused. All the evidence continues to point to THE DEMORALISING EFFECT of the frequent penetration of the German frontiers, particularly in the Rhine valley, where lively dissatisfaction is being ex' pressed with the German authorities owing to the failure of their anti-aircraft measures. Our activities thie week brought home once again to the enemy in German territory the fact that only during periods of unfavourable weather can they hope to en-oy immunity from attack.