THE LICHNOWSKY MEMOIRS

Otago Daily Times, Issue 17323, 24 May 1918, Page 6

THE LICHNOWSKY MEMOIRS

1 I A DISCLOSURE OF GERMAN DUPLICITY. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR. Karl Max Prince Lichuowsky is a nicm- . ! K ' r r] of 'i family which holds estates both in German and Austrian Silesia, and has uu hereditary seat in the Upper liouso of tile •„ lrussian Diet- 'Iho father of the present prmco, and Ins predecessor in the title, w;ls a Prussian cavalry general who, at the end of his life, sat for some years in the Reichstag as a member of the free Conservative Party. The present prince, after serving in > the I'nis.iian army, in which ho holds t.ho rank of iiwijar, entered the diplomatic service. He was in 1885 for u short time attached to the German Embassy in London, and afterwards became Councillor of the Embassy hi Vienna. From 1899 to 1904 he was employed in the German Foreign Office ' and received the rank and title of Minister i Jempotentiary. In ISO - he retired to his Silosian estates, and lived for eight years the life of a country gentleman, but read industriously, and published occasional political articles. : lie himself recounts the circumstances in which he was appointed Ambassador in London on the death of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein. Baron Marschall, who had been Secret tary for Foreign Affairs under the chancelt lorships of Count Caprivi, and for a time 5 under Prince Hohenlohe, had achieved great ; success as Ambassador at Constantinople, 5 and also, from the German point- of v.iew, j as chief Gorman plenipotentiary at tho 3 second Hague Conference in 1907. Baron f Marschall was, to nso an exprtissioti of 3 , Bismarck s, " tho best horse in Gc-rmanv's ; diplomatic stable," and great th.ngs were f expected of him in London. But he lived 5 only a few months after his appointment, i' Prince Lichnowslcy's high social rank, his f agreeable manners, and tho generous hos- :! pitality which ho showed in London, gave 1 , "?. a P os 'tion in English society which J facilitated the negotiations between England and Germany, and did much to diminish the friction that had arisen during e the time that Prince Bulow held the post 1 of German Chancellor. :1 An .account of his London mission was i. written in August, 1916, not intended for ; publication, but for distribution confii. dentiallv to a few friends. The existence .f of it had long been known, but it was only in March of this year that for the _ first time extracts from it were published n in the Swedish paper Politikfen. Longer e extracts have since appeared in the Lone don press. A complete translation, made from the German original, has boon re- - ccived in Australia, through Router's >. Agency, from tho Ministry of Information, London. It covers several columns of type, r We extract from it the following, which t bears more particularly upon the period immediately prior to the outbreak of* war: The King, although not a genius, is a simple and well-meaning man, with sound gommon sense.; he demonstrated his good will toward me, and was frankly desirous of furthering my task. Although the British Constitution leaves only very limited powers to the Crown, yet the monarch, in virtue |j of his position, can exercise a considerable a influence on opinion, both in society and ; in the Government. a Wo were received in London with open :r arms, and both parties rivalled one another e n courtesy toward us. In view of tho ,f close relationship between politics and j society in England, it would be wrong to r . undervalue social relations, even when the g majority of the Upper Ton Thousand are is ' n opposition to tho Government, i, Hence the social adaptability of a re■o preventative nowhere plays a greater role j. than in England. A hospitable house, with ;3 pleasant hosts, is worth more than the 3 . most- profound scientific knowledge; a LV savant with provincial manners and small means would gain no influence, in spite of all his learning. Tho Briton loathes a bore, a schemer, and a prig; he likes a good fellow. SIR EDWARD GREY. Sir Edward Grey's influence in all matters of foreign policy was almost unlimited. Oil important occasions he used, indeed, to say, "I must first bring it before the Cabinet"; but this always agreed to his views. His authority was undisputed. lie 1- was returned to Parliament as a young man, and soon began to interest himself 1. in foreign affairs. Under Lord Rosebery 1, ho was Under-secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and became Secretary of State in :s 1906 under Mr 11. Campbell-Bannerman; ho has now held the post for some 10 years. The scion of an old North Country family whieh had already furnished Grey, the well-known statesman, he joined the " s Left \\ ing of his party and sympathised with socialists and pacifists. You may call 1, him_ a socialist in the ideal sense, as he carries the theory into his private life, and lives very simply and unpretentiously, although he has extensive means. The simplicity and honesty of his ways secured him the esteem even of his oppo)s. nents, who were to be found rather in the sphere of home affair 3 than of foreigni, policy. Lies and intrigue are equally repugnant to hitn. MR ASQUITH. Mr Asquith is a man of an entirely different stamp. A jovial bon vivant, fond of the ladies, especially the young and -g pretty ones. He is partial to cheerful society and good cookings Formerly a well-known barrister -with a large income, and for a number of years in Parliament, 3 S then a Minister under Mr Gladstone, a pacifist, like his friend Grey, and favouring ,1 an understanding with Germany, he treated all questions with the cheery calm and ass. surance of an experienced man of business. His daughters were at school in Germany, s and spoke German fluently. Only on rare occasions did he concern s himself with foreign politics when imrg portant questions arose; then, of course, his decision was final. During the critical days of July Mrs Asquith repeatedly came to us to warn us, and in the end sho was quite distraught at the tragic turn of events. Mr Asquith, also, when I called on him on August 2 to make a last effort in tho direction of expectant neutrality, was quite broken, though absolutely calm. Tears were coursing down his cheeks. . ATTITUDE OF THE GERMAN 10 FOREIGN OFFICE, v- Nothing can describe the rage of certain ss gentlemen at my London successes, and it the position which I had managed to make is for myself in a short time. They devised e, vexatious instructions to render my office ie more difficult. I was left in complete t, ignorance of the most important matters, in and was confined to tho handling of dull in and unimportant reports. Secrct agents' et reports on matters about which I could is not learn without espionage and the ncecssn. sary funds were never available to mo, at and it was not till the last days of July, »d 1914, that I learnt quite by chance from »e the Naval Attache of the secret Angloto French agreement concerning the "coll- operation of the two fleets in case of war. Hie knowledge of other important events P t which had been known to the oflice for a si- long time, like the correspondence between re Grey and Cambon, was kept from me. IN CASE OF WAR. Ie 800,1 . ™y arrival I obtained the id conviction that, under no circumstances kJ had we to fear a Brit.sh attack or British , r . support for any foreign attack, but that under any circumstances England would proj Wet the French. I expressed this view :n trepeated despatches, with minute proof and great emphasis, but did not obtain any credence, although Lord Haldane's refusal to assent to the neutrality formula and England's attitude during the Morocco crisis had been pretty obvious indications In addition, there were tho secret agreements which I have referred to, and which were known to tho office. I always pointed out that in the event of a war between European Powers, England, as a commercial State, would suffer enormously, and would therefore do her ty best to prevent a conflict; but on the other m hand, she would never tolerate a weakenof ing or annihilation of France, because of al the necessity «f maintaining the European 10 balance of power, and of preventing a Ger--3e man superiority of force. Lord Haldane of had tola ine this shortly after my arrival. Iv and all the leading people had expressed □f tuemselvcs in tho same sonso. 'S THE SERBIAN CRISIS. At the end of June I wont to Kiel Lv , command .of tho Emperor. A few weeks ■> prior to tins I had been made an honorary D.C.L. of Oxford, an honour which had not been conferred 011 any German Ambas- " sador since Herr von Bunsen. On board .the Meteor wo learned of the death of the ' Archduke. The Emperor regretted thatlins , efforts to win him over to his way of thinking had thus been rendered vain. I do not. know whether tho plan of an active policy against Serbia had already been ded cided on at the lvonopischt. j s As I was not instructed about views and events in Vienna, I did not attach very great importance to this occurrence. Later 0 on I could only remark that among Ausd trian aristocrats a feeling of relief oing 'weighed other sentiments. On board the >f Meteor there was also an Austrian guest of tho Emperor, Count Felix Thun.

bad romained in his cabin all tho tamo, r suffering from sea-sickness, in spite of tho r splendid weather, but on receiving tho news 1 lie recovered. The fright or the joy had ■■ surod him. C On my arrival in Berlin I saw the Chan- v jellor, and told him that I considered tho t stato of our foreign relations very satisfac- I lory, as we were on better terms with Eng- I land than wo had been for a long time, c while in France also the Government was i in the hands of a pacifist Ministry I Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg did not ap- v pear to share my optimism, and complained t iibout Russian armaments. I sought to ro- ' assure him, emphasising the fact that Rua f sia had 110 interest in attacking us, and that such an attack would never receiie Anglo-French support, as both countries f wanted peace. Thereupon I went to Dr '! Zimincrmann, who was acting for Ilerr von ( Jajjow, and he told me tiiat Russia w;ls a About to daise 900,000 additional troops. ' His language betrayed unmistakable an- * noyanco with Russia, which was "every- r where in our way." There were also dilii- } culties in economic policy. Of course, I 1 was not told that General von Moltke was pressing for war. but I learned that Herr ! von Isehirachky had been reprimanded be- i cause he reported that 110 hud counselled moderation toward Seriba in Vienna. }; un my return from Silesia to London I f stopped only a few hours in Berlin, where • L heard that Austria intended to take steps ! against Serbia, in order to put an end to an unpossible situation. I regret that at tho moment I under- i estimated the importance of the news. I [ thought that nothing would come of it this ' tunc either, and that matters could easily c bo settled, even if Russia became threatening. 1 now regret that I did not stay in c .oerlin and at once declare that I would not co-operate in a policy of this kind. \ subsequently I aeoei-tained that at tho I decisive conference at Potsdam 011 Julv 5 1 the Vienna inquiry received the unqualified ' assent of all the leading people, and with 1 the rider that no harm would be done if a war with Russia should result. Thus it was expressed, at any rate, in the Austrian j protocol which Count Mensdorlf received in 1 London. Soon afterwards Herr von Jagow 1 was 111 \ ionna to consult Count Berchtold 1 about all these matters. i • th ! lfc t ' mc 1 received instructions to * induce the British press to adopt a friendly ■ attitude should Austria administer the coup ] de grace to the Great Serbia " movement, ( and to exert my personal influence to pre- | vent public opinion from becoming inimical . H'r?' rl j a ' • one remembered England's attitude during the annexation crisis, when ; public opinion showed sympathy for the , Serbian rights in Bosnia, as well as her ; benevolent furtherance of national movements in the days of Lord Byron and Garibaldi, the probability that she would ! support the intended punitive expedition I agamst the murderers of the prince appeared so remote that I found myself obliged to give an urgent warning. -But I also warned them against tho whole nlan, which I characterised as adventurous*and : dangerous, and advised them to counsel the 1 Austrians to moderation, as I did not betie\e that the conflict could be localised. ' Herr von Jagow replied to me that ' Russia was not ready; there would probably bo some fuss, but the more firmly we took sides with Austria the more would Russia give way. As it was, Austria was accusing us of weakness, and therefore we daro not leave her in the lurch. Public opinion in Russia, on the other hand, was becoming more and more anti-German, so ' we must just risk it. In view of this attitude, which, as I found later, was based on reports from Count Pourtales that Russia would not movo under any circumstances, and which caused us to spur Count.Berchtold on to the utmost energy, I hoped for salvation through British mediation, as I knew that Sir E. Grey's great influence in Petrograd could be used in the direction of peace. I therefore availed myself of my friendly relations with the Minister to request him in confidence to advise moderation in Russia in case Austria, as scorned likely, demanded satisfaction from Serbia. At first the English press preserved calm, and was friendly to Austria, because the murder was generally condemned. But gradually more and more voices were heard, insisting emphatically that, however much the crime merited punishment, its exploits tion for political purposes oould not bo justified. Austria was strongly exhorted to use moderation. When the ultimatum was published all the papers with the exception of the Standard were unanimous in condemnation. The whole world, excepting Berlin t nd Vienna, realised that it meant war —indeed, "the world war." The British fleet, which happened to have assembled for a naval review, was not demobilised. My efforts were in the first place directed toward obtaining as conciliatory a reply from Serbia as was possible, since the attitude of tho Russian Government- left room for no doubts about the gravity of the situation. Serbia responded favourably to the British efforts, as M. Pasitch had really agreed to everything excepting two points, iibout. which, however, he declared his willingness to negotiate. If Russia and England had wanted tho war in order to attack us, a hint to Belgrade 'would have boon enough, and the unprecedented Note would not have been answered. Sir E. Grey went through the Serbian reply with me, and pointed out the conciliatory attitude of 'the' Government of Belgrade. Thereupon we discussed his proposal of mediation, which was to include a formula acceptable to both parties for clearing up the two points. His proposal was that a committee, consisting of M. Cambon, the Marquis Imperiali, and myself, should assemble under his presidency, and it would have been an 'easy matter for us to find an acceptable formula for tho points at issue, which mainly" concerned the collaboration of Austrian Imperial officials at the investigations in Belgrade. Given goodwill, everything could have been settled at one or two sittings, and 'the mere acceptance of the British proposal would have brought about a relaxation of the tension, and would have further improved our relations with England. I therefore strongly backed the proposal, on the ground that otherwise there was danger of the world war, through wjiich we stood to gain nothing and to lose all; but in viin. It was derogatory to the dignity of Austria; we did not intend to interfere in Serbian matters; we left these to out ally. I was to work for "the localisation of the conflict." Needless to eay, a mere hint from Berlin would have decided Count Berchtold to content himself with a diplomatic success and to accept the Serbian reply. This hint was not given; on the contrary, they pressed on in the direction of war; ft would have been such a splendid success. After our refusal Sir Edward Grey requested us to submit a proposal. We insisted on war. I could not obtain any reply but that Austria had shown an exceedingly " accommodating spirit " by not demanding an extension of territory. Sir Edward Grey rightly pointed out that, even without an extension of territoryit is possible to reduce a State to a condition of vassalage, and that Russia would see a humiliation in this, and would not suffer it. The impression grow stronger and stronger that we wanted war under any circupst-ances. It was impossible to interpret our attitude on a question which did not directly concern us in any other way. The urgent requests and definite assurances of M. Sazonoff, followed by the Czar's positively humble telegrams, the repeated proposals of Sir E. Grey, the warnings of the Marquis San Giuliano and Signor Bollati, my urgent counsels—all were of no avail. Berlin persisted ; Serbia must be massacred. The more I pressed the less were they inclined to come round, were it only to deny mo tho success of averting war in conjunction with Sir Edward Grey. Finally, on tho 29th, the latter decided on the famous warning. I replied that 1 had invariably reported that we should have to reckon with English opposition if it. came to a war with France. Repeatedly tho Minister said to me: "If war breaks out it will be the greatest cata-strophe tho world has ever seen." After that events followed each other rapidly. When at last Count Berchtold, who up till then had, at the behest of Berlin, played the strong man. decided to come round, we replied to the Russian mobilisation, after Russia had negotiated, and waited for a whole week in vain, with tho ultimatum and tho declaration of war. THE ENGLISH DECLARATION OF WAR. Sir Edward Grey was still looking for new ways of avoiding tho catastrophe. Sir W. Tyrrell, his secretary, called 011 me on the morning of August 1 to tell me that his chief still honed to find a way out. Would we remain neutral if France did? I took this to mean hat we should then agree to spare Franci, but he had meant that wc should remain altogether neutral —toward Russia also. That was the wellknown "misunderstanding." Sir Edward had asked me to call in the afternoon. As he was at a meeting of the Cabinet, he called me up on the telephone, Sir W. Tyrrell having hurried to h'im at once. In tho afternoon, however, he talked only about Belgian neutrality, and the possibility that we and France might forcc one another into arms without attacking. Thus this was not a proposal at all, but a question without any liability as our interview, which I have mentioned before, was to take place soon afterwards. Berlin, hiiworer. without waiting for tho interview,

lade this report the foundation for fur- I caching measures. Then there came M. I 'oincare's lotter, Bonar Law's letter, King I Albert's telegram. The waverers in the I Cabinet — excepting three members I 'ho resigned — were converted. Till lio vory last moment I had hoped that England would adopt a waiting attitude, '•or did my French colleague feel at all onfident, as I heard from a private source. Jveu on August 1 tho King had given the 'resident .111 evasive reply. But England 'as already mentioned as an opponent in 110 telegram from Berlin announcing tho rnminent danger of war. Berlin was thereore already reckoning on war with Engmd. Before my departure Sir E. Grey recived mo on August 5 at his house. I tad been called at his request. He was leeply moved. Ho told mo he would lways be prepared to mediate. "We lon t. want, to crush Germany." Unforunately, this confidential interview was nade public, and Herr von Bethmann-Holl-peg thus destroyed tho la-st chanco of gainripr peace through England. The arrdneemcnts. for our departure were icrfectly dignified and quiet. The King lad previously sent his cquerrv, Sir E. onsonby, to express his regrets at my leparture and that he could not see me timself. Princess Louise wrote to me that ho whole family wore sorry wo were leavng, Mrs Aequith and other iriends came o the Embassy to take leave. A special train took us to Harwich, vhere a guard of honour was drawn up or mo. I was treated like a departing >overeign. Such was the end of my Lon--1011 mission. It was wrecked not by the >erfidy of the British, but by that of our iwn policy. Count Menßdorff and "his stiff had come o the station in London. He wa/s checrul. and gave me to understand that peri.'ips he would remain there, but he told he English that we and not Austria had '.anted the war. RETROSPECT. Looking baelt alter two years I come 0 tiio conclusion that i realised too late •hat there is 110 room lor me jp a system nat lor years luul lived un routine and .ldtiitions alone, and tuat only toieratcd xpicceiiuitivcs who reported what their •upenors wisiied to read. Absence of preuuice and ail independent judgment are .'usemcd. Lack ot ability anil want of iliaraeter are praised and esteemed, whiie successes meet with dislavour and excite liarm. i had given up my opposition to the nsonc Triple Alliance policy, as I realised .hat it was useless, and that my warnngs were attributed to "Austrophobia," to ny idle fix (idee fixe?). In politics, which ire neither acrobatics nor a game of red iape, but the main business of the firm, there is no ''phil" or "phobe," but only :ho intertst ot the community. A policy, liowever, that is based only on Austnans, Magyars, and 'lurks must come into conSict with Russia, and: finally lead to a :atastrophe.- ' In spite of former mistakes, all might still have been put right in July, 1914. An understanding with England had been reached. We ought to have sent a representative to Petrograd who was at least of average political capacity, and to have convinced Russia that wo wished neither to control the Straits nor to strangle Serbia. "Drop Austria add wo will drop the French," M. Sazonoff said to us. And M. Cambon told Herr von Jagow, "You need not follow Austria everywhere." We needed neither wars nor alliances; we needed only treaties that would safe guard us and others and secure our econo mic development, which was without its like in history. If Russia had been freed in the West she could again turn to the East, and the Anglo-Russian rivalry would have been re-established automatically, and without our intervention, and not less certainly also the Russo-Japanese. . Wo could also have considered the question of the reduction of armaments, and need no longer have troubled ourselves about Austrian complications. Then Austria would have become the vassal of the German Empire without anv alliance—and especially without our seeking her good graces, a proceeding ultimately leading to war for the liberation of Poland and the destruction of Serbia, although German interest demanded" tho exact contrary. I had to support in London a policy the heresy of which I recognised. * That brought down vengence on me, 'because it was a sin against tho Holy Ghost. MY RETURN. As soon as I arrived in Berlin I saw that 1 was to be made the scapegoat for the catastrophe for which our Government had made itself responsible against my advice and warnings. The report was deliberately circulated by official quarters that I had allowed myself to be deceived by Sir E. Grey, because r£ he had not wanted war Russia would not mobilise. Count Portales, whose reports could be relied on, was to be protected, not the least . on account of his relationship. He had conducted himself " magnificently"; he was praised enthusiastically, and I was blamed the more severely. " What does Serbia matter to Russia?" this statesman said to me after eight years in office at Petrograd. The whole thing was a British trick that I had not noticed. At the Foreign Office they told me that war would in any case have come in. 1916. Then_ Russia would have been ready; therefore it was better now. THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY. _ As is evident from all officdal publica?tions—and this is not refuted by our White Book, whieh, owing to the poverty of ite contents and to its omissions, is a gravely self-accusing document:— We encouraged Qount Berchtold to attack Serbia, although German interests were not involved, and the danger of a world war must have been known to us. Whether wo were aware of the wording of tho ultimatum is completely immaterial Daring the time between July " 23 and 30, 1914, when M. Sazonoff emphatically declared that he would not tolerate any attack on Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole of the ultimatum, and although an agreement about tho two points at issue could easily have been reached; and Count Berchtold was even prepared to content himself with the Serbian reply. On July 30 Count Berchtold wanted to come to terms. We sent an ultimatum to Petrograd merely because of the Russian mobilisation, although Austria had not been attacked; aad on July 31 we declared war on Russia, although tho Czar pledged his word that ho would not ordor a man to march as long as negotiations were proce . n.S —thus deliberately destroying the possibility of a peaceful settlement. . In view of the above undeniable facts it is no wonder that tho whole of the civilised world outside Gormanv places tho entire responsibility for the world- wa-r upon our shoulders. THE ENEMY POINT OF VIEW. Is it not intelligible that our enemies should declare that they will not rest before a system is destroyed which is a constant menace to our neighbours? Must they not otherwise fear that in a few years' time they will again %ve to take up arms" and again see their provinces overrun and their towns and villages destroyed? Have not thev they proved to be right who declared that the spirit of Trcitschike and Bernhanii governed the German people, that spirit which glorified war as such, and did not loathe it as an evil; that with us the feudal knight and junker, the warrior caste, still rule, and form ideals and values, not the civilian gentleman; that the love of the duel, which animates our academic youtli, still persists in those who control the d'estinies of tho people? Did not die Zabern incident and tne Parliamentary discussions about it clearly demonstrate to foreign countries the value we place on the rights and liberties of tho citizen if these collide with questions of military power ? BISMARCK. Bisniari-k, like Aapoleon, loved conflict for itself. As a statesman, ho avoided fresh wars, the folly of which he recognised, lie was content with bloodless battles. After he had, in rapid succession, vanquished Christian, l»*rancis Joseph, and Napoloon, it was the turn of Arnini, Pius, and Augusta. That did not suffice him. GortschaJcoff. who thought himself tho greater, ha<i repeatedly annoyed him. The conflict was carried almost to the point of war —even by depriving him of his railway saloon. This gave rise to the miserable Triple Alliance. At last came the conflict with William, in which the mighty one was vanquished, as Napoloon was vanquished by Alexander. . Political life and death unions only prosper if founded on a constitutional basis, and not on an international one. They are all the more questionable if the partner is feeble. Bismarck never meant the alliance to take this form. He always treated tho English with forbearance. I-Ie know that this was wiser lie always paid marked respect to tho old Queen Victoria, despite his hatred of her daughter and of political Anglomania; tho ' learned Beaconsfiold and tho worldlv-wiso Salisbury he courted ; and even that strange Gladstone, whom ho did not like, roallv had nothing to complain about. The. ultimatum to Serbia wa6 the culminating point of the policy of the Berlin Congress, the Bosnian crisis, tho Co'nfer-

ference of London; but there was yet tinM to turn back. We were completely successnil in achieving that which, above all other uiings, should have been avoided —the breach with Russia and England. OUR FUTURE. After two years' fighting it is obvious that we dare not hope for an unconditional victory over the Russians, English. French, Italians, Rumanians, and Americans, or reckon on being able to wear our enemies down. But we can obtain a peace by compromise only by evacuating the occupied territory, the retention of which would in any event bo a burden and cause of Weakness to us, and would involve the Angloteaxon will to dominate them. France exhausted by the war, will only attach herSt „ 0 0101 c l<»ely to Great Britain; nor will Spain continue to resist for long. And in Asia tho Russians and the Japanese will spread, and will carry their customs with their frontiers, and the south will remain to the British. The world will belong to the Anglooaxons, Russians, and Japanese, and the German will remain alone with Austria and Hungary. His rule will be that of thought and of commerce, not that of the bureaucrat and the soldier. He made his appearance too late, and his last chance of making . good th<f' past, that of founding a Colonial Empire, was annihilated by the world war. For we shall not supplant the sons of Ichwe. Then will be realised the plan of the great Rhodes, who saw th salvation of humanity in the expansion of Britondom— in British Imperialism. Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento. Hae tibi erunt artes; pacisquo imponere moretn, Parcere sobjectis, et debellare superbos.