NOTES ON THE WAR CABLES.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 17323, 24 May 1918, Page 5

NOTES ON THE WAR CABLES.

BT Sheafnel, THE FOU OF WAR IN THE WEST. Reports iroiri tho West front arc still minor operations. raids and countor raids by tho enemy an: remarkably few in number, hut sectional bombardments and artillery work of tho normal kind is always going on, though it may not always ho noted officially for publication. At least the comparative quietness of the enemy l in inspect- of front, line operations is remarkable. 'lho only thing that may bo said I-. that tho Germans are keeping the Allies guessing as to where the next heavy blow will be delivered. .Since tho effective drubbing the picked troops of the German army got in the »Sornmo areas between Arras and -Montdidier and on the present lines of Lys salient., it may be the intention of the enemy to keep the Allies in a state of tension for a longer time than appearances warrant. Heavy concentrations and great activity behind tho German lines on the Arras-Albert-Montdidier have been reported on several occasions, but absence of good communications and the desolated nature of the old Somme battle grounds may account for tho great activity behind the German front there.

Even for defensive purposes, it would bo necessary for the Germans to do a huge amount of work in tho way of repairing roads, bridges, and railways, and of establishing convenient bases for supplies and the billeting of reserve forces to meet any threatened advance by tho Allies. There can be little doubt, however, that if Germany still cherishes tho idea of separating the Anglo-French armies, the strategical plan of driving through Abbeville is not merely the best, but the only plan to follow, and the general opinion is that the Germans have not abandoned tho hope of separating tho Allies. Even if that is not the compelling idea in tho minds of the Germans, there is the fact that they aro in bad ground in the Lys salient, and that tho devastated areas behind the Somme front are nearly as bad, the communications being poor and much elongated. 'Ihero are three places behind the German lines where communications aro very good, theso being in West Flanders 5 behind the lines from the south of Armentieres to La Basse, and thence past Lens down to Arras; and the country north of the Ailetto round St. Quentin, Laon, and La Fere. It hits already been suggested that tho Germans may have decided to clear the French from the terrain north of tho Aisne either for the purpose of settling down or a strongly defensive line along the Aisne Heights with the river between them and the French, or for the purpose of holding tho southern flank moro easily whilo they attempt to smash their way to the coast near the mouth of tho Somme. In any case, the delay of the German offensive cuts two ways, one detrimentally for the Germans in Franco and the other favourably for the schemes they have on foot in Russia, for outflanking tho British forces in the Middle East, and for penetration into the heart of Asia, where they <j.vill recover a very strong strategical position in Asia if they can get a strong hold of the Russian communications and establish great military bases and firm corftrol. Those advantages, with the path through Bulgaria and Turkey improved by way of the Danube, the Black Sea, and tho old road through Constantinople, would give the Germans great opportunities for getting supplies and striking at the allied communications with tho East. The activity of the Germans, as reported to-day along the Ailette, may have moro to do with the Eastern ambitions than with the original strategical aim of separating tho Allies. It has certainly this advantage about it, if it ends in driving the French from the north of tho Aisne. it will servo both purposes. If the Germans determinedly essay the task, they will bo made to pay very dear for the effort, as the French will not ligh/tly give up the valuable tactical positions they have obtained by skilful, though costly, advances. AMERICAN NUMBERS IN FRANCE. There is much speculation as to the numbers of Americans in France. It is known that they hold at least three portions of the Anglo-French front. They have been reported as fighting in Lorraine southward of St. Mihiel, in tho Champagne, doing good artillery work, on tho sector opposite Amiens, and with tho British in Flanders or Picardy. Recently advice was received that the Americans are now holding moro of the front lines than are the Belgians, \Vho now number 245,000 and hold about 25 miles of the "Yser line. About the beginning of April, it was generally believed that there were 500,000 Americans in France, and unofficial reports from America gave tho estimate further credibility. Tho moro recent announcement that the first American field army ir. Franco has been formed is open to various conjectures. It may mean the forces actively engaged, or it may mean that tho Americans have formed two army corps, which are tentatively tho nucleus of tho great army which tho Americans intend to have officered and equipped by the end of tho year. On such an assumption as the latter it is a working model for the present, open to improvement when a sufficient number of officers have been trained and have been through active work with the American forces brigaded with the British and French. Two army corps of 100,000 men each, and each corps consisting of three divisions, each of which would be very nearly equal to British army corps, affords reason for believing that the grouping is imperfect owing to the lack of experienced officers, and that it is a reserve army working on the best lines that tho exigencies of the case in America and x' runce will allow. On theso suppositions that force, together with the divisions in tho lines and the raw or partially trained troops receiving instruction in stages all along the line from the port of disembarkation to the bases at tho rear of the battle front, must now number considerably more than 500,000.