NOTES ON THE WAR CABLES.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 17104, 8 September 1917, Page 7

NOTES ON THE WAR CABLES.

Bv Shrapnel.

THE fJKRMAN OBJECTIVE.

From all poiriU of view the operations of tbo Genitalis <;n the Kiga front are at this period of (lie war of the most farruiLching importance. In yesterday's notes the primary steps which Germany_ proposes to take to suppress .Russia as a still problematically powerful factor of war were briefly outlined. Those steps arc to make tho Baltic a German lake and to utilise the manhood of (.he Baltic races, which aro largely antipathetic to tho rule of Russia, either an Imperial Power or as a Republic, to cut tho Russian road of supply by way of tho Arctic Ocean, and to wrest from tho Russians tho economic resources and man power of tho Baltic provinces and utilise them to increase Germany's food supplies and military strength. By achieving those immediate ends Germany would bo ablo at least to prolong the war, if not to wear out tho will and clt'orts of tho Allies. That is the material and psychological object up to a certain point. Aβ soon as her objects .east of the Baltic should bo attained, the next series of operations which Germany would undertake is apparent enough.

THE LINES OF LEAST KESISTANCE. Wβ havo soon, in the course of the war that Germany has crushed one Weak Power after another. In attacking llussia— great territorially but wt-ak in other respects—Serbia, Montenegro, an 1 Rumania, sho took the lines of least resistance, using the great advantages of her central position which, with her magnificent and long prepared system of strategic railways, gives her tho" benefit of the " inside running." In a comparative sense and militarily theso victories havo been cheaply won by Germany. Sho has not obtained victory against any foe that has met her on anything approaching terms of equality in men and resources, but- her victories, though not glorious fighting achievements, aro extremely useful, and, be it noted and carefully weighed, aro part and parcel of the policy of defeating an enemy iu detail. J{ that wore all that is in the present policy of Germany we might view tho situation with a great amount of confidence, for we know that the final decision will be on the west front, where the German strength for tho time being is being ground into the dust of France and Flanders. Germany cannot beat France and Britain. On tho other hand she can, under certain oircumstances, prolong the war.

LATER STROKES. Given success against Russia and with time to follow, Germany's next stroke will bo in the Middle East. She has to look at the war from two standpoints—from that of commercial and economic developments after the war and from the possibility of defeat of the projects of the Allies, both from a military and political point of view. In working successfully in the first direction, she is buoying up the hopes of her people and encouraging them to further sacrifices by dangling before their eyes the achievements she has to her credit. AUGer,many has been filled with ideas of the magnificent future that lies before the Teutonic peoples in the Balkans and of the hold which Germany has upon the possessions of the effete and dying empire of Turkey, and upon her possessions in Asia Minor, so rich in material resources and so strong strategically. The military nation that holds the Middle East will, in another world war, occupy the position that strategically dominates the continents and oceans of the earth, and there lie the next lines of least resistance along which, if given the opportunity, Germany will attack later on. To prevent her from maturing her plans in -the Middle East, not only will Great Britain have to be prepared for desperato fighting there, but the Allies will require, as quickly as possible and without let or intermission, to keep on smashing the Germans in France as they have done since the battle of the Somme.

When Germany has finished with Russia —if she is able to finish with her —she will turn a large part of her forces westward, but,not all of them. She will send down to the Balkans and into Turkey such forces as, with the help of the Bulgars and Turks, will enable her, as she hopes, to turn the scale against Great Britain in the subsidiary operations which are being carried on in the east of the Mediterranean and beyond. In this, again, we see the Germane as close students of Napoleon's genius. They will be following out the policy of defeating their enemy in detail, of making the occupied territory feed the conquering forces, and of using its resources in material and men to strengthen her own resources. Such are the fruits that have accrued to Germany, and such as she expects to accrue to her by attacking along the lines of least resistance. She hopes, with foreign levies, to achieve what she cannot achieve with her own fast-diminishing man power. She must, however, first finish Russia, and then tackle the problems hi Asia, before the Allies in the west destroy her. The plans outlined iabove are without the slightest doubt those which Germany has in mind, but there's many a slip 'twixt cup and the lip, and the best-laid plans of mice and men gang aft agley. All the Allies havo to do is to anticipate Germany.

THE SITUATION IN MACEDONIA. Ex' King Constantine, somewhere from afar, has denounced M. Vonizelos, the- great Greek pro-Consul. G-ermany's successes on the Riga front have made him "chirpy," but it is Germany that is teaching the piping. The German military party is anticipating the defeat and downfall of Russia, and Constantino's chirruping. is the first irrepressible sound or sign of Germany's concealed hopes. At Salonika there is a thorn, of the touch of which Germany is afraid. It is to be hoped that M. Venizelos, with the- strenuous help of the Allies, is organising and equipping a-quarter of a million Greeks who should soon be at tho side of the allied forces, fighting the implacable enemies of their country. Generral Sarrail is now engaged on the preliminaries of his long-delayed offensive, and, if the truth wore known or if we could perceive what is going on, we should see columns of men and convoys of guns and munitions moving out from Salonika to the front lines.

Now that the policy of Greece is settled, the Italians aro withdrawing from Epirus and are using the withdrawing garrisons to strengthen the left flank of the Allies west of Monastir and in Albania. The Bulgarian Government, being aware of the danger, has refused to send troops to assist the Austrians against the Italians. Circumstances in Russia, Rumania, and on the Isonzo are such that it is a military and strategic necessity that General Sarrail and the Greeks should strike as soon as possible. It is true that the winter may prevent operations by the Allies from reaching a decisive point, but tho effort against Bulgaria will have to bo made while Germany is heavily engaged on the east and west fronts By attacking tho Bulgarians. General Sarrail will greatly modify the situation in Moldavia and' in Turkey. At the first sign of danger Bulgarians will bo withdrawn from the Rumanian sectors nnd Turks will bo called from Asia Minor.