MOTES ON THE CABLEB.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 17065, 25 July 1917, Page 5

MOTES ON THE CABLEB.

By Shrapnel. GERMAN ACTIVITY AGAINST THE FRENCH. The extensive activity of the Germans on the west front, especially during the last two weeks, is admitted as being felt chiefly by the luench. It has been manifested, aa Le Matin states, in a multiplicity of attacks, and, with the exception of tho German rush against the British north of th© Yser Canal, the majority of the more or less heavy local attacks have been directed against the French from tho Aisne plateaux to Verdun, the St. Mihiel salient, and in Upper Alsace. It is supposed that these attacks in Alsace are made by the Germans to gain observation posts which are required either for offence or defence.

Critics in the Matin suggest that the purpose of the attacks is political, Marshal von Hindenburg wishing to impress the Germans at home that tho military situation is good. If that is really his object, the Germans' situation must bo bad, for ho is sacrificing men's lives against the unyielding bulwarks of the Western Allies. The suggestion -is, however, not a sound one on all points. Tactically tho attempts, if successful, would be good for reasons of offence or defence, but Germany would bo politically served better by taking advantage of the embarrassment of the Russian army leaders and the debility of the Russian mixed authorities. On the east front there stands to-day as great an opportunity as there has been in tho whole war, and, indeed, it may be said the greatest chance of the whole struggle, to eliminate Russia thoroughly, both in Europe and in Asia Minor. It cannot be possible that the German militaty authorities are not alive to the tremendously far-reaching strategical possibilities that are staring them in the face on the Russian front. Russia could be utterly broken, Rumania hopelessly vanquished, and tho Turkish armies freed from their severest menace, in which event Trebizond, Erzingan, Erzerum, and the whole of Armenia would have to bo abandoned by the Russians. The great Turkish forces facing the Russians could then bo thrown against the British in Mesopotamia and Syria. There is amongst the many subsidiary aims of the German staff a good deal of "bluff" in the attacks that are being made on the west front. All these attacks, while serving useful secondary but very important purposes m' regard to the immediate future and the development that may take place in 1918, when America has a largo army in France, are more concerned with the state of affairs on the eastern front than with direct and decisive victory on tho west front.

THE ST. MIHIEL SALIENT. The opening out of a German offensive on the whole of the St. Mihiel salient, south of Verdun, demands vigilance on the part of the French. The apex of the salient rests on the west side of the Meuse, but opposite it the French occupy very strong positions from which they repelled all attempts to advance in 1914 and 1915. Where the danger lies, if the Germans have a large force for the purpose and a definite objective in view, is along the southern arm of the salient. It would seem from the map and from the French positions close to the border of German Lorraine that the Germans may bo developing an attempt to clear the country east of the Meuse and betwe«*i that river and their borders. It is from the French lines along the border that the German positions in France, Belgium, in the Briey iron districts, and even round Metz may be turned in a great allied offensive. It is not unlikely that the Germans are setting about either removing the threat or considerably weakening the French advantages south of Lorraine. All the other actions by the Germans on the Aisne, west and east of Verdun, may bo holding actions subsidiary to a heavy offensive south of the St. Mihiel salient. The' conception of the design, if this be it, will be apparent enough to the French Staff, and the attempt to fulfil the plan is bound to be anticipated. It has not much chanco of succeeding now that the French are in a better state ot munitionment than they were in the early months of the war when they drove the Germans back from the Grand Couronne of Nancy. The Germans are not as strong now, comparatively speaking, as they were then; but their purposes may be closely allied with what they hope to accomplish in Russia, whence, if they succeed in their wide strategical projects, they will be able to throw immense forces against the French on the east side of the Meuse. ACTIVITY ON THE BRITISH FRONT. On the British sectors of the western front a good deal of give-and-take business seems to bo the order of the day. Both aid<?s are actively raiding, and tho German artillery is more aggressive and prodigal in the expenditure of high explosive and gas shells than has been the case for many months. It is apparent that the Germans are "feeling" the British lines in the hope of finding out what Sir Douglas Haig has in his mind. On the whole, it is a good sign, inasmuch as it shows that the German Staff is in a state of uncertainty and that Sir Douglas Haig has concealed his intentions. Regarding his present show of activity Sir Douglas Haig reports that south of Lens, in the neighbourhood of Avion, his troops have carried out a local operation to the southward and reached their objective with Jittle loss. This operation is really important, though it is mentioned in a very casual manner. Avion is south by east of Lens, and covers tho junction of three railways under tho control of the Germans. Its capturo would go a long way towards rendering Lens untenable by the Germans. • In the raiding scheme of things the British hold tho ascendancy, the German successes being very infrequent. All the raids reported by the British Field-marshal have been eminently successful. Southward of Havrincourt, an important point west of Marcoing, and south-west of Cambrai, the British raided the German lines and bombed dug-outs. At Bullecourt also, west of Queant, south of the iScarpe, and at Hollebeke, near Ypres, in Flanders, successful raids have been made, and no doubt important information was gained. Mr Philip Gibbs states that no important action has taken place since tho German attack at Lombartzyde, on the coast, on July 10, while there have been many raids and minor activities. His despatch was evidently written prior to the British attack southward of Avion, or he would have mentioned it as a minor action of considerable importance. From his details as to the points where the German artillery work is intensive—namely, at Lens and along the Flanders front, it appears that the Germans are under the impression that one of those points will be the scene of Sir Douglas Haig's next heavy stroke. It is entirely satisfactory to have Mr Gibbs's declaration that the enemy are suffering a great wastago of men. He says that an enemy division has been burying 80 Germans daily for several weeks. Taken with the other casualties, that must mean the loss of over 100 men daily, or for, say, 10 weeks, a loss of 7COO. Mr Gibbs puts tho state of affairs grimly when he states that "blood flows in a steady stream from tho Germans at Lens." Incidentally, ho reveals the fact that the British are using a gas of a deadly nature whenever the wind is favourable. The German, troops must bewail the day their clover chemists designed poisonous gases for military use. It is suggested that the cause of the Germans' "jumpiness" is that they anticipate a heavy British blow, but do not know when and where it will be launched, and that the object of iiheir bombardments is to reduce the strength of the British and do as much damage in all directions before tho enemy are compelled to withdraw their heavy guns, as they had to do at Wytschaete and Messines; or, it might have been added, to lose many of. them, as they did at Angres and Lievin.

"OF CHAOS AND BLACKEST MIDNIGHT."

Reports from ll;:ssia arc not, on the whole, of ,1 ; :;ring character. That with reference > Galician front is a long wail of and there is good reason for it. ; 1 has been taken by the enemy, c; i material has been lost. Moreover. . _ cii", tho great military base and important religious capital of the south-west, is not far off. The road is open to the enemy, and from it thorei aro no great obstacles to a march either into the centre of Russia or towards Odessa. E? striking towards Odessa, and the Crimea] the Germans have a chanco of destroying tlw Vises of all operations in Galicia, Boko-

wma, Rumania, the Black Sea, and Asia - * I* 1 "' y W 'M go that way rather than?" i- ? SCOV7 ' as verv threat wilj acoom- * phsh so much. Tho Chief of Staff, Marshal"* von Ludendorff, who plans Marshal von' Hindenburg s strategy, will certainly Lend the great possibilities of such a.caursa'" of action. If that line of actiou is followed,* it is possible for the. Germans to acoomnligh'; a denouement analogous to that which Lord*" Roberts effected when he struck out forPretoria and destroyed tho whole system of* the Boer defencc. There is just a that an advance towards, the historic CityS of Kieff, which is a most important m2i-" tary centre as well, may arouse the rest' of Russia to a 6enso of shame and of the danger to the revolution. North of the Pripet, near Smorgon and? Krcvo, cast of Vilna, the Russian arrmeg?' are credited with having accomplished measure of success, in the respect that theyf have advanced to the depth of two mfleaf and taken over 1000 prisoners. It is Jadi'f mitted, however, that there are and moral weakness even there in certain'' detachments, and it is not a good sign thaijf tho lack of spirit in the men istho sacrifice of gallant and very officers at such a time and during such&V crisis. .'I;*! Tho Soldiers', Workmen, and Peasants*-?. Council, after an all-night sitting, realising? that the country is threatened with a mili-vf tary debaclo and internal anarchy, has ; recognised tho Provisional Government aa •aM Government for tho safety of-the and has " accorded " it unlimited powe*-;- to® re-establish the organisation of the r«rtnj|ls and publio order. The resolvo comes ratherC late, but it is better late than never, and*; if the council can strenuously badr the G6~i; vernment v.ith power and if both can u£o> the power in a relentless disciplinary Russia may yet again surprise the. enemy^f