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EUROPE'S WAR.

OPINION IN FRANCE AND GERMANS'. DECISIVE ACTION LOOKED FOR IN JULY: One of the roost constant and over-whelm-ing feelings one has in attempting to keep in touch with even the main outlines of the war is the extreme difficulty of reaching a safe conclusion on the most significant points. I have always believed in the uiitrustwarthiness ©{'human testimony (writes Norman Kapgood from, London on March 3 to the New York Evening ,Pest), but that belief, strong as it was, has been increased. Consider the mjost. important military question of the moment —the strength of the German, line in Franco, on which depends the outcome of the contemplated great push. I have just como'from a conversation with a man who is much more able to think than most men are. and 1 whose official position gives liimi exceptional advantages. Ho had 'been at the German Headquarters in Franco recently, and in the first-line Germain tranches, and had made up his mind that the German lines were impregnable. He then came to England, and after he had been hero two weeks ho was of. tha opinion that the British and French would; bo able to smish through this fipring. The general impression counts for a great deal in one's conclusion, and the impression is inevitably coloured by one's environment. It is also extremely difficult to get at more definite facts, as, for example, :at the morale .of the German troops. Wo know that a certain number surrender voluntarily, mere than tliey did before, but the numbers are not large, and it is dangerous to draw too sweeping conclusions. Again, we know that the British have

become excellent at ordinary trench fighting and raids, but wo have no way of knowing- how well they can manoeuvre if they ever get through on a large scale. " Let them got through,'" some German officers said to a friend of mine; " -we ask nothing) better than to fight them in the open. In this trench warfare there is no difference to speak of between the skilful and the stupid; but onoe the fighting gets beyond the trendies our military superiority will bo decisive."

That sounds well, but it may be added that, if the Germaus baliove it, they do not tako steps to lure the British and French beyond their trenches into the open. Also it is fair to say that many of the best experts believe that a sudden break through of several miles, with the consequent capture of the heavy guns, will be decisive. In connection with this question of skill and its relation to the spring campaign, a certain report about tha Prime Minister is interesting. It is narrated to me by one who ought to know that Mr Lloyd George was in. favour of co-ordinating the work of the west by having the whole British army act under general directions from the French supreme command. Lord Northcliffc was among those who opposed the measure. I asked: what the opposition was founded on, and the answer was: "Lord_ Northcliffe believes that Sir Douglas Haig is a very groat military genius,, and is thoroughly convinced that ho will accomplish marvels in the spring drive."

One is tempted to add that these differences of opinion about policies and the crucial elements of the situation would bo likely to bo removed when we find out how the spring drive gets on, except that experience earlier in the war gives one pause. When I was at the front in France in 1915 was given such, exact information by French officers and French statesmen in charge of munitions about what was going to happen one month and two months hence that I am now wary of drawing any conclusions about tho decisiveness of the next few months. All that can be reported positively is that it is tho preponderance of opinion liere. iu Franco, and in Germany that the war, if not actually finished, will be decided to all intents and purposes by July. ■

Besides the weight of the spring drive the two factors that will do most to bring the situation to a head are. of cour«>. the situation in Germany regarding food and ■certain Taw materials necessary to the manufacture of munitions; : and, secondly, the food situation in England,' which is comfortablo now and will remain comfortable unless the new German submarine campaign is unexpectedly successful. I have the best of opportunities of getting information about the food situation in Germany, that is as thorough as can bo procured, and is also impartial. What cannot be told, however, by anybody until the test comes is the psychology of the German people. That the distribution of food has failed in its object of equalising the burden is -unmistakable. I have already cabled that the poor, being unable to buy th-? meat for which they have tickets, are soiling their meat tickets to the rich. You might naturally ask why the tickets are not so 'made out that they can bo used only by the persons to whom they are issued, instead of being usable by the holder as they actually are. Tho answer is that the attempt to control the ultimate destination of the food is recognised as hopeless, and that it is believed and rightly believed, that the result would be more demoralising if the transfer were more secret and attended with more risk. If you stopped a man from selling his ticket you could not stop lum from selling the meat after he had obtained it.

Tho expe-nenoo m Belgium has boon exactly the same. Tho more difficult is made the sale of food tickets tho worse has been the result. The sale has not been dscreased, but tho demoralisation has been greater. The same principle- has applied to a large extent, both in Germany and in Belgium, to maximum prices. It is impossible to maintain them absolutely, but they can be more nearly maintained' when food tickets aro transferable.

Tho Germans arc hoping much from the Rumanian harvest. They have sent ono of tho ablest men in the Empire—a general from the western front—to Rumania, and under his direction tho planting has boon of the'very first order. "They have taken equally effective store in ife-bia. Nover♦neless it is extremely £tobable that. ev<m

if they tide over the time between now and September, they will not be much more comfortable after the now crops oomo in than in the meantime,'because of the ternfio strain that they are under on account of the shortage in' so many important affections. ,

If Germany feels the way the Southern States felt in the lasb part of the Civil War, it is the best opinion that she can go on for two or three years by gradually' retiring and by being prepared to wear herself out completely. If, however, her spirit is different, and she would rather vield as soon as her people are widely convinced that they are doomed to defeat and in danger of prostration, then much the most probable time for that conviction is next summer or autumn, if in the meantime the submarine campaign proves v insufficient to make England anything "like as uncomfortable as Germany is. . ' _ One of the results of warfare that have mterested me most is the effect of suffering and sacrifice on the heart that bears them, and here again we come against the'qualities of getting our quantities right. There was a fire in one of the factories of England some time ago. It was not a big fire, but tho_ workers in the factory were naturally excited. One very old woman worked ahead, never paying the slightest attention to the commotion. After it was over someone, spoke to her,, and asked her if she had not known there was a fire. She indicated, in bitter,words that have escaped my memory, tha,t she had noticed it, but that it could make ho difference to her. She had lost throe sons—all her sons—and she was doingi lier little bit towards manufacturing material to punish those who had slain them. Blind hate was all that remained in her. A conflagration around lier meant nothing. Life itself meant nothing, except revenge. I told this story to one of the most distinguished men in contemporary literature, who himself hadlost a son. "No," was hia comment, "that story is not fair; it is not those who have lost sons who hate the Germans. We feel too deeply. Wo know that the Germans have also lost sons'. Hatred is expressed by those who sit around the feasting table in the fashionable retaurants, not by those who reach down into the realities." ' ■

I desired to bslieve this, and carried it around with me. A while later the Secretary of State for the Colonies announced that the British colonies would keep the territories • they had. conquered. This waa a startling speech. The Premiers of the colonies had already been invited to London to talk over all the large questions, and Great Britain also was bound to talk them over with-her Allies, when the time for making peace terms should come. So I tried to find out what was the explanation of this aberration by Mr Long, and tho prevailing explanation was that he had lost his son two days before. A man who knows the personnel of tha House of Commons perhaps as well as anybody in it told me that , the. members who were most relentless in their attitude towards peace terms and toward Germany were those whose sons had been killed. I called his attention to the fact that Mr Asquith's son had been killed. • I hava heard Mr Asquith speak in the House sinca that loss, and been struck with the gentleness of his voice and manner.

'"Mr Asquith," was tho reply, "is a big* man. It does not affect the big men that way. but it does so affect the large majority-"

1 am not bigoted enough to think I can answer this question, of whether suffering the loss of thoso near to us more often softens or hardens the heart, but I want to mention one case I know of—that of a man who was not a pacifist before he lost his son, and has become one since.

A word that everybody is using just now: is the word : ' Nationality." We are supposed to do everything on nationalistic lines. That conception is put to the front in most of- the great geographical and political changes that the Allies plan. That it is ah extremely important fact to consider I do not doubt, but, like other facts, it cannot usefully be considered 'alone, and it is easy to exaggerate. Wo know, for example, that there is a great outburst of nationalistic feeling in Russia. We know that it is so strong, notably in tho army, that it keeps the country from going in the direction of separate peace, and also that it is the explanation of the vacillation' in the Capitol ( about the composition of the Cabinet, the ■ machine putting in one man after another, because he is, or is supposed' to be, sympathetic with their point of view, and then speedily throwing him out becauso they are alarmed at the indignation. caused in the nation by his inefficiencv.

This increase of nationalism in Russia is unmistakably one of the biggest developments of tho war, and yet it would bo a great failure m imagination to concm'vu the Russian people as being wholly made over m three years. The year 1917 and probably the year 1918 aro going to be spent in making the world over. The task for any one country of carrying on its share merely in conducting the war sooms superhuman. The task oE conducting the war and keeping open one's mind and heart is still more superhuman.In addition, we havo the immense difficulties of obtaining real knowledge. Against all thoso obstacles whaT kind of a record is going to be made by the liltla race of man"/ Imperfect at tho best. Better, let us hope, because of our own participation. At least all Liberals over hero believe it will bo better because of us Every day I feel overwhelmed by the bigness of the problems and the shortness of human vision, and yet every day as I thmk of what will soon fall on a few men I still ding to the belief that it is possible to mako out of the settlement something good enough to pay for its cost. Ta realise all the, difficulties and the imperfections of our information is not to be d-'s-comaged. It is to be prepared.

Whitcombo and Tombs —Sellers £6 6s. Wright. Stephenson, and Co. (ord.) — Buyers £7. Wright, Stephenson,' and Co. (pref.)— Buyers £4 15s. Bruco Woollen Company—Buyers £1 3s. AUCKLAND STOCK EXCHANGE. (Per United Press Association.) AUCKLAND, April 16. The following business was recorded on cliango to-day :—Sale: Auckland Trams, £1 Is.3d; salo reported: Auckland Gas, £1 &s 3d; .Union Steam £2 5s

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Bibliographic details

Otago Daily Times, Issue 16980, 17 April 1917, Page 6

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2,172

EUROPE'S WAR. Otago Daily Times, Issue 16980, 17 April 1917, Page 6

EUROPE'S WAR. Otago Daily Times, Issue 16980, 17 April 1917, Page 6