NOTES ON THE CABLES.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 16964, 28 March 1917, Page 6

NOTES ON THE CABLES.

By Shrapnel.

- THE BRITISH ACTIVE FRONT. The French reports from tho western front IXO fuller than the British by reason of tho act that our Allies have been able- to keep closer contact with the enemy forces than she British have. Sir Douglas' Haig's refciconce may be attributed to the character af tho man. When not much information is .coming from his headquarters, his staff is ■ preparing something serious for the enemy. Iho work that is being done at present by the British is not of tne nature that the censor will permit to. be bruited about. , In devastating tho evacuated country as they have done, tho Germans havo paid particular attention to tho destruction of roads, railways, and bridges so ar to provent the British from moving forward their heavy guns and trench mortars. Towns, fields, woods, and trees havo been destroyed in order that tho advancing troops and artillery will have no ready means of shelter ind concealment, and no readily available supplies of food and water. Such complete iestruction a>s the Germans havo effected will necessitate carefully repairing all means of communication because everything that is required will have to bo brought up from the old British bases on tho Somine, and, unfortunately, the country captured by tho British is not so well supplied *v>th radial railways as the country is that is behind the Germans.

Arras is an important road and railway lodal point, and that is one of the reasons

why tho Germans refuse to budge from around that town. Cambrai, St Quentin, La, Eere, and Laon are also road and rail-

way nodes or radiating points, tho like of which behind the Allies lines is found only at Arras, St. Amiens, and Compiegne. By making a stand where they now are, the Germans are, among other considerations, attempting to hold the points that command a great lateral railway running from Arras through St. Quentin, La Fere, Laori, Nmifchatel, Comay, a little northeast of Rheims to Chalons-sur-Marne. As far south as Rheims or Cernay, this rail-

way constitutes, with, the addition of Cambrai, the so-called new Hindenburg line. As the Germans, if driven from that line, will have no great serviceable lateral trunk line, to assist them except that which runs along the border of Belgium, through Valenciennes and Maubeuge, their choice of a line of defence can be accounted for. Already at Velu, Fins, Vermand, Moy, Berry-au-Bac, and Cernay, near Rheims, the railway from Arras is either out or under command of the' guns of the Allies,

and must bo inconveniently inoperative to tho Germans. Their anxiety is now not so much to use it themselves as to prevent it from being held and used by tho Allies for tho purpose of utilising tho great number of transverse railways and roads running from it to the borders of Belgium ind the Valenciennes-Metz railway, which runs through the important strategical points sf Hirson, Mezieres, Montmedy, and

Longnyon, to Metz—all the -way close to ihe Belgian border.

The Allies' capture of the country between Arras and Laon as far to th north:aat as Valenciennes and Hirson will form

the German line a re-entrant angle which

will again lengthen their front, and, moreover, will give the Allies a choice of rolling the ,Germans northward and eastward. That will be a useful achievement for the purpose of clearing tho greater part of northern Franco, but it will not be a particularly brilliant strategical way of bringing about a .decisive defeat of tho German forces. It is not a method of circumvention. It partakes more of the nature of a direct drive, but has the great advantage of affording the Allies an opportunity of pushing

a great wedge into, the German lines over the best open country in northern France. In to-day's messages it is reported that the British are in possession of Ecoust and Langicourt, north of Velu,..and between CroiselJes and Velu. Wo have also definite information about the possession of Beaumetz, 1 about seven miles cast of Bapaume and a mile north of Velu. .The British arc now astride the national road from

Bapaume to Cambrai arid also the railway between the two places, and when Croi.se lies and the country round it is definitely in the hands of tho British and the communications aro restored a rapid advance between Arras and St. Quentin astride roads and railways leading to Cambrai is to be looked for.

WITH THE FRENCH. Tho French at Grugies and Castres aro two miles' from St. Quentin. At Urvillers fctiey ; aro threo miles, and at Cerizy six miles away. All these villages are between the Somrao and tho Oise and across tho Crozat Canal, which runs south-west from St. Quentin to St. Simon, fivo miles east of Ham, and then turns south-east towards La Fere. Evidently tho Germans consider that the French thrust south of St. Quentin is tactically very dangerous to them. At Essigny and Urvillers the French aro endeavouring to obtain possession of a very irregular but useful piece of high ground which, by giving them good artillery positions and observation points, dominates tho country and a section of tho German lateral service lines between Ribemont and St. Quentin. An advance upon Ribemont would virtually settle tho fate of St. Quentin and La Fere. It is, therefore, to bo.-expected that tho French advance in. that direction will be stubbornly contested by the Germans, and that tho German Headquarters Staff will employ picked men to dispute the road.

South of La Fero tho French aro engaged in desperate and bitter fighting. Knowledge of the wanton destruction and of tho barbaric sufferings inflicted by the Germans in tho occupied territory has inflamed tho French, and the Germans aro paying the penalty there as they have never paid it alsewhero on the front since the war began. The distance along this sector between La Fore and Vregny, north of Soissons, where' desperato encounters aro now taking place, is, in a straight line, a little over 18 miles, but the irregularity of tho fighting lino will make the distance 25 miles Dr over. Tho forccs engaged on that short 'ront will on each side, therefore, be 200,000 men,' moro or less, but probably more. Tho strong positions tho Germans occupy may snable them to use fewer men, but the need of counterbalancing,, owing to their loss of the initiative, 1 ) and tho importance of defending tho approaches to Laon will cost them dear in the prcsenco of the French irtillery and machine guns.

This condition of affairs is exactly as tho Allies wish. Their great desiro is that the Hermans will fight, and especially that they ivill oounter-attack. Tho principle governing the Allies on tho west front i= to roiluce the strength of tho Germans before they can retire to their border.

FRENCH AIRMEN'S RAIDS. Away to tho cast French airmen havo jomharded Bricy and ThionVillo They Jaim to have heavily bombed factories and ron works at those two places, where they Vavo. dropped .a ton of high explosives. Th:\ itations at l the great concentration centres if Conflans and Montmedy have also been ittacked with bombs. At this junction such .york has a most important bearing upon :ho situation in France. At Briny and rhionvillo there are great iron works, and n tho former town there are great stores if ammunition made in the factories there, file stations are in the towns in both eases, rad undoubtedly they have also suffered. The places attacked are those through which jermany can most conveniently send men ind munitions to tho French front in tho lorth of Franco.

THE RUSSIAN FRONT. On t,ho Russian front there has been somo ighting at Bavanovitchi, north of the Pripct Vlarehes, and near Dvinsk. In these encounters the Germans wcro the aggressors, Vut- though they gained a little ground near Barariovifcchi, they have chiefly succccdod a a«ciimuktij)c fresh losaea. Thcso German

attacks have probably been made as demonstrations and reconnaissances, and may be the heralds of a great attempt against the southern flank of the Russians. It is important that the Germa.ns should strivo to gain a great victory against tho Russians in order to throw tho Russian Government into confusion while it is organising tho system of control and endeavouring to promoto order and efficiency. A defeat of tho Russian armies would give tho ultra-revolutionaries and the pro-German and Imperialistic reactionaries their opportunity to create another revolt which might prove very embarrassing to the Allies.