NOTES ON THE CABLES.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 16667, 12 April 1916, Page 5

NOTES ON THE CABLES.

Br Shbapnbl. THE MEASURE OF RECENT VERDUN ATTACKS. From tho French description 0 f the battle line west of the Meuse, it is evident that tho Gentians are attempting to outflank the fortress works that protect Verdun. The French lino now extends from tho south of Avocourt across the slopes •of Hill 304, tnrough Chattoncourfc Wood to Cumierea Wood, near tho Mouse. Froig the westerly point to Cumieres the line runs northeasterly. This shows 'that the Germans are trying to drive a wedge south-westward past Avocourt, through tlio Foret de Hesse, towards Neuvillyj the nearest point to the St. Monehould-Verdun railway. Attention has .i.i!_ady been drawn # to the, fact that it way surprising that the Germans were wasting men against the Douaumont positions when, by concentrating all tho power of their forces and their artillery against the positions west of the Meuse, they had a chance of isolating VerduS by striking at tho, point of the railway where it curves northward towards Boureuillcs and Neuvilly.. Rather late in the day, they are now throwing their main strength in that direction, and it is plain thftt in Berlin much reliance is being placed on this movement to accomplish what the frontal attacks failed to do. Much now depends upon the extent towhich tho Crbwri Prince's forces have been exhausted by their attacks west of tho Meuse, and upon the strength of his reserves. It is a principle of Prussian strategy to count Josses as of small account in - comparison with the value that will a<ccruc from the capture of an important strategical position. As the German Staff is - still attacking with large numbers, it is to be admitted that the Germans still entertain hopes of taking Verdun. If "they Capture a point- commanding the railway, then tho position of the' French' in and around Verdun will become critical.

German strength is still wry powerful, and almost any position can be, taken if tho enemy is prepared to sustain the necessary sacrifices. By meeting the attack with an almost equal number of men, though this is dillicult from a centre in a constricted area, the defenders may hold off the attackers; but such tactics are bad. Tho converging forces have the advantage, and the best method is to relieve the pressuro by strong • counter-attacks 'on tho flank of tho enemy's, centre. These the French do not deem necessary at present. It must therefore be concluded that the safety of Yerdun is not dangerously menaced if the French General Staff tho retention of the position is neoessary and advantageous for future operations. Apart from the consideration that tho loss of Yerdun might not vitally interfere with the intended offensive, it would certainly have, amongst certain neutrals, an effect that might embarrass, though it would not much hinder, the • future developments of tho Al'fed strategy.

Tho fact that the French are continuing their successful attacks south of Douaumont indicates that they are confident of their ability to overcolhe the efforts of the Ger-, mans. In the last attaok, over a, front of 12£ miles, the Germans gained a few yards on the slope of Hill 304, but they paid an enormous price for this slight forward step. A one point a division—over 20,000 men—was annihilated, ajid, judged by the distance along which they attacked, the Germans must have moved forwardagainst the French lines west of the Meuse at least, 100,000 men. Two such heavy attacks have been rapidly made,' and it would seem that, if tho losses on the east side of the Meuse were 200,000, the Germans will not bo satisfied with their self-slaughter until they have lost a similar number oh the west side.

It is a favourable augury that General Joffre makes no sign. The German attaoks will probably continue as long as the floods in Russia render an offensive, on the part of the Russians or the Germans impracticable. General Joffre, knowing the strength of his position and the spirit of his troops, .is apparently satisfied that 'his Verdun forces can withstand at certain given points all tho attacks that the Germans can make. It is noticeable that, in conjunction with the abandonment of the heavy attacks' in the Woevre "and the transference of the chief energies to the Meuse heights, there are signs of, the .battle extending into the Argonne. It it does so, it will be an indication that the Germans, if time is on their side, are about to make a heavy attaok in the Champagne, which is the true French centre.

GENERAL TOWNSHEND'S PLIGHT. It is most unfortunate that the melting of " the snows in the Armenian highlands has raised the waters of the Tigris so eonsider'ably as to incommode tho movements of General Lake's relieving forces. If the ' river is overflowing into the marshes, their extension will prevent General Gorringo from deploying his forces in front of the ElHenna position. Should tho Suwaiohi marsh waters spread to the flood ba,nks of the river, t his position will 'be very critical. In front of him the Turks are on higher ground, and the floods may prevent the British.frojp digging in; or, if they have dug in, may drive them out of their trenches, and hopelessly oxpose them to the fire of the Turks'.' Luokily, the ground on the south side, where there is another British force,- is higher, and, still more fortunately, the British on the south side are able to enfilade the. Turkish positions on the north. It is probable that the relieving force is acoompanied •by gunboats of various descriptions; but it' is said that navigation of the river when in full flood is dangerous, as it is difficult to keep the channels, and also that the olijinnels are frequently altered by the floods. General Townshend's position must ' be bocoming very serious. In his attempt to capture Bagdad he marche,d to with a division —a ridiculously small force for such an important purpose. He, fought and gained the battle of Ctesiphon, but, discovering strong reinforcements of Turks advancing, he was compelled' to retreat, fighting most of the way, back to Ku't-el-Amara, and carrying his wounded with him. .There he settled down with probably 10,000 more or less oifective fighters. His retreat was a masterly one, and that ho is still holding out is nothing short of miraculous. Either the Turkish numbers have been overestimated or they have no taste for fighting the British when they havo their backs to the wall; but now that the Turkish officers know that large forces are marching to General Townshend's relief, they may make a desperate attempt to destroy or capture his forces ibefore the floods subside, unless they also are inconvenienced by the rising waters. One thing in General Townshend's favour is that Kut-el-Amara is on high ground, and is a splendid place for resistance. NICE LITTLE HOLLAND ! German politicians, diplomatic provocateurs, and the press affect to havo good. grounds for asserting that Holland is arming against some threatened violation of her territory' on -the part of the Allies. The German solicitude for her safety frofn a treacherous attach by Great Britain would bo extremely farcical were it not that persistency of reiteration may influence any people in the lon£ run, find that in Holland thero are not a few papers that champion tho side of tho Germans. One influential paper, however, the Telegraaf, is a loyal supporter of tho Entente Powers. The attitude of the court and the upper classes is generally supposed to lean towards Germany ; but tho Government must know that any equivocal act on the part of Holland wpuld causo the loss of what trade is in existence, and also the loss of Holland's colonial possessions, which arc vast. Politically and commercially Holland would have nothing to gain by joining Germany, and the condition of the meases in Holland.

a would 6oon become as unenviable as thai of the German masses should her porta bo absolutely blockaded, which •would to '■ an easy matter for tho British to carry out. . , ' Tho fulsomoness of the German fla-tteqr , of Holland and tho hypocritically-expressed concern at Holland suffering on behalf of Germany is too patently ludicrous m its purposiveness, and the appreciation of the ' ; j suffering of Holland is a queer mental atti- i-\ tudo to be associated with tho arrogant tone of Germany towards neutral shippers f , and the . treacherous and piratical conduct towards Dutch shipping in particular. »• Holland has nothing- to fear from Britain \ or France. Tho German ambition to havo what the Germans call a free Rhinp is what all loyal and independence-loving Dutchmen *• should fear. No one wants the Dutch just now more than Germany does for her submarine warfare against Britain. Those ports in the hands of the Germans would be of incalculable value as bases for submarine work, ,Zeobruggc- is too apt to bo frequently knocked to pieces to be a good - - base, and as the estuary of the Scheldt is Dutch territorial water, iho Germans* . i. cannot lawfully use Antwerp as a base. The invasion of Holland would be of greater advantage to Germany and a questionable 1 one to the Allies. ~ * ?> All the Germans are working for is to ■ be called in to protect Holland, '■o that they may be free to manipulate the Dutch ,1 military strength, as they have manipulated that of Turkey and Bulgaria. To that end they are trying to create a sentiment and a.<ferment against Britain. Their preposterous assumption of a cherishing and fond attitude is something akin to tho actiob >; of the elephant that attempted to play the part of a mothering partridge. • m . £