THE OTAGO DAILY TIMES WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1915. MR CHURCHILL ON HIS DEFENCE.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 16543, 17 November 1915, Page 4

THE OTAGO DAILY TIMES WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1915. MR CHURCHILL ON HIS DEFENCE.

The report, cabled'this morning, of Mr Winston Churchill's speech in the House of Commons in vindication of his actions as a member of the Cabinet, from which he has resigned, will be read with interest. For a long period, .for more than a year indeed, Mr Churchill has endured in silence aspersions and criticism emanating from certain quarters which he must have found very galling. The trouble began with the British expedition to Antwerp. The Belgian city and fortress fell on October 9 of last year, after a short and sharp siege, and that Mr Churchill's reputation was damaged by failure of the British expedition was promptly suggested to the public by the • Morning Post, which placed upon him the whole responsibility for the experiences of the British force and bade him mind his own business at the Admiralty. In this attack on Mr Churchill the Morning Post found a whole army of supporters. No doubt the Antwerp expedition was an incident of the Flanders campaign upon which light was desirable. The version of the story which the public has generally accepted hitherto is that in response to an urgent appeal from the Belgian Government the British Cabinet agreed,' on Mr Churchill's re-, commendation, to send a marinP brigade with two newly-formed naval brigades—a contingent amounting in all to 8000 officers and ■men with two naval guns—to take part in the defence of the fortress during the last week of the siege. This force reached Antwerp- via Dunkirk on October 4, and the bulk of the men were sent on at once to the trenches . that had been constructed on the right bank of the Nethe River. Fighting alongside the Belgians, these men held their own in the trenches for two days, but then had to face such an overwhelming artillery fire that they were compelled to give way and retire behind the second line of forts surrounding 'the town. Subsequently, although the defence could have been prolonged if there had been any hope of relief, the British and Belgian military commanders decided to evacuate the fortress in order that the retreat of the garrison might not be cut off. The retirement was carried out in good order, but, owing to tlie pressure of the German attack, some 20,000 Belgians and 2000 men belonging to the British Naval Brigade were cut off and compelled to cross the Dutch frontier where they laid down their arms. The naval guns were removed to Dunkirk without mishap. That Mr left the Admiralty in order personally to visit Antwerp was no secret at the time, and was one of the grounds of the criticism that was passed upon him. The explanation of the circumstances attending the British attempt to stiffen the resistance of Antwerp as now given by Mr Churchill ,is, to a large extent, a repudiation of that measure of responsibility which has been fastened upon him. The project of sending an army to Antwerp originated, we are now told, with the French Government and Lord Kitchener, and Mr Churchill was not consulted until large bodies of troops were actually moving. The preparations for aiding Antwerp were far ad- , vanced when the Belgian Government notified its intention of abandoning the defence , of the city. It seemed as though everything would be thrown away for the sake of two or three days' continued resistance, and Mr Churchill therefore offered to proceed to Antwerp in order to tell the Belgian Government what ,\?4 been done and see in what way

the defence could be prolonged. His colleagues accepted the offer, and he crossed the Channel immediately. Having consulted the Belgian Government and the British staff officers in Antwerp, he made a telegraphic proposal that the Belgians should continue their resistance to the utmost limit and that the British and French Governments should say within three days whether they were able to send relief. Great Britain was also to encourage the defenders by sending naval guns and a naval brigade. This proposal was accepted, and Mr Churchill was assured that a relieving army would be sent and everything possible done to maintain the defence. The sequel is a matter of common knowledge. One critic has written: '' The defence of Antwerp does not appear to have been well organised. The Belgians trusted too much to their forts, too little to mobile defence. British help was sent too late> and when it arrived it was not the kind of help wanted.

The Nethe trenches had been so hastily and unscientifically constructed as to be practically useless, and when the Naval Brigade arrived they were literally shelled out of the jsosition without being given a chance to use their rifles." Mr Churchill, ifc will be observed, besides repudiating an undue share of responsibility in connection .with the British expedition to Antwerp, asserts it to be "a great mistake to regard Lord Kitchener's effort to relieve Antwerp as resulting only in misfortune." He claims that it resulted greatly to the advantage of the Allies in that it caused the great battle of the Yser to be fought rather than a battle further south. We are still left very much to the conclusion that if the British expedition had been successful—although, as events proved, it had' no chance of success—Mr Churchill would have received as much credit as, because of its practical failure, he actually refeeived blame. What he has had to say in relation to the Dardanelles enterprise refutes the idea that the operations in that relation were at all hasty, immature, or ill-considered, biit it gives evidence of the clash of strong minds— that of Lord Fisher and that of Mr Churchill—regarding certain phases of the undertaking. Mr Churchill complains that he did not receive from Lord Fisher that clear guidance and firm support which might have been expected. His explanation generally will remove some misapprehensions, but the nation is probably more interested just now in the vindication of enterprises than in a knowledge of the exact incidence of responsibilities.