THE TYRANNY OF PROHIBITION.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 14715, 24 December 1909, Page 9

THE TYRANNY OF PROHIBITION.

Sin.—ln a recent letter in your columns I ondoa.voured to prove that prohibition of tho use of alcoholic liquors is tyranny. Pursuing, tho subject further, I should now like to give some idea of tho best thought of tho age in regard to it. Among writers on political science there appears to be it pretty general agreement that one of tlw main objects of government is to promote freedom, and freedom has been defined as the " natural or moral right of every man to do that which ho wills, provided he infringes not tho equal freedom of any other man." This principle, formulated by Herbert Spencer about 60 years ago, and somewhat differently stated by Kant before him, has now become it current conception of thought, which crops up with great frequency in literature. Spencer contended that it is really an "ultimate ethical principle, having an authority 'transcending overy other"; and that it constitutes a supremo guido to tho establishment and maintenance of right social relationships." Unfortunately tho "law of equal freedom," as it has been called, is often lest sight of by politicians and reformers; and then measures in violation of the law arc passed which are productive of evils that sometimes far outweigh tho good sought to bo attained. It is, of course, not always easy to determine beforehand whether a legal enactment will violate the higher ethical law of equal freedom; but thero seems to be a remarkablo unanimity of opinion among great thinkers that "prohibition is a violation of the ethical law— that is to say, that prohibition, is tyranny. A perusal of Mill's essay on "Liberty," and Spencer's "Social Statics," "Tho Study of Sociology," and " The Principles of Ethics," leaves no room for doubt as to the views of those writers on the subject. Not only is prohibition expressly denounced as tyranny by them; but it would bo difficult to find more cogent reasons than tho works cited afford for such denunciation. But, to come nearer to our own time, let mo quote the opinion of an emiment historian and moralist of high standing—namely, W. E. U. Lecky. In referring to prohibition legislation in the United Stated in his work on "Dcmooraey and Liberty," Lecky says: "To attempt to guard adult men by law against temptation, and to place them under a moral tutelage, may, no doubt, in particular instances prevent grave evils, but is a dangerous precedent and a bad education for tho battle of life. There is a specious aspect of liberalism in a proposal to submit such questions to a popular vote, but in truth this is a pure delusion. The essence of great liberty is that every >i<lult and sane man should havo the right to pursuo his own life and gratify his own tastes without molestation, provided lie does not injure .his neighbours, and provided ho fulfils the duties which tho Slate exacts from its citizens. If, under these conditions, he mismanages his life, the responsibility and the penalty will fall upon himself; 'but in a perfectly free State the law has no right to coerce him. Violations of liberty' do not lose their character because they arc the acts, not of kings and aristocracies, but of majorities of electors." Tlia same writer mate; it clear that the coercion of a majority which wishes " to attempt to prevent all men, from using drink because some men use it in excess" must not be confounded with that which is sometimes found necessary in industrial life. "If," ho says, "the great majority of shopkeepers desire to shut their shops on a particular da;', or if the great majority of workmen wish to leave tho factory at a particular hour, thov may plausibly argue that the rule should bo made universal, as a.dissentiont minority pursuing a different course would frustrate their desires.. But the man who wishes to go to a public.houso docs not in any degree interfere with the liberty of those who desire to abstain." , A still more recent authority on the question of liberty in relation to prohibition is Professor W. M. Flinders Petri;, the learned author of "A History of Kgvpt." In an admirable article on " The Right of Constraint," which appeared .in tha Hibbert Journal in July of last year, the professor very forcibly condemns compukory abstin.enco from the ns9 of alcoholic liquor. In the course of the article referred to the writer says:—"The various proposals of tho present lime for dealing with tho undoubted evils of drink may be perhaps tested first by inquiring what will promote lawlessness and deceit. Now, any attack on the public sale will naturally increase the private sale in chile, and an attack on clubs will incrcaso tho drinking at home. It is hopeless to establish tho inquisition in overy house and every club. Moreover, if it were attempted on' an effective scal.o it would certainly lead to such a gigantic system of blackmail and bribery that the army of corrupt/inspectors would outdo the delntors of Tiberius. Moreover, it would need a conscience of stalwart Pharisaism to attack the essentially private acts of a largo part of tho population by domiciliary inspection of associations or families. 'This leads to the question, How far can interference with private acts which do not injure another p?rson, ever be justified? . '. . Can we insist on dry-nursing grownup men? And, if wo do so, are they more likely to learn temperance and selfrestraint? I cannot see that any rule, short of an inquisition, can regulate private lives that do not give open offeree. Exactly tho samo reasoning ajplios to clubs, where drinking is done in private. It is not our wishes, it is not our dogmatic certainty that our judgment is right, that can give the authority tor interference. It is only as soon as a man is incapable on his way home, or kicks his wife on irotting there, that the law can touch hint. The penalty cannot be on the act of drinking, but the .penalty for offences committed when drunken may well be greatly increased. . . Our general view of thy supposed right- of constraint, apart from tho repression of selfish action on others, seems to leave but little ground for safely dealing with the acts of an individual on himself. Even where constraint is apparently beneficial, by exercising it wo may risk evils as great or greater than those wo to - to suppress. And wo givo scope to a blind Plmris.iism and inquis'tarul dogmatism which is a curso to those who exercise it and a terror to those who en. dure it."

Now, it may suijpriso prohibitionists to learn, that Professor Petric is an abstainer from alcoholic liquor; and as such his views should! have some weight with thorn. J'ufc file fact of great significance is that Potrie,'Mill, Spencer, and Lscky aw supported in their view that prohibition is tyranny by numerous otljer writers of great ability, notably by Mr Frederic Harrison (in his article on "The Veto on Drink"), Mr Charles Fletcher Dole, an American moralist'lin ins work "The Spirit of Democracy"), Mr E. F. B, Fell (in "The Foundations of Liberty"), and Mr Bruce Smith (in "Liberty "and Liberalism"). All the writers mentioned may bo truly regarded as anti-prohibitionists; and when I say that I cannot remember a Single great thinker who lias dealt ivith tllG subject of liberty and .lias not, either expressly or by implication, condemned (prohibition as tyrannical, it will 1 be seen that those who hold the same view stand in company on one subject, dt onyrate, with the " kings of modern thought," and moralists of the highest standing. Holding that view, they \vill probably agree with Mr Frederic that "No goodness m motive, no zeal in philanthrophy or ipiety, no picture of the horrors of alcoholism, no statistics of national loss and misery, no aocumul&tion of psoudo-scicntific authority, will ever justify the monstrous wrongfulness of any attempt to suppress tho Ui-o of alcohol by law."—l am, etc., 11. F. 15,