THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 13222, 3 March 1905, Page 5

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

SEVERE OUTPOST FIGHT, ARTILLERY DUEL CONTINUES A JAPANESE REPULSE. NO TRAINS FOR THE FRONT Preas®iS.s3bciation— By Telegraph—Copyright. ATTACKS REPULSED. LONDON, March 1. (Received March 2, at 8.26 a.m.) The Japanese repulsed a series of attacks between the railway and the IJun-ho. FIERCE HAND-TO-HAND FIGHTING. RUSSIANS FORCED TO RETREAT. LONDON, March 2, "'(Received Maicli 2, at 8.56 p.m.) Early on Tuesday morning five companies of infantry surrounded the Japanese outposts on the railway bridge at Shu-pang-tai, north of the Sha-ho. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting in the trenches for two hours followed. The Russians retreated, leaving 60 dead. ATTEMPT TO BREAK THE CENTRE. THE JAPANESE REPULSED. LONDON, March 2. (Received March 2, at 8.56 p.m.) An attempt to break tlio Russian centre at Fyn-dia-pu on the 25th failed, owing to the swift- arrival of reinforcements, who, shouting "We have no more cartridges," lured tile Japanese near them, and then volleyed, killing 120. The rest retreated. A RUSSIAN SUCCESS. ARTILLERY FIGHTING CONTINUES. LONDON, March 2. (Received March 2, at 8,56 p.m.) The Russians, on the 27th, captured Lao-tiiii-tzu, near Sandc-pu, inflicting great losses with hand grenades. Artillery fighting continues along the whole front of 80 miles. The Russiiiii3 state that the Japanese have been driven back from the Tun-si-lai-ling and Fu-si-ling Passes. THE VLADIVOSTOK GARRISON. NO TRAINS FOR THE FRONT. LONDON, March 1. (Received March 2, at 8.26 a.m.)

The. garrison lit Vladivostok is estimated in Tokio to number 40,000 men. Owing to the strikes in Russia and damage to the railways, no train . has started for the front for a week. THE PORT ARTHUR DEFENCES. AFTER THE -SEIGE. BUILDING STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS. (FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.) YOKOHAMA, January 25. General Stoes;el, together with some 47S ofl'icors, their wives, soldier servants, and orphans left Nagasaki for horns oil tlio M.M. steamer Australian oil January 16. Some particulars of his Inst days at Fort Arthur are now leaking out. Licntenanteolonel Tsunoda, who accompanied General Stoessel back to the fortress after the General's famous interview with Nogi on' tlio sth ir.Gt., says that Stoessol asked for information as to the whereabouts of Kourapatkin. Tsunoda replied that he oould not bo sure, tot ho thought that 'Italian, near Mukden, was Kourapatkin'; .present quarters. Stoosscl then explained that his last letter from Kourapatkin lmd been dated the 6th of October, and in it the assumption of tlio offensive was announced, as well as tlio writer's intention of pushing southward. Naturally this intelligence, was received with much satisfaction, but day after day brought no further now.s. Then a Chinese spy reported that Kourapatkin had got as far as Ying-chin fez, which is south of Nan-shun. This indicated the imminent relief of tlio fortress, and again and again Sioessol consulted his maps, following in imagination tlio course of Koura.patkin's inarch. Tsunoda explained tlwt ICouropatkin hid actually assumed the offensive, hut that he had been repulsed with a leva of 50,000 or 60,000 men. Stoessel then asked about the. Baltio fleet, hut of oourso Tsunoda could net toll anything certain. He knew only that the floot was ssid to have passed the Cape of Good Hope. " What on earth can tliev bo doing," asked Stoosscl. as well lie might. Asked by Tsunoda what the besieged had found most .'formidable in the attack. Stoessol again emphasised tho immensely destructive cflVc.te of the ?.B-cent. guns. He declared that, these weapons had destroyed all the defences. For his own part ho had always been opposed to tlio creation of such admirable communications as those existing between Dalnv and Port Arthur. Ho pointed out to Sarolioff tlio unwisdom of such means of transit should Port Arthur ever 1:© invested, with Dalny for basis. But no attention'had been paid to his warnings, and it might now lie said that Sarahoff himself had sealed the fate of the fortress. He went on to explain that he himself Ins been opposed to the war. His experiences in the North China campaign a year or so back had shown him that the beat troops then in the field were tlvc Japanese and tlio Russians under his own orders. No other troops could compare with thein, and lie had deprecated the great unwisdom of a combat between such armies. People alleged that Alexeieff had been in favour of this war. There cgold •bo'no .greater mistake. Alexeieff had been Commander-in-Chief of the Russians in the Pokin expedition cif 1903, and he liarl learned the value of the Japanese as fighting men. Therefore war with them had keen the last tiling ha desired. It was to the ignorance of tho St. Petersburg officials that the failure to effect a peaceful settlement must bo attributed. Stoeseel addci' tlwt ho had hewi for five years in Port Arthur. He had commanded tho Third Division of the Third Army, troops on which ho could thoroughly rely. But the Third Army hid been sent north, mid he. who would gladly have .accompanicd it. had» been obliged to remain r.t Port Arthur with the Fourth and Seventh Divisions. When tile Jananese made their first- attnel* on Port Arthur—the naval attack of the 9Mi February—tho garrison was much alarmed. There wore then only two or three thousand men in the place, and the defences were far jrorp eomnletion either in tlio f-ea-front or on tlio land side. Thereafter the utmost diligence had been excreted to place the fortress in a- nroper condition, but it could not be enid that the work had been fully carried out when the investment beian. General Kondraebenko had been the We and ami of these defensive preparations, and his death was a terrible blow. Ho foil on tlio *rd of Dee?mber in the East Kee-kw.m-sliau Fort. A council of war. was hein<r held there, when a Jananese shell struck the place and killed a number of men, anion? them the brave ant! competent General. Stoes;el concluded by saving that he had been wounded three time in his life, once in each war which he had fought. He lmd now done his duty io his country, and ho intended to spend tho rest of his days in peaceful retirement. Ivouranatkin was an old friend of iiis. They had been schoolmates, and it naincd him very much to think of tlio difficult position in which Kourapatkin now found himself. It is said that the forts _ most injured nt Port Arthur arc East Kee-I:wan-shan, Ur-lung-shan, and Sung-shu-shan What with Japanese shells and Japanese mines they are thoroughly wrecked, and to restore them to their original condition would be a very heavy task. The forts on the western face are much less hurt, 'lhey were the target chiefly of the naval guns, and the saps do not appear to have : Deen cavricvl within mining distance. With_regard to the section between Fast Kee-kwan-shan and tho sea no' apprecitbk-

damage has been done., .These were never subjected, to .any .really serious bombardment. All tho. operations undertake.! against them wcro in tho nature of diversions. On tho sea .face, whoro tho torts were subjected to naval tiro only, tho re-, suits are inappreciable. There tho.defence may bo said to bo intact. 'Tho naval tiro, it will bo remembered, was~diroetcd rathor against the military; buildings than against tho forts, 'which are virtually imprcgnablo from the .sea. The condition of tho gun» has not yet been accurately ascertained. A commission of examination has been organised under Major-General Arisaka, the great artillery expert, dnd according to this commission's report it will bo decided guns to retain in position, which' to repair "in loco," and which to send to Japan as irreparable. A story typical of the Japanese character is now. going tho rounds of the vernacular press. It comes through an officer's, letter sent to his family from tho Slia-ho, whore ho is serving, and it tells of a really tc- , markable incident. It seems that tho thought poured to some of tins younger . officers that it .would bo good fun to ac- : quaint tho Russians,'.of - tho fall of Port i Arthur, and so .volunteers weiro invited to carry tho necessary letters. Two. non-com- ■ missioned officers and two privates under- . took tho task. They rode out towards tho enemy's lines.-(bo intention being to deliver tho letters direct into the hands of the Russians, instead of depositing' them at some midway point, as had p hitherto boon tho custom. Thovo was, : however, a great danger that, this change of procedure might ho fatal to tho little party. nevertheless they rode off stoutly. Arriving within a thousand metres of tho enemy's iutoost they waved white handkerchiefs. The Russians did not fire, and the Janancee moved on stcadilv. At 300 metres tlicv observed 20 or 40 Russians dismount and lie down in firing positions, but still the sergeants and soldiers pushed oil,, waving, their wliito flaps. Tho Russians now signed to thoni to lay down their arm's, evidently imaging tlwt. tliey had come to surendcr,'lmt they j paid no attention, and, ri'j'ing on steadily, ; came at last within handshaking distance. They carried several bottles of wine r.nd boxes of cigars. On these were inscribed in big letters: "To-morrow will be your Christmas T)nv, Wc wiii not attack jf yon do not. Drink and smoke to vour hearts' content, and have a trcod time." Tho Russians were at first indisnoscd to accept these presents, but when thev read what was written on tho bottles and boxes thev changed their attitude completely. ,and thovo ensued, an exchange of greetings. Then the visitors handed their letters, speaking of the fall of Port Arthur, telling • bow Stoo?scl would soon be oh his way homo, and calling attention to somo pictorial postcard' which accompanicd the letters, and which showed how j^issian prisoners were treated in Japan. Finally tho four men rotlo awa" in safety. Was there ever a stranger piece of outpost work? A short account of tho Seoul-Fusan railway in Korea, which, to all intents auft purposes. is a military line, designed ami executed solelv by Japan* with Japanese capital, should lw interesting reading at this time. This railway, which was opened to traffic.on the inst., had its ].ractieal origin in tho troublous time of 1694, when Japan and China were at war, so far as projection went, but it did not actually obtain official sanction until 1698, when tho charter : for its construction was signed. Surveys, • made by Japanese engineers, commenced at a later period, and wore concluded by Juno, 1900, work keing inaugurated from hctli fnd-3 in Sc-ptember, 1901. Tho capital was Tint at 25 million yon, and 100,000 shares (50 yen each) were issued in June, 1901, 335,684 'in 1902. and 64,316 in 1903, tho 'otal issue being thus effected. Ton million yon of tho entire capital was paid up in two years 1902 and 1903.—and tho Japanese Government agreed to grant a subsidy- of 6 for cent, on the paid-up capital pending tho opening of tho road to traffic, and thereafter to hand over such a sum as wi.nld bring tho net earnings to that percentage, this arrangement to hold for 15 years. Tho Korean authorities gave the land for tho road as well as for the stations, warehwises, and workshops free of charge, and agreed not to lQvy any Customs duty on articles imported for the construction or use cf tho lino or to imposo any taxes on its income of whatsoever kind. It will bo seen, therefore, that tho company received no small measure of Slato assistance. Nevertheless, its work did not progress satisfactorily, and in tho meanwhile tho need for tho lino became pressing in view of tho strained relations ljetwecn Japan a.nd ■ Russia, 'llierefoi'fl, at tho close of 1903 the Japancso Government placed a sum of 1,750,000 yen at tho disno-'al of tlm company, and eooii afterwards"addo-J 750,000 yen, bringing the total grant to two and a-half millions. This liberality was accompanied by an injunction that the road must 'lie opened to traflio lathe of ISO 4, and the personnel of tho directorate was reorganised, Professor Furuiclii being appointed the director, witli ilr Oya for liis vice. - Work was now carried on day and night, and the whole length of 276 miles between Seoul and Fusan was completed. Hut. owing la this basic, temporary bridges and partially-prepared tunnels had to be employed at some places, so that, although the road was opened to traifio on tho Ist of January, tho construction will not be solidly finished before next April. It is understood that in csonswpience of tlw haste made and t-he difficulties of obtaining labour during tlw war, a further sum of 1,560,030 yen had to be lwrrowed from the Japamiso Treasury without interest.aiul thus the money given in aid by the State totals a tittle over four million yen. The cc&t of construction is stated by Professor Furuiclii to have been about 100,000 yen per mite, wliicli is a better result than was anticipated. Tho steepest gradient is 1 in 50, and the sharpest curve has a radius of 15 chains. There are 26 tunnels, baying a total length of 16,390 ft, their locations and their respective lengths being as follow:— " „ ,

Songhwa tunnel (in Kyongsando Province "318 Muwolsan tunnel (in Kyongsando Province) 1452 Ftisang tmuicl (in Kyongsando Province) .. -• "SO Hwnnggnng tunnel (in Chliungoliliong Province , 330 Kuipok tunnel (in Ckhungehhoug Province) 921 Cheungye.k tunnel (in Cbhungehhong-do Province) .. 838 Wolyon tunnel (in Kyongsaug-do Province) .. .. SIS, Hwaluvau tunnel (111 Kynngsnngdo Pro- ■ I vine;) 525 ' There aro S9 bridges, with a total length of 23,791 ft. with 501 small bridges totalling 341£ ft in length. Tho principal bridges are: — Over the Ila'.i Diver 2054 Over tho Jfakdong liivcr ~ .. MO Over tho ICcumho lover .. .. .. 1217 Over tho Second Ketim River .. .. 1915 Over tho Jliiyoug liivcr ....... 879 Over tho Kyongho liivcr .. .. 8)8 . Over tho First Kciim River .. S2l Of these bridges tho meet difficult aro said to have been those over the Nak--dong, tho Koum-ho,- and tho Han. The stations number 53, and the rails weigh Yslb per yard. Tho gauge is 4ft Bain, which has been chosen with the object of subsequent connection with the Chinese, and Siberian lines. It was at first thought that as tho lino lengthened Ilia profits would ' become less, but facts have not home out that supposition.. On tho contrary, tho earnings aro steadily increasing. Tho northern section yielded only from 3 to 4 yon per mile daily, but this has bccome 6.70 yen, and the southern section is earning 8.30 yen. Tho expectation is that the 10-yon figure, which will pay expenses, will soon be reached.. Its military va'.ue to Japan is enormous. Another very important strategical railway in Korea, built by Japan, is that known as the Seoul-Wiju line, which was at ono time supposed to bo on ihe ovo of construction by a l'rr.nch syndicate, and which would probably have figured in Russia's programme o: expansion had not events moved too quickljj for her. It is not a mero military macadamised road to tho Tain that would lntvo" satisfied Russia. When she found a campaign imminent sho wisely set to work to construct such a road, but, unless my informants be mistaken,' sho laid ill her archives plans- to join • Liaoyanjf with Wijn by a line of railway, which would have subsequently boon pushed on to Seoul, thus bringing St. Petersburg into dircct communication by rajl with 1 the Korean capital. What that would liavo portended any reader of Russian history may dcnipb&r for himself. It is not a new instrument of-Imperial expansion, tho railway, and Russia, having utilised it in Manchuria oil a scale that commanded tho world's admiration, was tolerably. certain to extend its use- to Korea. The distaiico between Seoul and .Wiju is 300 miles, lieir.g thus some 30 miles greater than t the distance between' Seoul and Fman. Therefore the whole trunk line from north' to south of the peninsular empire will be 570 miles in length. At tho. outbreak of the ore-sent war; Japan obtained the Korean. .Government's consent for. the construction of tho. I Seoul-Wiju section. Immediately a sum.of | ]f> million yon was set aside from the war ! fund, and work; was commenc?!], being; thenceforth oorricrt on with such vigour, % day and by night alike, that; according to our, Tokio conteni'joriiry, two-thirds of. the road liavo already bjc'n built, and the whole will probably bo opened to traffic in. March.

This big enterprise has been going 'on quietly. . Not muoh attention as been attracted, but the .results are solid. As to tha geographical features, tho work bus been easier than that on tho southern half of the'trunk line, thovnumb&r; of bridge's and tunnels being comparatively few. The Ta-dong River required a 1 large bridge, but tho country selected is in the main lovel, and tho cost of tho' undertaking is thus small. Closely associated with the building of tho lino is tho question of its prolongation into 'Manchuria, so as to connect with tho extra-mural system of China. Two routes are understood to bo now under discussion, tho first of which may bo. roughly described as a ccastwiso line, since it runs comparatively near the shore of tho Yellow Sea; whereas tho other is ail inland route. No statement has yet been published as to their relative engineering facilities and commercial prospects, but from a military, point o£ view ihe second route would probably. be tho better, as an extension of it from tfongh-wang-chcug to Liao-yang would bring

Korea into direct communication with what may bo 6alled tho strategical base of Manchuria. Among Japan's proposals to Russia for a peaceful settlement of tho churian-Korca question ono was that the Seoul-AViju railway should • ultimately ho carried on into Manchuria'so as to link with tho system of lines in tho latter district. But Russia would not accede. Sho mustregret that decision now. A. Beuamt Brown.