REFLECTIONS ON THE WAR.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 12989, 2 June 1904, Page 9

REFLECTIONS ON THE WAR.

V.y Captain A. K. OrmiiEiu, Deolali Dcnot, Jiombav. •■

(Written for llic Olngo Daily Times.) Tlio present war boliveon Rmsin ami , Japan is, in some aspects, unparalleled in the history of nations. Kuwiu. is one of Ilio. '('rent I'owors of (lie world; by soino it lias been considered to he tlio greatest Power; but, in any case, all inust agree that it Ims ii forcmio.it .place amongst Iho fireat Towers. On Iho other hand, Japan, until recently, has licon generally regarded as a small Oriental and uncivilised nation; ami, even on the ovp of the outbreak of tlio war, was not considered by ninny to bo-a Power of any groat magnitude. There may be few, perhaps, who can Jay claim to having held', any time during tlio past 10 years, the opinion that Russia was a Colossus with foot of clay, and Japan is a rising Power whoso strength was a quantity all Great Powers would do well not to neglM. But, speaking generally, Iho work' , has considered Russia to b'o one- of tlio three greatest Powers, anil , Japan to be a. Power whose weight was of little value in the Council of Xation*. . , The question that ftiioilhl Iμ jn tlio minus of all men is this: How comes it that Japan, nfl'-r a dignified, patient, prolonged, and courteous attempt to arrive at a peaceful i'SrM.wiit with Russia, suddenly, _ apparr'iiily, broke oft ""' diplonmtio negotiations viili" her ureal- niilttnfiiiisr. ami proceeded In iictivn ho-itilili-."i? Tlio ready answer on the lip? of most men may be that, seeing \m k iucvitable, Jftpiin 'liiwtoed to cn-

gago the onemy before the latter had time to complete his preparations for a- long and arduous campaign. On the. surface, tins appears to ho the correct view, ami, looking at the question with military eyes aloiro, it was the only step Japan could take, being the ABO of strategy. But wo must not 1)9 satisfied wii.li a glib superficial answer to so momentous a question. The matter is of (ho first importance, and demands tlio ■cliiECst attention of our deepest thoughts. ■ Wo have, hardly a parallel ea;e with which to compare, the'exisling eircnistanees. With regard to apparent audacity, wo have tho eiiso of (ho ltoer Republics in 1699 ilofyinif the. might of Rre.it Britain. But, in that wise, though wo need not descend so far os to describe, the conflict as one between a !ou?a organisation of bold inland farmers mid ilio "grmtKt Power in (lie world; still, w> rtiay reasonably assert that, aiiiougst men capable of exercising judgment in the matter, llici'o never was any doubt ahoufc the inevitable- result, seeing that tho Republics .did not own a single ship, and had i:o access, either by land or by sea, to otlier civilised 1 natiuiis who might have desired to lielp them. Tlio nearest similar oase, perhaps, to the present war between linssia and Japan is that of England and Franco at tho beginning of tlio nineteenth century. Ifc was then the fate of an England, far different from tho ono of to-ctoy, to defy the French Colossus. Wo must not forget that, in Ihcee days, tho opinion of tho world, generally, was that Napoleon would overrun Kngland in the samo way aa ho _ had ravaged other nations opposed to his will. However, although this is the nearest similar case \vo can call to mind, yet it ia far—very far—from being exactly similar. At the beginning of tho nineteenth century England was already a nation with a glorious history, already a world power, rich and resourceful, and had gained and demanded liur right to ho heard in tlio council chamber of every nation in tho world; whereas Japan, until 10 year? ago, was at least a negligible quantity in the council of nations, and on tho evo of the outbreak of the present war was certainly not a world power. And so wo are forced hack to the conclusion that the present conflict i\s unparalleled in tlio history of nations. I'nlofs wo can account for something moro than has been made, public, tho audacity of tho Japanese in being the first to declare open hostilities seems almost dwpsrato and reckless. Yet the Japanese surely cannot bo convicted of being cither desperate or reckless. Their dignified patience and courtesy during tho prolonged negotiations with lius.ik before the war entirely disproves thk We must sock elsewhere for the solution to this intensely important and interesting question.

That Russia- despised her enemy is beyond doubt. By reason of his temperament, environment, physique, ami his political and religions institutions, it would bo difficult for a Russian not to regard a Japanese as an Oriental, a heathen, a yellow man, or, in plain English, a nigger. Even now, in spite ot the glaring jtnprcprjedhess of tho Russians which the initial successes of the Japanese have so prominently brought to light, Russian generals, admirals, and newspapers talk of nothing else but sweeping the Japanese back into the sea, and dictating the terms of neaco at Tokio within thrco months. Now wo may bo quite certain that Russia, would not talk Jike this, or even bo so ready to despise tho yellow man, did she not feel suro that Great Britain would remain strictly neutral so long as Franco maintained the same attitude, Russia will take the greatest kito net to call upon France for active assistance, as by doing so she knows only too well that it will mean iha whole might, Imperial and colonial, of Great Britain thrown into the scale against her. Tho greatest island power in tho world joined to tho greatest island power in tho East is a combination which Russia and France may well regard with respect, if not with awe.. Russia will not, then, willingly do anything to cause France to actively assist her. The Japanese must understand this thoroughly, and yet, apparently, knowing Mint they must fight (•ingle-handed, they unhesitatingly, .and with calmness, most energetically begin open hostilities, ao'.v, it is not to bo supposed that tho Japanese, in spite of their most marvellous regeneration as n nation, imagine that, single-handed, they are a match for Russia—the greatest land power in the world. If we appraise the Japanese at their tmo value, we must credit them with no siit'h foolish thought. Wo must again turn elsewhere for light on the situation. Has Japan another ally other than Great Britain? Has Russia another onomy in tho Far East other than Japan? In nnswering these questions wo may find the secret spring to the hold action of the Japanese. Jf the expression "yellow peril" has any meaning, assuredly it includes both China and Japan; and justas assuredly wo may conclude that ihero is a very complete and secret understanding between those two nations. Again, if Japan has just caiii-e to feel enmity towards Russia, xf ill mom so has China such cause. Here, then, lies the fulcrum on which the Japanese lever is moving, and by which Japan hopes to sot back I lie Russian advance to Far Eastern waters. There eeems to be little doubt that, when the preconcerted moment, arrives, the Chinese will very actively assist the- Japanese. There are signs already that tho Russians are apprehensive of some such action. They know that there arc a large number of Japanese officers with the Chinese army, and that there is a widespread feeling in China of antagonism to Russia which may somo day break out info open hostilities. A war of reprisal against Russia would ho popular with all classes in China, provided it had any chance of success. The Chinese Government is too astute to openly side with Japan at the beginning of the war. It is its policy to seo which way tho wind blows boforo it embarks on so serious an adventure. Moreover, Japan herself has no intention, wo may suppose, of calling in Chinese (lid until the opportune moment

arrives. It is an interesting speculation to conjecture at what particiar phase of tlio operation!! (lie Japanese and Chinese, will consider the time ripe for the union of (heir powers against tho common enemy, and what will bo the result of such union with regard to tlto action of the (Jreat Powers. Aβ far as e.an/bo gathered from what lias transpired, it appears to l;o evident that Japan, if slio can, means to obtain tho mastery over Russia in Far Eastern seas, to capture Part Arthur, Xeivchwang, and Vladivostok, to drive the Russians north of a lino drawn from Newohwang to Vlatlivostock, and then to entrench themselves on this lino, and hold it with modem arms against, tho whole Russian army until the situation further develops. The further development which, apparently, Japan has provided for, may be this: Having secured tho command of the Far Kastcrn seas, and (ho roads and railways in rear of its entrenched line, Japan will proceed to make her advanced position impregnable to anything Russia can bring against it. Japan will then take tho Cliiueso army in hand— instruct it, equip it, and staff it. The combined forces of Japan and China will then, gradually, but surely and slowly, advance- to the attack. Tins only doubtful point is, supposing .Tnpan obtains the , I'ommand of the Far Kastorn seas, can she retain it? Can Russia raise a fleet much stronger than the one Japan possesses, and send it out to the Far Eastern seas so as to arrive there in fighting condition? Russia will havo.no docks or equipping.stations in the Far liast (presuming that Port Arthur and Vladivostok have fallen), and how is hlio to coal a fleot from the Baltic and Mediterranean seas to the China seas? It is not an easy task, and it appears impossible for Russia to send out a fleet- under such circumstances, strong enough and in condition and disposition to overcome the whole Japanese navy. In the meantime the Japanese navy will add to its strength by