THE PROBLEM OF PERSIA.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 12445, 30 August 1902, Page 2

THE PROBLEM OF PERSIA.

To the uninitiated the visit to England of the Shah of Persia, Mnzuffer-ed-Din, "The King of-Kings," is probably a passing incident of no importance, but it is more than likely that affairs of State and not the, delights of travelling are the cause of his presence in London. The Shall, like more than one Sovereign aiul President, owes his throno to the assassin, and in turn has been the object of. an, assassin. In Persia, as in other countries ruled by despots, accession by heredity is almost an 'unknown eveut might rather than right being the prevailing means of gaining a throne. In tho< Slink's case, though the second son, lie was nominated by his father, ami during liis father's life was recognised as the heir by choice, but there was a strong following in favour of his elder brother. In 1896 the late Shah, Nasir-n-Din, • was visiting a shrine near Teheran, when a notorious follower of Jainal-u-Dln, who plotted against. Persia from • Constantinople, stepped forward with aj.petition. As the Shah was in the act' of taking it the assassin fired his revolver, which was secreted beneath the ■paper, His victim fell mortally wouuded a>ifl died immediately after. The Prime Minister rose to the occasion, and, with rpady wit, gave out that the Shah was only slightly wounded, drove back to Teheran, and took the necessary steps to maintain order and secure the present Shah's accession before the sad news made known. His action was supported by the British and Russian Consuls; and Sir Mortimer Durand, the Britislj Consul, instructed the Ihiperial Bank 'of Persia to advance money to pay the.troops and to enable the present Shah to reach the capital without delay. In this way, Muzuifer-ed-Din ascended the throne without the attendant anarchy which would almost certainly have followed.:a. less .prompt and foreseeing line of action.

This is the Shah's second visit to Europe, the first being in 1900; .but in that year England, though included in the original programme, was omitted,' on account, it is said, of the death of the Duke of Coburg. When at Sevres, ia France, an unsuccessful attempt was anade upon bis life. Why his Highness is in England at the present time it is impossible to more than conjecture, but foi' soiiie years past the struggle for the political'--and commercial control of Persia has caused much unrest in the Councils of Russia, Germany, and Great Britain, and it is possible that the Shall, recognising 'that Great Britain has less desire for , political control than any other nation, is wishing to gain Britain as.an ijlly against the Northern Colossus. A year or two ago China was gridironed with railway concessions, now lying dorltiaut, but potentially providing a plentiful % crpp of disputes in the .future. The scene is now changed to Persia. Russia aims at occupying strategical towns, and is credited with the intention of fouildinj.two trunk lines of rail-way-none south from the Trans-Caapian railway, flanking the western frontier of Afghanistan, threatening Herat, Kabul, and : Kandahar, and striking the open Sea at Banda Abbas, or some other maritimepQrt of strategical value; the other owning in from Trans-Caucasia and striking'down in the west. On the ot&r'hand, it has been suggested that Great Britain should continue westward. tW Indian Tailway systems, by a line skirting the southern boundary of Afghanistan,, and strikiug across Persia to tlije bead ,of, Persian Gulf., This line could throw off commercial aiidi strategical Hues south to the seaports and north to Korman, the great carpet and silk manufacturing centre, and to Isfahan and Teheran. Then Germany, undreamt of tea yeans ago as a colonising nation or jaaritime Power,' appears on the scene with, a line from Asia Minor, coming dawn-through the valley of the Tigris and • Euphrates, and terminating perhaps at Koweit, of which we hear every now 1 'audi .again, or in • the 'neighbourhood of Basra, and so Connecting with the contemplated Perso-Indian line. The . problem has led to the marking out of three distinct lines of proposed action. One school of publicists suggests that we should make terms with; Germany. But, according to Major Percy Molesworth Sykes, late Consul at Kerman and in Persian Beluchistan, it is Germany that is ou,v feal rival—the empire with the future on tl\o water, the empire which cherishes ambitionsi that can be satisfied only at our expense, the empire whose statesmen and' press are unfriendly and insulting, and the empire which cherishes the dream of a colonial possession extending from the Bosphorus to the Persian Gulf, a possession embracing territories in the enjoyment of a. splendid climate and capable of absorbing the stream of emigration now wasted in the cities of America. The second school advocates making terms with Russia. But 1 our past experiences of a reliance on Russian promises are not such as to make us auxious to put any further dependence upon Russian diplomats or Russian treaties. Further, Russia' on the Persian Gulf—and a Russian authority ridicules the idea that we can stay Russia's progress southwards—; means a direct menace to India; for Russia at, say, Bauda Abbas (which is lier ' objective), will necessitate the doubling of the Indian garrisons and of the Bast Indian Squadron, will cut the Suez route to India and the Par JEast in time of war, and will absolutely prevent the opening up by Great Britain ■of any overland route to India from the Mediterranean. The third school would venture upon the bolder policy of "a splendid isolation." This school maintains that, supported by her daughter nations, and backed by the benevolent neutrality of the United States, Great Britain must be free to follow her own destiny, even if. it signifies an Empire from, Egypt to Hongkong. Whichever school of thought will prevail, Persian politics are of extreme interest to Great Britain as the paramount Powov in ■India, Afghanistan, and Beluchistan. It is our object to maintain Persia in as •strong a position as possible that she may continue-to act as a buffer State between Great Britain and Russia; 'for to be in juxtaposition in Asia to one of the great military Powers of Europe involves heavy additional expense in the defence of India-, and the .loss of that strength of remoteness which recently stood the Boers in such good stead.

At the present moment there does not appear to be any doubt that Russia's influence is paramount politically. The Persian (lag is prohibited on the Caspian, Persia is 'bound not to borrow except from Russia, and it is reported that no more road or railway concessions are to be granted in Persia except with Russia's consent. In the north Russian influence and proximity have caused commercially a large decrease in the imports from Great Britain, though Manchester cottons are 'still sold in the bamrs. Cotton previously exported to India now goes to' Russia. lii the south the commercial and the maritime supremacy of Great Britain are undisputed; but Russia has new a; line of steamers between Odessa and the Persian Gulf, and Germany is struggling for a foothold. At the moment the trade of the Persian Gulf ports;is worth abput live millions a year to the British Empire, and is capable of almost indefinite expansion, providing that Persia remains a free agent. It was only a few months ago that one of the Cecils said in the House when referring to Persia generally and to Southern Persia and to the Persian Gulf in particular: '-'We are anxious for the integrity o£ Persia, but we are anxious far more for the balance of power, and it would be impossible for us, whatever the cause, to abandon what we look upon as our rightful position in Persia. It is true, not only of the Persian Gulf, but of. the .southern provinces of Persia, and those provinces which border on our ..Indian Empire. Our right there and . our position of ascendancy we cannot abandon."!. Historically the Persian Gulf is one of the most interesting bodies of water in the world. It is said that the Chinese played pingAng a thousand years ago! Five hundretf years belVo that Chinese ships crowded the waters of the Persian Gulf. Is it again to rival the splendours of the past ? Or is it in the immediate future to bo the scene of a great conflict on which will depend our continued commercial and maritime supremacy in Persia and Persian waters? And if we get worsted in the conflict, will the natural sequence be the downfall of our Indian Empire?