MORE ABOUT BULLER.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 12394, 2 July 1902, Page 2

MORE ABOUT BULLER.

COLENSO AND LADYSMITH.

SOME SENSATIONAL [REVELATIONS,

EXAMPLES OP INCAPACITY

OR WORSE

OI'P.OIYX ConBESPOXDEXT.)

. LONDON, May 23.

A profound sensation will bo created by volume. 11. of. The Times' History'of: tho South African War," which is published to-day, by Sampson Low. It is a most .startling hook, making freo. disclosure of roaiiy facta which hithorto liavo been scrupulously concealed, from' the' public by tho press censorship and through tho studied vagueness o( the official despatches. As a result the interest of -.this instalment is extraordinary. It brings us down to the lattlo of Colonso,

The.book is described as follows: "It is written throughout in a calm and critical stylo. Iho volume" opens with a mordant Skctcll Of the organisation and training of tho two armies. The lack of preparation, the suppression of all individuality and iniwfttivo in tho British 'urmy tiro well analysed: Nowhere was the™ any definite prep.ua. tioii for wirj nowhoro any clear conccp* • tion -that .the war was the ono end and object for winch armies exist. liv their plaoo icigned a continuous bustling activity about tho details of tho daily life of tho army, and a hazy.confidence that British good fortune and British courage would como successfully out o[ any war that tho _ inscrutable mysteries of foreign policy .might , bring about,' "There was no general staff : 'The. British army \yw without a responsible thinking dopartment entrusted with tho duty of working oiit soiontillcally the whole problem presented by war with the Beers and with ii P°^ e l ?. acting on its. own conclusions. Awl-wis,was because of the' politicians: i>ir H. Cani])bcll-Banncrm<\n expressed his strong dissent from tho proposal (of tho' Hartmgton Commission). to create a Ghief-of-thp-.Staff, on the. ground that the British I'jmpire could have general military policy,. that., fiuol) wars ns it might "have", to wage were better muddled through than, provided for, and that tfic thinking over pos--81 bio wars, might insidiously suggest a wish to provide tlicni,' and thus bo "a danger to our best .interests.". 1 .

, "t! .j! 1 ';' wa J, not'ft Chinoab mandarin hufc a British parliamentary leader! In tho Boer amy there was no 'fuss and feathers,' hut .a much, .closer;, approximation to efficiency. Tho growth,, of Boor contempt for mil- army is well' traced. It began with Isant hlwana, and tho fooling which that disaster engendered for our fighting power; wana. cro&ted an enormous sensation in South 4fri«i. .Such* a disaster could nover-have befallen a Boer force, and from the Boer point of view to bo wiped' out, by Kaffirs was a far worse disgraca to troops ..than merely to run away. The Boera revolted .not because they were .oppressed, blip bccause they wore confident they flould; dfive ■the troops out: of the V'. "Tho final preparations on tho eve of war aro described'm 'another chapter. Here,' again, ~flverything \yas procrasfcinatioji ■on our part, and foresight and activity on the part .of the enemy. -By the incredible' apathy and blundering . .of the British l'oreign. Office,' vast consignments of animii-' nition were, allowod to pass through Delagoa_ Bay] aftor •.tho.Portuguese authorities had 'gtonus ( #n:®portniiify of stopping thorn. ,'jThe Bptish dispositions are studied and severely, blamed, <' "Awl so W comb,to Talana; It has always been a puzzle y.'hy the enemy wero alt,o under! the muzzles of the guns, after' the ridgo had been stormed, Here is, the explanation which n m this critical 'moment' Uoloiiel Piok\voatb (ip command of thd'artillem . ; . to Jiavo lost' hiB r nerve. ;• Whether hp f tliought that our, mounted troops were 'mixed up with tlio Boers, Qr was .afraid of. hitting the Boer a white. flag raised by some of> the Tetreafeg Boers, is not quite dear, either from his own report, or ironi tlie accolinta of other ofneors who wero with him. Whichever it was, it was no reason for even a moment's hesitation. But Colonel Pickwoad refused to fire, in spite ot the. qntratiia of his:ijubord.inates. ..Instead,,lio'. sent'messenger? galloping off :to' find General Yule and ask him what to do.'

"The fiistory. m'ake9 .it clear'.thatat: falpna tlic British' - troops \Vcro comptatoW surprised,To the. story ' of Elandslaagto: there is little to a'ddj l)u.t .puite otherwise, H it lVjtlii tho battle of Ladysimth on ' Black Monday. It' is declared that this affair,; far-from being a ntfaenful 'rceonnaissanee m force,' as tho pres3,eoneors ohrist«ned it, was a-,serials defeat, oven-anart from tilie (leplorable disaster of Nicholson's Nek. The infantry of, Colonel C|r jimyood's Brigade] wo arq .tajd; wore badly handled and unsteady in Option, '' Colonel Grimwood,, to whom the fetish of seniority had assigned so all-Jmpoftant a. command, proved (juilo unfit jo gl'ftpplo wit|i. tho extremely difficult situation iii, which; hirgely by the. niistakes of otliors,/lis-whs placed;- complete!)' unnerved, incapable; of issuing orders, too confused to remember the position of his men or to fry, and recover hia missing battalion?, lie.simply left his brigadoto' itself. 1 ' "

"Tha retirement of the troops was, to use tlie mildest phrase, precipitate: 'The retirement soon lost all semblance of order.Tho two rilje battalions were' especially bad. .• .( . The bulk of Grimwood's Brigade just .dribbled ill a. straggling crowd through tlie extended files of the Manchester.; and Jjive-i'pools, who held their ground : firmly. For a moment the' situation looked" serious.

It was only saved by tho heroism of the artillery.. Tha cavalry were as-bad as the infantry. 'For reasons it is'difficult to understand, the' navnlry were allowed to save themselves bv their speed alone. 'Ka attempt \v;is jnhde at a judicious withdrawal i . A seething mass of clubbed and, broken cavalry charged down tho ntirrow nek . . . . and streamed southwards'into the opBU plain.' _ " The _ painful' story of Nicholson's Nek 13 told in great detail, and the conclusion is reached that tho surrender was premiiture, thougli not 'more humiliating than many snrrendere that occurred after it. thero liave been many instances whero ..the struggle haa been abandoned when tliore was much bolter hope of escape or relief.'",. To tlie stppy of HlormboVß and Maffersfon-' t-ein much is added by tho fao.ts which up. to this date have'not been common property.' "But the Aiost startling portion of the book is that which tjeals with Colenso ;uid the famous heliogram. General JJuller'^ conduct in abandoning the guns at Colenso is thu? ;To know when to acknowledge'dr.feat- .... is somet'iines part of wise generalship,, But there can be no such justification for the abandonment of tlie'guns at Colenso. : . . . Even-sup-posing that the retention,:o[- tho guns had doubled the casualties of tho day, that loss should have ,beon iaeqd— not for the ealce of more pre'stige,, biit because at that moment guns were far more important: than men. .. They were : nearly half of Suiter's held artillery; without tliem there could b«. no question of relieving Ladysmith. itoeks would elapse before new guns could reach Natal,from England.' " Yet the .abandonment of the gnus tos not. tlie worst: 'Just as in the hour of battle lie (Oeneral Buller) had failed the men whom lie led; fo now in the hour of trial he was to fail his oountry, which had entrusted the fortune of the war into his bands, , . . Ho utterly lost heart, Not only did lie despair of doing anything himself, but he despaired for others. . .. .• On tho morning of tlie 16tli he telegmplie'd to Lord Lansdowne that the relief of Ladysmith was impossible, that Sir G. Whit© would be compelled tp Fay down his arms, and that ho proposed to entrench himself in a defensive position near Ohieveley. Thon on tlntt same morning, without waitin? for n reply, without waiting to got the fullest information from Sir G. White as to the 'resources at his disposal, without consulting his senior officers, he 6ent a lioliopwphie inossaije to White suggesting the surrender of Lndyanitji.' '"The exact terms of that message are unknown, but the following, which differs fro m previous versions, is given

afl j l * wal purport. Wo reprint it exaotly rus it stands, but it will be seen that there JLf r Ulm appears certain that I cannot relieve Ladysmith for another month and even then only by means at protracted siege operations, . . vo ' u will bum your ciphers, destroy your suns lireaway your ammunition, and make tho best terms possible with (ho g«mral of tho besieging forces, after p'ving mc ti mo ta fortify myself on tho Tngcla.' i, was at first taken by >Sir G. White for a Boor forgery, it being supposed that the o.tiemj- hail discovered our t by Mf Aincr >'. rbnder pop,, ) ' to ftn immediate sur-

| "At, Home General Bullcr's telegram', caused consternation, the more so as ho had shortly boforo' refused slroug rcinforccmentvK- The War Oihre, overwhelmed by the niccessivo tidings „f disaster, seemed almost inclined to acquiesce in his conclusions. ror once the much-abused politicians showed thomsolvcs stronger men than tho soldicn. Most of the Minister* had left town for Christmas. But Lord Laiifdovma Jmd stayed on. at tlio War Office, and fortunately ho had'at. his'side, in Mr Balfour a colleague on whoso firm eupnort aqd courteous counsel he could roly. at this cfMoal moment.. A mossftgc was immediately cabled to Sir li, J3ul!er direotinjr. hirti to porsevere, or, if unwilling to do sol" to liaixl oyer tlio Natal command to one of his subordinates and to return Home.' . \ . fhe contradiotoiy message sent by Buitor from before Colenso increased the uneasiness of tho government, an uneasiness quickened to instant decision by the news of his defeat and tho dear evidonce of his demoralisation. /-• .•

. ■ lirirn tho cup of mismanagement, .General Buller is stated in tlio history to have informed Sir 6. White that his attack on Colenso would not bo made till the 17th; whereas it wns actually delivered on tho 15th, thus, rendering co-operation on sihlo*" ° • jflt Vsmith garrison imposWith reference to Gatacro's, reverse at iMormberg, the author says:—"The inadequacy of the forco taken; the neglect ot simple precautions which prevented tho arrival of the detachment from Pen Hock -. tho long and wearying delays of tho entramment; tho chango of plan at the eleventh hour, involving an extra effort on the pnrt of the mon, and a plunge into country complotely unknown to the General or to any of tho officers with iiim.; the pernicious order to march with fixed bayonets a precaution the absurdity of which stands iti all tho more striking contrast to the culminating, picce of carelessness, the unscrecned and lundly confident route march after daybreak over ground of which tho General know nothing, save that ho was within two miles 0t we enemy's positions—all those were Sheer. on tlio part- of'the UCneral or of his staff." Stormberg was followed closely, as. will be remembered, by MethuenV attempt to lores a passage through Cronjo's position at' Magersfontcin to tlio relief of Kimberloy. iho author refers to the most absurd'and cr "P' rumours that Lord Methuen had, in fipite Of Wauehona's protests, insisted on the mght attack being delivered by the High-' landers m quarter-column, and that, tho •Highlanders as a body showed disgraceful ranol f°ii immediate cauaeof tho disaster was undoubtedly, Genera , Wauehope s mistake •in not deploying till within 400 yards of the trenches; But so closely is this cause bound up with the preceding onerthat it is difficult to attach any blame, anything. nioro than, a more regret, to Watiehope's action. *' ' .As to the failuro.of the battle as a whole 10 volume states:-"Not the least was the absence of any provision for tho contingency of Mure. That defect tias nevw romcx.iod. Instead of concentrating all available troops to striko a Wow which should rctnovo tho failuro.of the night it tack, Lord Methuen simply used them to hold the lists while the Boers firo arid the burning snn y r II!" suro r ' r c , om P ,at «l the demoralistition of tho confused and leaderlcas Highland Brigade. .There can be no surer sign of weak generalship than laying a sevoro'strain unon, and running great risks in, one part ot Eti urmy while leaving another nirt inactwo, than being forced into accepting tho defeat of a section as'the defeat of the r'°!°- % this standard Magersfontcin, and « oriy but Ladysjnith demncd " P ' Btaml Con ' It will he seen that tho editor, Mr Amery. (OM,aot shrink from assuming full .responsi-' bihty for tho information which has reached lmn. Tho _ volume is througfont v 0 f enthralling interest, and it promises to be of immortso value to the present and future generations. • v " >