THE INTERPRETATION OF A WILL.

Otago Daily Times, Issue 11794, 25 July 1900, Page 7

THE INTERPRETATION OF A WILL.

Mr Justice Williams gave judgment yestcrflay morning in Richards v. Richards, argued in-chambers by Mr Gallaway (for. the plaint iit1) and Mr Calvert (for the executors) on Friday last. His Honor said: The question is whether the plaintiff is entitled to interest on a

pecuniary legacy from the date of the dc;uh of the testator. If the plaintiff is entitled to interest, the other legatees who take under the same clause would be entitled to receive interest also; The will is divided into paragraphs. It commences with the appointment of executors and tnistees. Then there are bequests of a number of specific legacies and a specific devise. Then comes the following paragraph: " Subject to the provisions contained in the. preceding paragraphs of this my. will. I direct my trustees to sell, call in, and convert into money all my real and "personal estate, and direct that my trustees shall, out' of the moneys produced by such sale, calling in, and conversion, and out of such part of my estate as shall consist of money, and out of the moneys to arise from the .policy pi insurance oh my life, .pay immediately after my death the following legacies." Then follows a list of nine pecuniary legacies to different persons in different amounts. The first legacy is the sum of £3500 to his wife,' the second is a legacy of £200 to the plaintiff... There are legacies of £200 to each of four nieces, a legacy of £200 to a nephew, a legacy of £100 to a friend, and of £10 to a church. The total of these amounts is £4SIO. Then follows a provision that if" any of the said legatee's children of his sister Jane should die in the testator's lifetime, " or before receiving the legacy bequeathed to him or her," such legacy is not to Japse, but be divided between the biothers ana sisters of the legatee so dying. Then the testator directs that his trustees, alter payment of-the, aforesaid legacies, his debts, funeral and

testamentary expenses, and the cost of a tomb-

stone, .are to hold the residue ,on trust, first to pay the.costs of executing the trusts of the will, then to pay. stamp or legacy duty and exchange, so-thtit each legatee may have the clear amount of his legacyjand then to divide it equally among his nephews and nieces as therein mentioned.' . Then follows a. proviso that the legacy to his wife is :to be . paramount to the ■ other legacies. The question turns on ■ the meaning of the word. ■" immediately," where the . testator directs the trustees to pay the legacies " immediately after, my death." Does it fix the day or the,-day following the testator's decease as the date "upon ■which.the duty is-imposed by the will upon "the trustees to pay. the legacies? The paragraph in which the .words occur imposes certain.duties upon the trustees, and to pay the legacies is one of them. In order to ascertain the meaning of the -word "immediately" the whole paragraph must be looked to. The testator contemplates that the trustees are to sell, ckllin, and convert into money such part of his estate as does not consist of money, and are to receive moneys from a policy of insurance. Out o{ the moneys so received the legacies are to be paid. The testator does not assume, nor can it be assumed, faal mone> sufficient to pay the, legacies would be in hand on the day of his death* He- must nave.contemplated that some time at any rate would, elapse before .the-trustees"-would,, pay the legacies. That being so, the.mefuiing which the- testator intended to give to the word "immediately" would be within " a reasonable time,' or at the most "as soon as possible." Where there is a provision in a deed or in a statute that a thing is to bo done immediately after a certain event, it does not necessarily mean that it is to "be done at the very moment.- In general it would mean that it was to be done.in the shortest time after the event that it could reasonably be done in looking at the whole of .the circumstances (Toms v. Wilson, 4 Band, 5155; Forsdike v. Stone 3 c p 007; : . Masse? V. Sladen, L.R., -4, Ex. 13),. I think, therefore, that the word " immediately.' here means exactly the same as if the words as soon •as possible " had been used, and therefore, on the authority of Webster v. Hale .(8 Yes., at page 415), that interest on legacies would not run- after the death o£ the testator JNor does the'cage of Dundas v. Wolfe Murray (1 H. and N., 425) assist the plaintiff. In that case a separate fund was expressly set apart from the general estate. Here there is nothin" more than the ordinary disposition of the general estate ,upon. trust, firsb to pay the ■legacies, and then' upon other trusts. If the principle of Dundas,.v. Wolfe Murray could be invoked in the present case, it could be invoked in every will where there -was first a trust to pay a legacy and then trusts of the residue me defendants are, therefore, entitled to judsrinent. . h