THE FUTURE OF THE NAPOLEONS

Otago Daily Times, 2 October 1865, Page 6

THE FUTURE OF THE NAPOLEONS

(From the Saturday Renew.)

It is easier to fonnd aname than to found a dynasty, end in the middle of his later?, hia triumphs, and his pleasures, the Emperor of the French can never be fice from serious anxiety as to fhe future fortunes of his heir. Since tbe famous night of the coup d'etat wliich raised him to "the throne, Napoleon 111. bas gained in sr-rne degree the ephemeral confidence of Fiance, and the admiration, if not the respect, of Europe. French Cabinet Ministeis have a right to boast, in the presence ofthe French Chambers, that their Sovereign has retrieved the ci*-asterß of 1815, and restored tbe nation to the first place upon the Continent. Tbe heir of the great Napoleon is no longer beset by the sea of difficulties wbich for many years poured down upon, and at Isf-taverwheimed the first Emperor; for, taught by bitter discipline, the French empire has laid aside that portion of its earliest programme wbich consisted in schemes of unlimited aggression. Europe, no longer menaced, has in its turn sheathed the sword, aud the French Emperor in our days can afford to play tbe part of a simple monarch, who is not threatened on bis frontiers by a bristling European coalition. The tact aud genius of Napoleon 111. have evidently consolidated his own power, both abroad and at home ; and be will in all probability go down to tbe grave witbout being shaken from his imperial saddle. Even the adherents of the old regimes, with some notable exception-, have become weaker and more spiritless in tbeir opposition. Like his uncle, the present Emperor posscspes, and bas successfully used, a remarkable g*.niiis for conciliating nnd attracting these v.ith whom he ia brought into personal contact. Frenchmen who mi^-ht be er*pecfed to cavil at bis title to he obeyed are compelled day after day to acknowledge bis unwearied industry, his ! salience, and his temper. France has been ialf conquered and half to acquiesce in his rule. This is a great deal, but yet, if he achieves no more than this, half of the Emperot's ambition and purpose will bave been left unrealised. N:,poleon 1., at the outset of his autocratic career, publicly refused to be satisfied with a mere life e-tate iv tbe Crown. He insisted upon the privilege of transmitting his authority to a natural or adopted heir ; and the institutions of tbe Second Empire would appear impc-j-ftct in Imperial eyes unless provision had been made in them for the creation of a permanent dynasty. Unlike tbe Bourbons of the Restoration, the Emperor has .shown that he is able to learn and to for.et. He has learnt moderation and he has forgotten old animosities; but there is one thing wbich he never forgets — nnmely, the interests of his son.

The difficulty in the present nge of establishing a dynasty is incomparably greater than it us-ed to be of old. Every year that the world bible, personal prestige in the conqueror of a Crown is Jess and less likely to be accepted ns of itself a sufficient cause why bis ton should succeed liim; and France is the last country in Europe where hereditary Imperial rights can be planted at a moment's notice. Repeated revolutions have not only bn.keti in upon continuity of succession, but have weakened, so far as public opinion is concerned, the very principle of succession itself. Frenchmen ecaiccly feel inclined to hold that the Royal or Imperial heir has so much us a prima facie claim, wliich ought only to be disregarded for good and palpable causes. In constitutional monarchies the onus probandi would be universally thrown upon the interrupters of a dj'nasty. It is a serious thing to break in upon the custom of hereditary succession. Violent change weakens-the cauFe of order, and exposes public safety to be endangered at the caprice of fanatics or agitators. But since the French revolutions oi the last eighty years, the onus probandi appears to have been shifted the other way. A Frenchman who wishes to govern liis fellow countrymen is expected to show excellent reasons \yby he sbould be allowed to do so, and on such a„point the most excellent reasons oflen setm to Frenchmen to be terribly inconclusive. Nor does dynastic succession follow in any way tis a necessary corollary from tire premisses of Imperialism. The Imperial theory is that Ministerial responsibility to the Chambers is a delusion. The Cabinet is responsible to tlie Emperor alone, and the Emperor is responsible to n<*ne except the nation. But the French Constitution provides no way for tbe nation to show its , dissatisfaction .with i's great representative. •Tbey can only revolt if they do not like him. "While, monarchical succession is, therefore, a sort of law of nature, an Imperial dynasty is theoretically illogical. Napoleon 1., on accepting the throne, solemnly announced, iv terms which the second Emperor has adopted, that his "spirit would no longer be r\ith his posterity on the day when they ceased to merit the confidence of the grand nation." How is the* grand na'iou to exhibit its want ol" confidence under a system in wbich there is no much thing as Ministerial responsibility ? By revolution only ; and the principle of revolution is virtually consecrated, by the very Constitution which -provides, in tbe same breath, that the Prince Imperial is to inherit the power and prerogatives of his predecessor. To make good its claims tothe allegiance ofthe country, the Imperial dynasty must, .11 a dynasty and independently of its fb unler, represent some idea, be bound up with some cause, be identified with the interests either of all classes or ofthe most po wet ful among tbem. The Emperor, it may be conceded, represents something. lie represents influence abroad, nud order and' able government at home. But wbat does the Pi ince Imperial represent? Why should France have bim at all?—for we may rest assured that France will not have hitn unless it is fbr the obvious and undoubted good of the majority to take biro. It is said constantly, though oftcner on this side of the Channel than on the other, that France is unfit for Republican government. She does not care about the Oilcans family, she dislikes the elder Bourbons, she is not suited fbr a Republic; and the argument therefore is, by a simple process of exhaustion, that she must have a Napoleon. Tbe reasouing is not altogether satisfactory. Because a Republic had its draw backs in 1848 and subsequent years, and may not be for a long time to come a brilliant r s'uc'cess ? it is not" certain that the Fi'endh' nation m_y not -choose to try'it once again. Very likely it will be a f__u.e

■gain, and a Napoleon will once more bave to be called in. But the question is not whether the Napoleons every twenty years are to have a chance, so much as whether the Napoleons can go on reigning uninterruptedly from father to son. The youthful Prince is believed to possess some natural ability, and he will have the advantage—if Napoleon 111. lives—of being educated by a profound and accomplished thinker. But the plant which is to be trained so carefully may, after all, turn out to he a weed; nor is it unlikely that the Prince Imperial may he too young to rule when he is called upon in the natural course of events to reign. The French will not wait for a boy f o come of age and govern them, simply because he is precocious, or because his mother is a charming and pious lady. It is accofdinely of no small importance that France should understand what a Napoleon dynasty means, if indeed it means anything in particular. Tbe Freuch nation may be roughly divided into two broad classes, the middle class and the people. The noblesse, as a distinct political order, exist no longer. Tbey are. gone, and their place knows them no more. As far as the comfort of the middle class was involved, few Governments could beat the Governments of Louis Philippe. The educated classes were free to write and to think. There was peace abroad, and liberty at borne. The one thing wanting to the excellence of tbe regime was stability, which for tbe commercial classes is a matter of as much importance as either peace or liberty. Tbe revolution of 1848 proved that the Oileanists did not possess this inestimable and essential quality, and from the moment that tbe throne of the Orlean-i family began to shake and tremble they ceased to be of any use to tbe body on whose (>us>port they bad a right to rely. The masses, indeed, had less reason to be satisfied with their adminislration than the bourgeoisie. In England the lower classes are content if the law gives them full liberty to rise in the social scale,- provideonly th«2y can manage to do so. They start, it is true, at a disadvantage when compared with the more fortunate position of tbeir betters, but tbey accept this portion of their lot as a dispensation of Providence, nnd as one of the incidents of their condition. The French masses are more impatient. Tbey think they bave a right to demand that their Government shall smooth away all such disadvantages, and help one and all of tbem to bc?in life more on a level with those above tbem. If they have not the work and the wages that tbey like, they ask that work and wages shall be found tbem. They wish their eons to have a professional education at tbe expense of society, and a good start in the world. The " extinction of pauperism" was one of the cries with whicli Napoleon 111. went, so to speak, to the country, and this is wbat the extinction of pauperism practically means. Up to the present time the Emperor has managed to keep all classes in suspense, without altogether satisfying any. Foreign wars bave amused and excited tbe nation. The national flag has been raised till it floats above all other flags in Europe. The resources cf the country have been developed as fast as an extravagant military expenditure will permit. Order and security—security being as important even 33 order—have been establii-htd witliin. But neither the middle nor the lower classei have a« yet all that they require ; nnd though Napoleon 111. may hold on firmly to the reins of power for his life, his dynasty must promise something more than he bas yet effected, or it will fall.

So lone as political liberty is withheld from the classes who care most about it, tbe Emperor will alwajs have na'ural enemies among those whose good opiuion tbe Orleans Government deserved to bave retained. As political liberty and Imperialism cannot live together, this is a consequence which he foresee?, and believes that he can meet. The man may, by sheer force of geniu3 and will, trample down such opposition; but the dynasty must discover some friendly force upon which it can rely, to counterbalance the certain hostility of those who tree that Imperialism means perpetual political extinction for themselves. At the moment when the claims of tbe dynasty come to be cousidered by the country, this hostility will display itself unhesitatingly, and tbere is some reason to b.lieve that it may not di.-play itself in vaiu. The only chance of overcoming it is to persuade the class below that the interests ofthe dynasty arc- synonymous with their own. If*Nape!eon 111. can effect this, he may hope to transmit bis crown to a successor; but in order to effect it be must speedily apply himself to the development of that democratic programme which hith.rto he bas only shadowed out on paper.. A vast system of public works h one of tbe first and most essential features in it. He is, in this respect, a good deal hampered by his own military expenses, and by the growing thrifiiness of the Chambers. The commercial classes in France are anxious for retrenchment. The masses dislike taxation, because it directly and indirectly affecis their smill incomes; but they are not so anxious tbat the national debt should be lightened as that' all the money which is raised should be spent upon themselves. Fortunately for the sake of internal concord, railways and canals and public works partially benefit both rich and poor. But the middle classes not unnaturally prefer that the resources of tbe nation sbould bs developed by individual enterprise, according to the received maxims of modern political economy Those below them demand assistance out ot the funds of the State, and are willing to draw heavy bills upon posterity in order to help themselves along. This is one great difficulty of ' Imperial government — a difficulty not decreased by the calls which costly foreign expeditions to Cochin China, Rome, and Mexico have made on the treasury. Another difficulty is that of education. Here the wishes of the Catholic clergy conflict with the wishes of tbe extreme' Liberal party. The Emperor hardly knows wbich way to move, but his embarrassments will be doubled in another ten years. His position te complicated by the fact that, adopt what;-programme he will, the democratic classes, wheu it comes to the point, may possibly be of opinion that they can govern France and provide for their own iuterests quite as well a 9 a Napoleon. The dynasty may be useful to hold the balance between conflicting classes, but cither class, if it became 'predoimiiiantj might take it into : its'head dhat it 'could do without a representative and a patron.