GERMANY STARTS TO CAPTURE WORLD COMMERCE.

Oamaru Mail, Volume XLIV, Issue 14704, 3 June 1920, Page 8

GERMANY STARTS TO CAPTURE WORLD COMMERCE.

- (By Edward L'. JByrne, > J

"Witlr all her'old- siull, uiiu with tliu new - ingenuity ol .{Jteajjemutut:- .tier--many is preparing: a campaign, lor. conquest ot .world trade, wnicn is hueiy feoon t"opo.store her battered fortunes. or at least to Jjat.cer thefortunes of certain commercial rivals who at present flatter themselves that they are much better off than she. Organisation, t lie weapon with which - she loughf? before she plunged unwisely j into a. world' war. is the urm she is using i.o-day. Germany is in a bud plight, tjlie is hungry, ill-clothed) physically exhausted, short ol capital, snort or raw materials, short ot fuel . ■ Vet of Jier recovery she is confident, and'Witli considerable malicious .joy,' she sees the growing troubles of her victorious iilu-' ropean rivals—their collapsing currency exchanges, their labor unrest, ahci their lacic of faith in the future. Rjjui;first of all overtook herself, .and . in that' she find's the ' belief tliat sh«?' also will first win recuperation. 'jiufac-t' thisrecuperation lias begun : ; arid the countries nearest to Germany are feeling;it. Only a few months back these. countries proclaimed coiilitieiitly : that Germany v.-as irremediably down: to-day they find her uncomfortably up. Chambers "of"; Commerce are groaning for: better protection against her..cheap exports. Governments are planning legislation as the only remedy againsi the universal" German dump. This vein - ccly is likely to prove vain. Citizens of those countries which-.-grumble-most are the first to buy German Neither war hatred, nor considerations of patriotism,-nor regard for then■ mrh countries' economic future prevent foreigners—neutrals and enemies alike — rushing to Berlin, Leipziz, Dresden,' Frankfurt, and Duesseldorf to buy in the great bargain of the world and to gain for themselves as iiidividuals, without regard for jniy national considerations the advantages of the organiations with which, Germany is plotting to win. >J Germany's key to success is that with a Socialist Government, she lias managed ..to.. throw Socialism overboard and to put in its place a, system" of collective organisation which provides aIT the economy and efficiency of the American trust without tlie trust's monopolistic stisma. This is complete reversal of expectations. A yesir ago not only the Socialist Partv. but also even the anti-Socialistic Democrats, the next most radical party, admitted that nationalisation of the great raw material corporations and! the natural monopolies was inevitable. That plan has entirely disappeared. Vast private trusts, with a. very small, almost microscopic, amount of State supervision, are to take -Socialism's pine".

Germany has been brought to this repudiation of socialism by two powerful arguments. First is the failure of the existing war socialism, the so-called State "Zwangswirtscliaft" which' between 191.4 and 1918 concentrated in its hands for military aims the production and sale of food, metals, chemicals, leatlfer, textiles and all other stnple industries. The "Zwangswirtscliaft" earned only.-hatred and the moment the armistice came, the whole producing population and a great many consumers demanded its abolition. The second argument was the glaring failure of nationalisation in Soviet Russia. These arguments convinced the mass of Germans, including the socialists themselves, that nationalisation was a dangerous thing. - The principle upon which Germany is to-day reorganising her industry, is not te tutelage nor nationalisation, but private combinations on an unexampled scale. A special institution of state, in which the Government will have practically no part, is to lie created so that production of all kinds may be protected against the political interests which at present, and not only in "Germany, hamper industrial efficiency. With this aim will arise a special Parliament of industry. The drafters of the XJepublican constitution provided for that, when in Article 145 they declared that a "State economical council" or "reichswirtschaftsrat" should be created.

From the plan for this "reichswirtschaftsrat" which has now "been published, it appears that Germany will not'only have the most representative Parliament of industry - in the world, but also a Parliament with enormously wide authority and great powers. Tne reichswirtschaftsrat will consist of 200 members. "Of these 46 will represent industry, 46 agriculture, and tne remaining. banking, trade, insurance, communications, handwork, and tne consumer. The State's participation will be limited to a mere 12 members,, who will be appointed by the Central Government from among experts in different branches. The function of this Parliament; of industry is to guide the political reichstag in all business matters.

Germany in this Parliament of industry will realise an ambition proclaimed by European constitutional reformers long before the war. On every disputed question of applied- political economy, she will get an authoritative judgment from the experts and the interests, which judgment will be unclouded by parallel quarrels about foreign politics, the church, schools and the other . controversies which in all countries dominate and often seriously injure national business. The underlying principle is: Let the people who know the facts, and who are interested, dictate economic policy, and keep politics as far as possible apart. In foreign trade, Germany has embarked upon the organisation of private interests in a similar way. She is creating great foreign trade trusts. For a year past, Germane have been clamoring that their foreign trade is unpro-fitable'-carried on. Every month Germany imported goods to a value. of 3,000,000,000 marks,' and exported only to a value of 1,000,000,000. Yet m real, values, authorities declare Germany exported quite las much as she imported. The disparity in registered values was caused by: the ruinous practice of buying foreign goods at full-world-ma,rket> prices, while selling .native goods at; the low - native papermark prices. -That is a chief cause of the drop of the German mark exchange between January, 1919, and February, 1920, from about, one-half to under onetwentieth of--its gold value., Germany's new preventive against this abuse-is not" to be State control, but collective pri- ; vate control; and this control is to be organised in the form of foreign trade trusts. The foreign trade trusts are to bear the"title "Aussenhandelsstellen." Every great exporting and importing branchsuch as iron, textiles, coal, machinery, . porcelain,, and toys will have its own foreign trade trust, in which' not only the producer and trader but also t-hoj. - private consumer will 'be represented; The "Aussenhandelsstellen" will have great power. They will punish violations of their decrees with heavy fines. Some of these bodies are already at work;, and they have rooted out the most ruinous abuse'of post-war German trade'.' They have forced exporters. to double and treble their priced to foreigners, and even to charge; foreigners full-world-market. prices"V'hich are usually several hundred per cent, above. German. As a. result, the value of Germany's exports -in a single month was raised by 500,000,000 marks. The "Aussenhandelsstellen" a.re entirely private organisations. „They centralise industry and trade quite as much .as a Socialistic State could do, but they leave manageinent of. .affairs tpi the private interests concerned."" On .similar lines are now being organised the more important, producing industries. In air other branches of German/ industry, organisation on trust arid fusion lines is rapidly going, on. Under the title of f 'Commimity of German Automobile; Works.'' has been created a big combine of the Brenriaibor, Hansa-liloyd 'and National Automobile Companies. Other big firms ha,ve united under the title "German Automobile Concern." and the two companies are now negotiating for fusion'. "The aim - is to facilitate 'the adoption -of American methods of.standardisation, so as to pro-' duee in vast quantities "a- limited numTier of types ,of cars and trucks ; and to . create m the intereste of economy a. common selling organisation at home and abroad. Greatest of all. tlie new concentrators is. the firm of Krupp. • Krupps' report issued at the end -of 1919 declares- that they have almost :eompletely succeeded in . adapting their arm s :. and' \jnuriitions '.'departments to [ profitable peace aims. Krupps have "already turned out their first- locomotive, and they, "have made-.a- contract *w.ith the Prussian ' Railroad;, .ministry ,

to supply in . 1920, 100 locomotives and 2000 cars; they are advertising in' tlie Scandinavian press their -first cashregisters, they describe as. being "as good as American and one-third cheaper" ; they are preparing to turn out typewriters, and they are producing motor cars, motor trucks, aviation ■ and general motors, and small machinery of every kind. Where existing plant and workmen are unsuitable for a proposed new branch of production, Krupps buy up or enter into contract ; with existing specialist firms; and these firms, thereafter work with or un- . der Krupps. German, industry and commerce were made by organisation before the war. They will be made by organisation again. "In the new organisation some of the faults of the old • are being avoided. Despite a supposed Socialistic Government industry is freer far than it was under the pre-war "chairsbcialist" system which, a handful of theorists, headed- by Professors Adolf Wagner and SchmoUer, enforced on Willielm 11. The pre-war form of state socialism hemmed and hampered.industry. Political. fiscal interests of the state were 'allowed to dominate the interests of efficient output. The new trust organisations ignore- almost wholly the' state, and consider only technical and commercial interests. Therein lies , their strength, and therein lies the 1 possibility that in a very few years Germany's foreign trade will succeed :in winning back fully the position which it lost owing to the war.