MR TAFT'S SCHEME—AND AFTER!

Oamaru Mail, Volume XXXIX, Issue 10753, 28 April 1911, Page 6

MR TAFT'S SCHEME—AND AFTER!

WOULD ARBITRATION END WAR. (llv Norman Augell. author of "The Great Illusion.''! Treatv or no treaty, it has lon- been evident'that never again would England and the United States attempt to -cltle their differences on the hattelield. That, indeed, was plain on the mo' Tew i>; I're-ident Cleveland's mes-.-age concerning the Venezuelan hound..rv di.-pute. That message was. as ,„;„,,- ,'.,,,iueiit Americans have since admitted in form and matter an unwarranted affront to Great Britain, which raised the less civilised elements in the United States to a perlect I rclizy of enthusiasm: and I hough—perhaps intentionally—a humiliation to J'ng!;lnd it was vet dealt with by a British Prime Minister, wedded by tradition to ;!m older diplomacy, in such manner :is to lead not only to a peaceful .settlement but to prepare the. way with the help of the better elements of the United States, to a sense of solidarity between the two peoples which has srendilv increased to our own day. Honor and territorial interest were both involved, and that at a time when mutual suspicion was immensely greater than it is now: yet the matter was .submitted to arbitration. 'When, therefore, we take into account the change that has come over the spirit of Anglo\mcrican relations in the last decade we realise that those relations have reached a stage which places military conflict outside the range of practical politics. And even when the greatest and the most prosperous of British Colonies seems to be drifting into absorption bv the United States, and even when the' word "annexation ' is pronounced by an American statesman, hafdlv a whisper of rancour or lllfccling is heard on either side. Are we to conclude, therefore, that the contemplated treaty is supererogaif in politics the immediate material result alone mattered we should have to reply in the affirmative. In saying that I do not disregard the hmt of bir .Upward Grev that a thorough-going arbitration treaty would develop into a defensive alliance. In the present condition of political philosophy in Europe such an alliance would result m a general reshuffle. Any attempt on the partof Anglo-Saxondpm to "impose peace on .theT balance of the world by force of arms would be regarded by other nations as an attempt to achieve AngloSaxon world-domination, to be resisted bv Pan-German or, as the new arrangement would cause the. dropping of existing differences (mainly imaginary), by a Pan-German-cum-Pan-Slavpnic combination. And as such _ combination would command, even to-day, military forces as considerable as the Anglo•Ymericaii, the.armament rivalry would be likelv to go on as fiercely as ever.We seem for the moment quite to have overlooked the fact that the United States is the most portentous industrial and political rival which we possess. Just think: it represents a homogeneous political entity of ninety millions: to-dav the greatest and most powerful in the world, when we consider the high average of activity and efficiency of the people; to-morrow perhaps dominating, by virtue of closer relations with Canada on the north. Alexico on the south, and the control of the Panama Canal, half a hemisphere and populations miming into/one hundred and fiftv millions, with resources immeasurably'greater than those at the disposal of any other single Government — a Government with which we have been twice at war in the past a people comprising elements deeplv hostile to ourselves. This incalculable political force is able to harass us at fifty points —navigation through the Panama Canal the relation of our colonies in the Antilles with the continent our Eastern trade as it affects the Philippines, transcontinental transit to Australia, to mention only a few. As a matter of fact, the points of contact and of difference with our European rivals are trifling in comparison, {surely all this, as much on the economic as it'll' the political side, constitutes a rival immeasurably more disturbing than any which has disturbed our sleep withm the last few decades—France, Russia, Gcrmanv. Yet it is precisely with the "rcatest of all our rivals, the one most able to challenge our position industrially and the one who at this moment is iii' the process perhaps of absorbing industrially at least, and with our virtual assent, the greatest of our co onies with whom we propose to make the first binding and complete treaty of arbitration, and, what is more significant, with whom such a treaty seems the most natural thing in-the world! . . - ~ , ■■ Now. if an undertaking of that character is possible between two such rivals as England and America, what arc the material facts which prevent a similar undertaking as between England and Germany? , . More and more shall we be apt to (•(include that if arbitration covering all points is possible with America, so is it possible with France or Germany or Russia, and the peoples of those countries will in their turn more and more conclude that if the two most alert, expansive, and enterprising peoples in the world, the people who between them dominate half the surface of the globe, can fight out their differences on other than the military field, so can they. Admittedly a great change of spirit in our general political conception will have to precede any such conclusion. But as aoplied to a largo area that change has taken place. Again, it cannot be too insistently pointed out that the projected arbitration treaty is important rather as an effect than a cause — as giving definite form to a change of political conception already accomplished, and without which it would have bcen-neither possible nor effective had it been possible. If this obvious truth needed demonstration we have it in the history of the two Plague peace conferences. The nations of Europe, presumably in good faith, something more than a decade since, went into the first Hague Conference with the avowed intention, not of disarmament, it is true, but of some limitation, some check on what even then was regarded as an all but intolerable burden. With this result — that, speaking roughly, the great expansion of armaments among the i modern nations may be said to date from the first peace conference. Nothing is easier to achieve in international politics thau academic declarations in favor of peace. But Governments, as Admiral Mahan has so well pointed out, are corporations, and corporations have no souls. They are; moreover, trustees, and as such must put first the lawful interests of the wards. According to the prevailing doctrine, military victory over a rival ensures for the victor immense economic aiid social advantages. So long as that philosophy holds the field armaments will continue to be merely a form _of national competition, and arbitration treaties and academic declarations in favor of peace would be futile to arrest them.

But the English and Americans, subconsciously—unknowingly it may be — have in fact repudiated this philosophy as between themselves; . have realised that, in their own case at least, military force jn the conditions of the modern world is economically futile. The English have realised that if America is to be a rival in the economic field Dreadnoughts are not going to preveiit it. That if Canada is to drift into closer relationship with the United States it would he futile to. raise a single bayonet to prevent it; that our whole phraseology about the ownership ot colonics and the notion that nations can fight about such ownership ignores nearly ail the facts. We do not "own" Canada. America docs not and never will "own" Caiiada. Canada is owned by tho people who live upon her territory and by those who exploit it, "-and whether the relations between Ottawa and Washington become a little more or less intimate is not going to alter, material facts. Wc shall continue to trade with her, to send our. children to her, to remain good friends with her, to co-operate with her where any real interest is to be advanced by so doing. These arc the essential facts, and we have passed out of that stage of development in the, world in which miliiary force could permanently alter lliem. And what is true of. Canada is true nt' all other great coMiies. They, not we. are the masters of their destinies; never again shall we use force, even u-lieii we deem them to be entirely wp.-ng. Aud what, is true of inde-t.-".f!<:nt colonies is true of all great in ; rnmmnnitifcs. By one of

those curious contradictions we are contimiiillv meeting in the development of ideas, w refn.su to "duiit as true with reference to one set T»f civilised comliniiiiiies what we readily admit as true of another. Vet if we acknowledge force to lie unavailing with the communities that we "own." why should ue hope to employ it more suceessl.ully with communities we do not "own. ' After all, our historical association with the great Germanic nations, if less recent than that, with the Anglo-Saxon nations, is hardly lefts fundamental. The slime principles'underlie practically all the international political. economic problems which concern us. If we could compter Germany. Germany would still continue to manulacture cheaplv. to compete with us in the markets of the world: if she should conquer us we should continue to do the same tiling, and on the morrow of the most frightful conflict which imagination can conceive all the essential problems of progress which confront outtwo peoples would he precisely where they 'were before. Military force has become futile. When this i.s realised as applicable to all civilised nations (and the treaty will help us to realise it) universal arbitration or agreement leading to immense reduction of armaments will present no difficulty.