BRITISH AMD GERMAN NAVIES.

Oamaru Mail, Volume XXXVI, Issue 10103, 22 March 1909, Page 1

BRITISH AMD GERMAN NAVIES.

- The question of a naval understanding with Germany was the theme of an article in the Fortnightly Review by "Exciibitor, which was, occasioned by a, statement mat the imperial Government in England is working to settle the problem and secure a simultaneous reduction of expenditure on armameilts by. which both nationsBritish and German—stand to gain enormously without any loss of security. But it is "dillicult to "imagine any Britisher seriously entertaining such a delusive expectation; for, in the Jirst place, there is a widespread, though wholly erroneous, belief in Germany that England is only waiting an opportunity of destroying the German lleet" and of'thus crippling lief commerce: and, in the second, it seems to be forgotten that the German Navy Act, being an expression of the national will, ratified by the vast majority of the people of the 'Empire, must be regarded as irremovable. Therefore, there is not the slightest probability of Germany departing from the policy to which that Act lias committed her. On the other hand, it is admitted by all sections of politicians in Great Britain that "the navy is to them their liberty, their food, the material with which they work, and the Empire on which they pride themselves." For these reasons the fleet must be maintained at a two-power (standard, and this resolves itself into a, question of limine;'. Looked at in this light, "Exctibitoi" makes the pertinent remark that- "battleships are cheaper than batties. Our aim,'' lie proceeds to observe, 'must be to have sullicient battleships to guarantee us against the probability of having to finance for more costly battles. The South Alrican war entailed an cxpediliire of about £230,000,000. A European war would cost mure than 'twice, probably lliice times, that sum. It is the truest economy, therefore, to maintain the licet, and thus avoid tho burdensome expense of war. Hostilities against a European Power, even though we "eventually succeeded, would disorganise the whole industry of the country, and would leave us with a heavyweight of debt, as was the case with Japan after signing the treaty of peace with Russia." A programme of two to one against German would involve an outlav of £81,600,000, and of three to two of £60.700,000, which, it is suggested, should be defrayed out of a short-dated 'loan. Koine weeks ago, " Ignotus," in the National Review, defined the position as between Germany and Britain to be this: "Peace depends, first and foremost, on the incontestable superiority of the British navy, and this incontestable superiority depends on three points—(l) the laving down of two keels in each class of ship for the German one: (2) the correct disposition of those keels when completed and commissioned; and (3) sound sinuei;y at headquarters." -Now. as regards the first, this writer asserts that the British navy is hardly being maintained upon a one-power standard. " With respect to the second, he complains that that navv is scattered iif'little packets' while that of Germany is concentrated to the highest degree."" Concerning the third, the writer alleges thai- the result of recent manoeuvres in the North Sea was disastrous: and, finallv. that, "like France in the years before 1870, England is preparing for defeat, and increasing the risk of war by diminishing her armaments in the fare of German preparations." At the same time Germany is doing her utmost, to break down the entente cordiale between Frame and Great Britain, and as at any time irresistible military pressure may be brought to bear upon the former Power by Germany, England, it is contended, should Vie ill a position to place from 200,000 to 300,000 men in Lorraine with the utmost expedition, "the problem being not to injure Germany, but to prevent her from using her enormous strength to the rain of Iter weaker neighbors.'' Furthermore, as a corollary to the. pnlicy tlnis lecommended, "Ignotus'' argues that a defensive alliance should be entered into by France. J!us.-ia. and Great Britain: end that ill the meanwhile the arniv shrmld be re-formed, the navy increased in the manner proposed above, and concentrated in the North Sea as "the key to European peace, and the only chain e of averting a tenible and sangiiiuai'v conflict."