NORTHLAND TUNNEL

New Zealand Times, Volume LIII, Issue 12458, 28 May 1926, Page 8

NORTHLAND TUNNEL

SPECIAL COMMISSION’S REPORT DISCUSSED BY COUNCIL

WHO WERE TO BLAME?

SCATHING CRITICISM OF IMPORTANT UNDERTAKING

The report of the Northland Tunnel Commissioners (Messrs R. W. Holmes and F. W. Mac Lean). was made available for publication by the Mayor yesterday. It is given in an abridged form below.

The commissioners, in the course of an introductory review of what took place in connection with the Northland extension, say:— •‘As indicated to us, we have not re atricted ourselvevS to a literal and rigid interpretation of the older of reference., but have taken it ns a general guide to tho scope of our inquiries. Although not included in the order of reference, nor indicated therein, we feel it our duty to make some recommendations for the consideration of the Mayor and City Council, based on the conclusions we have come to as th-3 result of our investigations.” It was decided to hoar all evidence in private. “In addition to the evidence, wo nave carried out extensive investigations into the work, and have examined all the available plans, files and records. The absence and incompleteness of th'se (and the disappearance of important plans) have involved protracted search and examination, greatly increasing the- difficulty in obtaining definite information in connection with our investigftions.’* THE LOAN PROPOSAL At of the City Council on August oth, 1920, it was decided to submit certain proposals to a poll of ratepayers, among them— PROPOSAL No. 4—TRAMWAYS Kelburn, Karori and Northland Tramway Extension, viz., Willis street, Aro street, and Raroa road ; extension to Northland, £66,986. “No active steps were taken to tarry out the above tramway proposals till 1922, when the City Council was pressed by those interested to ircceed with the proposals authorised 4y the ratepayers in 1920 . . . The City Council at a meeting on November loth, 192*2, decided: ‘That the Raroa road tramway proposal be proceeded with, and that application he made for an order-in-council to authorise the extension.* “Whether the council intended that the whole scheme outlined in proposal No. 4 of the Loan Schedule should be undertaken or only the Northland extension, seems open to question . . . We are of the opinion that the Northland extension was intended by the council in the resolution. NO ACTION TAKEN . . No copy of the resolution can he found in the instruction books of the tramways or city engineer’s departments. and no action was taken. “. . . The City Council was again pressed to proceed by those interested. On being advised that the Northland extension could be carried out apart from the other portions of No. 4 proposal in the loan schedule, it was decided at the council meeting on July sth, 1923, that the ‘tramway extension from Northland to Karori was to be put in hand as soon as possible.* (Presumably Northland to Karori road was meant.) “The necessary instructions to this effect were given. “No reference was made in the decision of the City Council at this meeting (as in the previous resolution at the meeting on November 15th, 1922) to an Order-in-Council being applied for; but»as the proposal was distinctly for a tramway extension, for which an Order-in-Council was necessary, it is obvious that this should have been applied for with as little delay as ! possible. \ “The general manager of tramways \ Realised this, and asked for plans of • 4he work, but was informed by the city engineer’s department that these , were not ready. “In November, 1923, the district engineer, P.W.D., wrote to the general manager of tramways asking for plans of the Northland tramways extension, which he understood was under con- • struotion. A ‘preliminary* plan was obtained from the city engineer’s office, and was forwarded to the Public Works Department on November 24th, 1923. This plan was a print from a tracing which cannot be found. We have, however, been supplied by the Public Works Department with a photostat copy (about half size) of the print. The application for Order-in-Council could not be made until the plans of the work were completed, consequently the application had to be held over. WORK STARTED EARLY “Work on the approaches to the tunnel was commenced on July 25th, 1923. “This early start with the work, so soon after the decision of the council, appears to have been due to a desire to give employment to tne men engaged on the Onslow road work, then practically completed. The plans of the works in connection with the Northland tunnel and approaches had not been completed, nor had estimates of the quantity of excavation and other work been prepared. “The city engineer states that no estimate? of work as designed with the steeper gradients, nor of the work wfth the altered gradients, wer© prepared, nor of the amount of earthworks and other work involved in each. He was therefore not in a position to state what the comparative cost would be. “. . . The concrete work of the tunnel appears to have commenced on July 9th, 1924, though considerable charges debited to the tunnel (probably for excavation work) appear in the tramway department’s accounts from early in May. . . Allegations having been made about faulty construction of the tunnel, it was decided at a meeting of the council on December 15th, 1924, to ask the Public Works Department for a report on the tunnel work. “The engineer-in-chief, Public Works Department, declined on the ground that he bad no “official knowledge” of the tunnel, but called attention to some matters in connection with the work which had been reported to him. ; ORDER-IN-COUNCIL REFUSED . . The wKole question wag considered by the council at a meeting on February sth, 1925, and it was decided that an order-in-council should be

applied for. Steps were taken to prepare the necessary plans and documents for the order-in-council. These, and the required procedure, occupied some time. The draft order-in-council was forwarded in September, 1925, and the complete document in November, 1925, to the Public Works Department. •‘The actual tunnel work was completed in August, 1925. “The order-in-council applied for was not granted, the engineer-in-chief. Public Works Department, calling attention to the alleged unsntisfactoiy nature of the tunnel work, and asking further information. “Discussions took place with the Public Works officers as to remedial means which might be adopted to overcome the objections of the Department. “It was finally decided to appoint the present commission.** “We may say that in our opinion, the route adopted was the best practicable one for a tramway connection to Northland. TUNNEL OR OPEN CUTTING “Some consideration is stated to have been given to the substitution of an open cutting for a tunnel, but why this was rejected by Mr Morton we have been unable to ascertain. Possibly —and we think probably —it must have been the fear of heavy compensation for property to .be acquired. Only very special reasons can justify the construction of a tunnel in place of a cutting only about 50 feet deep, and that depth only for a short distance. In this case we arc of opinion that there was not sufficient reason for the construction of a tunnel. A liberal estimate of the cost of a cutting to replace the present tunnel (adopting the same width of roadway as the tunnel) would be £SOOO, against nearly £16,500 which the present tunnel has cost up to date. “We have no hesitation in saying that an open cutting should have been adopted in place of a tunnel. “Wl)o was definitely responsible for the tunnel length of 130 feet shown on the plan we have been unable to ascertain.

“We cannot understand why a complete set of plans of the work was not prepared at the earliest possible date after the Northland tramway extension was ordered to be proceeded with, and copies supplied to the officers in charge of the work. If an Order-in-Council had been applied for at this stage-—a considerable time before the actual tunnel work was commenced —the city engineer would have had the benefit of the advice of the experienced officers of the Public Works De-

partment with regard to the design of the tunnel. NO EXPERIENCE IN TUNNELS “Mr Paterson states that he advised Mr Aked to consult ‘Rankine’ (a recognised authority in civil engineering works), and to assume the ground would be bad. “Mr Aked states that mention was made of a number of authorities, and that ‘Rankino’ was one. “Mr Aked had no experience oF tunnel work, liis principal experience being in steel framed buildings and reinforced concrete work. He consulted reinforced concrete text books, and made a number of elaborate calculations of the stresses in the arch based on certain assumptions. From these calculations he concluded that an arch of tho form of the Seatoun tunnel (and therefore of the somewhat similar Karori tunnel) would bo unsafe in the case of the Northland tunnel. He accordingly designed a tunnel section conforming to his calculations. The design was handed to Mr Paterson, who had no experience in tunnelling work himself, and was approved by him as ‘he had every confidence in Mr Aked’s theories.’ Mr Paterson states that he had an idea of submitting the design to another engineer, but did not do so. The plan showing the design was signed by Mr Paterson on April 17th, 1924, and the plan used in tho construction of the tunnel was prepared from it. .We

are of opinion that the design is defective. “For the adoption of this design the-city engineer (Mr Paterson) must be held responsible; for the design itself, the constructional engineer (Mr Aked). ORGANISATION OF WORK ‘‘Leaving out of consideration the work in the approaches, which was of an ordinary character and carried out under the supervision of the engineer for the district, with the assistance of surveying staff in setting out the work, the tunnel work was entrusted to the following officers: General charge: Mr Custofson as district engineer. Setting out: (1) Mr Speight, assistant surveyor; (2) Mr Kitto, surveyor. Tunnelling: Mr G. Quin, a 9 tunnel foreman. “None of those connected with the work, except Foreman Quin, had experience in tunnelling, and we do not consider that the latter could be deemed a suitable man, from liis previous experience, to be put in entire charge of the tunnel construction. “No definite arrangements appear tD have been made for supervision by any of the senior officers, or for periodical and systematic inspections of the work. Mr Paterson states that h 3 assumed Mr Brigham, assistant city engineer, would exercise a general supervision and direction of the work, but Mr Brigham does not seem to have understood this, and stated that his ether duties kept him fully occupied. In actual fact he did not exercise direction of the work. Mr Paterson also seems to have assumed that Mr Aked, who designed tho tunnel section, would exercise supervision to the extent that he would sec that his design was being carried out, n’ul this is borne out by tho fact that Mr Paterson called Mr Aked’s attention to tho shape of the tunnel section as con!structed. No instructions were given in writing, no arrangements were made for progress reports, and no records were kept of events in connection with the tunnel work. Everything was done verbally throughout the whole of the work. “It is needless to call attention to the risks attendant on such methods. Misunderstandings as to the duties and responsibilities of those concerned were inevitable, efficiency in carrying out the work was not contributed to thereby, and any saving of time in making arrangements for, or control of, the work was illusory. Even the verbal instructions given appear to have been somewhat indefinite. “In the absence of a clear definition of the duties assigned to the various officers concerned it is dimcult to assign respective responsibility, and without written reports on tho work as it progressed, to state with certainty when vairious occurrences to be referred to later took place. “W,e consider Mr Aked should, have considered it part of his duty not only to design the “centerings” but to have seen that they were properly constructed, as constructional engineer, and as the designer of the tunnel section Mr Gustofson, as district engineer, was in charge of the whole work, and should have seen that the ‘centerings” were in accordance with the drawings. Mr Gustofson seems to have the impression that he was in no way responsible for the actual tunnel work as, to quote his evidence, he “had no experience at all in tunnel work and knew nothing of the timbering that was necessary.” As a matter of fact he did exercise some supervision in the tunnel work and

therefore must accept responsibility. Early in December, 1924—about five months after the tunnel work had been begun—Mr Aked prepared a drawing the tunnel section. This was taken by Mr Paterson and Mr Aked to Mr Sharp, inspecting engineer, Public Works Department, “unofficially” to show him the nature of tho tunnel design. This was the first occasion on which n> design of tho tunnel as being constructed was shown to the Public Works Department. Mr Sharp had had his attention called by one of his assistants to tho curious shape of the arch of the tunnel. He therefore visited the locality (taking some photographs) about the middle of October, 1924. Mr Sharp has explained to us that he wa« concerned about the matter as he anticipated an order-in-council might he applied for later. Although Mr Shntp had not previously seen the tunnel design he at once called Messrs Paterson and Aked’s attention to the tunnel ns constructed being, he thought, n different shnno from the design then showp him. It was only then—after measurements had been taken —that it was discovered the “centerings” were the wrong shape. Exactly what point had been reached in the tunnel construction, we have been unable to ascertain. Instructions were given to correct the “centerings” and return gradually to the shape as designed, but the shape of the tunnel ns constructed is so irregular that the place cannot be identified. Assuming that daily

progress in tho tunnel work was fairly uniform throughout, about a third —say 100 feet—of the tunnel had been constructed at the time. “It seems inconceivable that Mr Aked, who had designed the tunnel section and had made visits to the work; Mr Gustofson, who was in charge of the work, and was thoroughly familiar with the design; Mr Kitto, who had actually prepared the working drawing and was setting out the work; and Foreman Quin, who was carrying out the work, and had the large scale drawing to guide him: did not observe the serious departure from the design, and that it was left to the inspecting engineer of the Public Works Department, who had visited the work on one occasion and had not seen the design, to call attention to the matter. CONSTRUCTION AND ALIGNMENT “Shortly after the tunnel was commenced —wlieu about 50 feet had been completed—it was found that the work was being carried out on the wrong alignment. Wc are of opinion that this departure from the correct line was due to insufficient pegs being supplied by Mr Kitto. “Mr Kitto seems to have limited his duties to giving alignment and level pegs at the floor level, measurements from the level pegs to the crown of the arch, and marks to indicate the centre line of the crown. Such information as was given was loosely conveyed to the tunnel foreman on small pieces of paper with measurements marked in pencil. No attempt was made to give other important measurements necessary in such work, nor was ony of the work checked as it was completed. “Mr Kitto may have erred through ignorance of the duties required, but even if, as seems probable, the instructions given to him were somewhat indefinite, he was aware that he 1 was given an opportunity to gain ex- , perience and might have been expect,ed to take a special interest in the work, and to have exceeded rather than limited his duties. We consider that Mr Ivitto’s failure to carry out his duties was largely responsible for the deviations from ‘the true alignment, levels, and form of the tunnel, though this does not exonerate Mr Gustofson and Foreman Quin. “We consider that Mr Gustofson was responsible as district engineer for not issuing the necessary instructions for the safety of tho work; and Foreman Quin, who was in actual charge of the excavation and tunnelling operations, for not himself taking steps to prevent accident.

It is important that the space between the concrete lining and tho lathing should be packed with suitable material, preferably rubble. Generally this space seems to have been packed with cement bags filled with material from the tunnel excavation. . Statements were made that a “forest of timber” was used in filling the cavities. This is no doubt an exaggeration, but in one place opened out we found a sjmee of from 18 inches to 20 inches between the back of the* concrete and the lathing partly filled with baulks of timber, and evidently a considerable quantity of timber was s.i used. As stated above, Foreman Quin appeared to us to consider that there was no serious objection to this, although he denied that it had been done.- To what extent these defects in the construction of the work exist it, is impossible to say. They affect the stability of the work where they do exist. ” Foreman Quin must be held primarily responsible. That Mr Gustofson did not discover what was going on may be accounted for partly by his presence in the work being limited by

his other duties as district engineer, but as he was in charge ho must share the responsibility. INEFFICIENCY ALLEGED It will he seen from the foregoing that, in our opinion, the whole bf the work was carried out in an inefficient and unworkmanlike manner. This must be attributed partly to the laclc. of clear instructions and of definite allocation of responsibility among those concerned, but we consider was principally due to ignorance of tunnel work of the officers of the staff entrusted with the work, thus practically leaving the control of the tunnel work to a foreman who, although undoubtedly having had considerable experience in tunnelling, required careful supervision and instruction by an engineer with tunnelling exnevience. “Seeing there wn« no engineer with such experience on the city engineer s staff, tho proper course for him to have adopted under the circumstances was to apply for authority to employ nti engineer w'.th the ne r cssnry qualifications The lato Mr Morion recognised this in the enso of the Orongo rongo tunnel, where an engineer with tho required experience was engaged to superintend the work. At the time tho Northland tunnel was under consideration tho engineer engaged for the Orongorongo work was (he. still is) in the service of tlm corporation. “To considering the whole matter and tho degree of blame which should

he attributed it seems to us necessary to review the general position at the time the Northland tunnel work was put in hand.” The report here mentions the absence, and subsequent death, of the city engineer, the illness of the town clerk, and other circumstances leading to disorganisation. COST OF WORK The cost of the whole work, including the tramway and overhead equipment, was estimated at £17,385, which with additions authorised by the council, brought the estimated expenditure to £22,585, The expenditure to March Bth, 1926, is given to us as: —Land purchase, £366 10s; McKay’s house removal, etc, £1396 9s lid; approaches and retaining wall, Karori road, £9524 13s 9d; tunnel, £16,490 16s 9d; “Putnam’s road,” £1502 15s 9d; total, £29,281 6s 2d. To this amount has to be added Formation and surfacing roadway from Karori road to Northland road including retaining walls (estimate), £1500; construction tramway track, etc. (estimate), £10,500; value of land Connor block, taken for approach road—say £100; value of land in earn© block vested in McKay (city valuer’s valuation), £300; possible land claims 9 Total, £41,681 6s 2d. “The general manager of tramways and electric lighting states that several hundred pounds w r orth of electric current was supplied, but not charged for, in connection with the operations, so that the actual expenditure may be stated at about £42,000. STRENGTHENING OF TUNNEL “There is no doubt some method of strengthening of the tunnel will have to be carried out before it can be considered suitable for public use. We estimate the cost of strengthening the tunnel throughout, to the design submitted by us, at not more than £4600.” OFFICERS* REPLIES Oiiioers concerned were giveu an opportunity to reply. iUi* -u. u. rutci-soii, city engineer, says: “I have to admit that there were errors iu the actual construction ot the tunnel. For tiiese errors as beau oi the depaitiucnt i have to take tno rcspoiisiuiA*ty ana blame, a take it, tlic design of the tunnel is not seriously questioned, and still maintain taut tne original design of the tunnel is correct ... In tnis connection I would point to pages 41T and 41 of the main report . . . ’ljUis is cleariy an admission tnat tho original uesign ui the tunnel was correct. That the axiproval of the Public Works Department was given iy confirmed by the city solicitor’s report that the Public Works Department approved of Mr Aked’s original design of the tunnel.” CONTENDS DESIGN IS CORRECT Mr Walter F. Aked replied: *'(,l) x was instructed to consider the previous.y contemplated design oi the proposed tunnel with respect to the cut and corer portion and reported adversely upon same, i submitted au alternative design to the city engineer for his consideration. This design i understood from him was approved by an outside engineer, i contend this design is correct. (3) With the submitting of tho above design to the city engineer, my work and responsibility in connection with the tunnel proper, ceased. I received no further instructions in connection with the above, nor were any working drawings prepared or approved by me.” ANOTHER REPLY Mr A. Gustofson’s reply included the following: “I wish to state that the centerings were designed entirely by Foreman Quiii, and that the carpenter »imply. carried- out Quin’s instructions. The commissioners considsi me responsible for not issuing necessary instructions for the safety of the work. I wish to state that the departure from the true cut and cover to the half tunuel method was agreed upon between Mr Paterson and Foreman Quin without in any way consulting me. In fact the half tunnel was well advanced before I knew anything about it, as L had not visited tho works for a day or two. Immediately 1 saw what was being done 1 asked ior an explanation and Foreman Quin informed me that he had persuaded Mr Paterson to let him do it that way. I told both Mr Paterson and Foreman Quin that they were taking a big risk, and neither of them denied it. When cracks developed in the hillside above the liaiftunnel Quin assured me that they would be all right if the weather lield good,, and in am case a slip could do no material damage as the timbefuig was quite safe. Mr Paterson and. Quin bad decided to take the half-tunnel risk, and I did not feel that it was my- place to inte’fere. “The commissioners find that I am responsible for failure to supervise tlio work satisfactorily. I cannot deny the charge of failure to supervise satisfactorily. The question of responsibility is another matter. In common fairness to myself I think you should be made acquainted to some extent with the conditions under which I took charge of the job and under which I was working. “In regard to the crossing over Raroa road, I found that to make a practicable and moderate safo crossing, it was necessary to cut back the bank on Raroa road to such an extent that further private land had to be acquired. The amended plan' was submitted to Mr Paterson by me* and it -was approved. When the construction work was getting close to the tunnel Mr Kitto came to me and said that he was to attend to the alignment and levels of the tunnel, so I handed over the plan to him and showed him the lines on which wo were working. ‘This plan subsequently disappeared; it is an open secret that it was destroyed, yet no one will officially say by whom.* I had no previous experience in, tunnel work, and it was reasonable for me to assume that Foreman Quin was the man relied on to carry out the work. ‘ln actual fact this was so.* When the actual tunnelling started Quin also received a substantial increase in his pay. “I had every confidence in Quin. He never appeared in doubt at any time as to the right thing to do, and apparently was a very capable man. Quiii had nothing to gain by skimping the thickness of the concrete, or slumming the work in any way. In any case, even if I did not have confideence in I had no option but to depend on lum. I did net- visit the works everv day, though I was there on most days. Putnam’s road, over the tunnel, was being formed at tho same time, and the supervision of this accounted for the rest* of my time there. The average time for each of my visits to the works, inside and outside of the tunnel inclusive, would be about one hour.” ABILITY OF OFFICERS COMMISSIONERS’ NOTE. In what might bo termed n reply to the answers of the officers, the Commissioners who compiled the report expressly stated that what they said of the officers concerned their work in tunnelling only. Otherwise thev regarded them as very valuable officers.