The New Zealand Times. FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1924. ELECTIVE EXECUTIVE

New Zealand Times, Volume LI, Issue 11932, 12 September 1924, Page 6

The New Zealand Times. FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1924. ELECTIVE EXECUTIVE

The mem'ber for Invercargill haa taken up the mantle of the late Sir William Steward, who was at one time the foremost champion of the above system of selecting Governments. The only difference -between these champions is that the present one is a member of the Opposition, whereas the other marched with the party in power. There is, however, a difference in the circumstances. It is that when Sir William Steward moved the second reading of his bill, Parliament knew only two parties, while to-day three are conducting the business of the country by their opposing contentions. That, in fact, seems to have been the main reason on which the Hon. Mr Hauan relied for success. He pointed oqf that the three-party system had invaded the British House of Commons, where it was proving a hindrance to Parliamentary progress. But he did not confine his example to the House of Commons, for he declared that in many legislatures of the world there was similar hindrance to the public business, and urged that the only remedy is through the principle of the Elective Executive. Applying this to New Zealand, we try to see what chanoe the remedy has of success in the House of Representatives. Let us suppose the new Jaw carried. The first thing that strikes is that there would still be three parties. The question at once arises: how would they vote' if the House had, under the new law, to elect a Cabinet ? They would, of course, vote chiefly by party. There would be some movement of independence, but it would he too, slight to make any very serious difference. One or two members of the Cabinet might lose their seats, but the Ministry would he - a Reform Ministry under the present Prime Minister. Were the election in the hands of the constituencies—a logical sequel that would be to the referendum and initiative suggested by Mr Fraser during the debate—there might he a change. But if the majority of the electors want a change of Government, they can get it at the general election without taking a special poll to elect a Government. The special poll would be unnecessary, for, as an alternative to the election of the Executive, the constituencies have now the power in their' hands. But as the election by the House could not be by any means regarded as certain to effect the desired change, the case for the Elective Executive falls to the ground. Now, the requirement, according to the supporters of the elective method, is for an effective remedy. They, however, offer a ,thing like a reed, likely to be broken. The hope in some breasts is high that the three-party leopard will change his spots, and vote for every member of the Cabinet entirely on his merits. Bnt Parliamentary leopards are just like other leopards: they cannot change their spots, even if they have the will. A few may break loose from the party tie, as an occasional speaker does. But the party tie is too strong for a general disturbance. If it were otherwise, what sort of a Government should wo have? No answer is needed, for it is impossible to conceive that the strength of any party will be used against its chiefs. This even if the party in the ascendant contains a few malcontents. It seems to be forgotten in certain quarters that members are accountable to their constituents for their votes. There is no surety that discontent with a Government in the House is reflected outside. To vote, therefore, in a Parliamentary Executive election is to run

a risk that the average member will not care to run. But we need not discuss the matter theoretically. The debate on Mr Hanan’s bill was a revelation of the practical consequence. The support all came from the Opposition side of the House, and that support was radically divided, the Labour speakers holding that the Reformers and Liberals would coalesce, the Liberals strongly denying the soft impeachment. The debate was a three-party debate. There is, of course, not the smallest chance that Mr Hanan will. get his bill to the Statute Book. But if by some miracle it became law, the three-party character of the debate has revealed that the three parties, being in their present respective strength, election would just about retain the present Government in power, to be held under about the same conditions that limit their hold of it now. If anyone wants to get the Government out—and that at bottom, we take it, is Mr Hanan’s object—he will have a better chance to do it by working with his party at general election time, and in preparation for it, than by asking Parliament to alter the system of appointing Cabinets. It is really a case of “kicking against tne pricks.” The only way to prevail against pricks is to deprive the kickers of power. The House represents the country, not perfectly, hut that raises another question, not within reach of any remedy such as the Elective Executive. Representing the country, the House submits to the Executive. The degree of the representation is the work of the constituencies. If the degree is small, thd Government of the representation will he weak. The remedy is to bring about a more' satisfactory degree of representation. If one party of the three going to the country can get a decisive support from the country, there will be no more weakness of Governments, and all will be well. Wnen all three parties advocate principles, and so differ radically, and none of them gets a satisfactory majority, there is no hope of salvation hut in pegging away until one set of principles prevails of the three offered for the country’s choice. That is the way offered by the constitution. To lie down in ignoble content would be political stagnation, a great evil. But to manufacture a Government that does not represent a majority, would be the greater evil of arbi’tray government. But the people of New Zealand is not a people politically stagnant. It is keenly political, asrit has been from the day of the first settler landing. It will always hear reason; it will never tolerate failure to govern. In the present situation there is abundance of ie aeon to support popular appeal. But there never will be any reason for jumping out of the fry-ing-pan of weak government into the fire of arbitrary non-representative rule.