The New Zealand Times. SATURDAY, MARCH 22, 1924. SINGAPORE

New Zealand Times, Volume LI, Issue 11785, 22 March 1924, Page 4

The New Zealand Times. SATURDAY, MARCH 22, 1924. SINGAPORE

When the Singapore wave reached New Zealand it touched the Prime Minister, who responded promptly. The wav© also touched the Leader of the Labour Party, who also responded promptly. Mr Holland gave Mr Massey the “retort courteous,” claiming to speak better for New Zealand. At the other end of the wave Mr Ramsay Macdonald was promising to lay before the Commons the views on this great subject of the overseas Prime Ministers. Doubtless the majority of the Commons will, so far as the public opinion of New Zealand about Singapore is concerned, prefer Mr Massey’s statement of its liking for the Singapore project to Mr Holland’s insistence on its hostility. Naturally, for Mr Masßey, who approved of Singapore at the Imperial Conference, was the accredited representative of the New Zealand Parliament, which also approved of Singapore by vote of money. Very probably, however, Mr Holland’s view will not lack backing in the Commons from members of Mr Macdonald’s party there. That may serve to accentuate the want of unanimity of oversea Prime Ministerial opinion, indicated already by Mr Macdonald’s quotation of General Smuts’s statement lauding the Singapore abandonment as a bold move in support of the British Ministerial policy of conciliating the Governments of the world into adopting some general system of disarmament. What the outcome will be in the Commons when tho question of Singapore goes to a division remains to be seen. The opinion of the overseas is not the only factor in the matter. A very strong factor is that the defeat of the Government on this question will bring about the dissolution of Parliament. For this contingency all three parties are evidently preparing—as, indeed, must always be the case under circumstances such as prevail to-day in the Commons. In view of the possibility at any moment of a deadlock, with no way out but by appeal to tbe constituencies, all parties must always have one eye at leact turned in the direction of the polls. But experience has proved that often a dissolution, instead of removing a deadlock, makes it only more pronounced. Moreover, none of the three parties is ready for an *-2eal to neoola. though Der-

haps, owing to superiority of organisation, the Labour Party is probably nearer readiness than either of the other two. Then, again, the Labour Party is naturally keen not to lose office, the possession of the same offering it the best opportunity it has everhad for forwarding its views. It is only an opportunity for forwarding to a. limited extent, but half a loaf is always better than no bread. It will not be surprising, therefore, if the Government decides to go on with the Singapore project out of deference to oversea opinion, Prime Ministerially expressed. Nor, on the other hand, will it be surprising if the other parties fail to give a majority againet tho Government for fear of the uncertainties of a general election, which may give greater strength to their common opponent. The position is curious and interesting. There are, of course, many other factors besides those to which we have just drawn attention. The opinion of the naval expert, Archibald Hurd, will have its weight. It is that, quite independent of the oversea opinions and interests, and in view of possible Pacific developments outside their sphere of influence and interest, there must be a fleet of some kind in the Pacific, and that such a fleet must have a base. That some naval force is necessary in the Pacific is held by more than the naval experts of England. France is one of the nations to be conciliated by the “bold move,” supported by General Smuts and by the Leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party in New Zealand. But we have a French newspaper of standing asserting that the move is hold, with a strong implication that, undar present world conditions, it would be very dangerous for Britain to throw open her Pacific flank, which the abandonment of a pacific base project would certainly do. That France would certainly not object to the establishment of British naval strength in the Pacific, we may take for granted. And, therefore, the view taken by the French journal in question must help to discount the bold venture of leading disarmament for the benefit of the world. Moreover, the question of disarmament cannot be said to have taken a hold of the world strongly enough to ensure a following of British advice to disarm merely because Britain refuses to arm her Pacific flank in a situation admittedly dangerous. A very serious impression will be produoed by Mr Bruce’s recent statement. This practically means that if by the abandonment of Singapore protection is refused to the Australian Ccir.mon wealth, the Commonwealth will have to seek outside the Empire for tho protection that great, growing country in the presence of Pacific Powers, and in view of the possibility of* the rise of complications through tho development of other great Powers on Pacific shores, imperatively requires. That statement will be widely regarded as a protest from Australia against the Macdonald “bold move” as likely to cost Australia very dear. This view may be carried further a great deal. For example, where would Australia find this protection denied by the cen tre of the British Empire? To this question answer has been made that the United States might be induced to enter into an alliance with the Aus* tralian Commonwealth for the protection of both their interests in the Pacific. And it haa been added that America would be glad to see a strong base' established in the Pacific, which would considerably strengthen her hold of the Philippines and outlying posts of defence—or offenoe, as the case may be—of Hawaii, Guam, and possibly others. But Australia could not undertake the erection of a base without financial help. An alliance between the United States of America and the Commonwealth of Australia would, therefore, mean strong financial help from the former for the purpose of making a fleet base. It would also mean the employment in case of need of a United States fleet for the defence of Australian coasts and trade routes. But could such things he done without a closer tie between the two countries than an alliance P To pursue this line of reasoning further would be unpleasant, for ahead of it lies a danger of a dismemberment of the Empire. But the implications arising out of the protest of the Commonwealth Prime Minister cannot but suggest themselves to the Prime Minister of Britain and to the House of Commons. The former will see for himself that the applause of one oversea Prime Minister of his bold, tactical move is countered by the resentment of another overseas Prime Minister, whose protest, though not his suggestion of action, is supported by a third overseas Prime Minister. And the majority of the Commons, probably including many of the Parliamentary Labour Party, who have given their support to the new Imperial idea, will see dangerous and undesirable possibilities in the protest of Mr Bruce. It would not be surprising, as a result of all these factors, to see the Macdonald Government continue in office in a House of Commons voting the Singapore expenditure.