The New Zealand Times. FRIDAY, MARCH 21, 1924. SINGAPORE

New Zealand Times, Volume LI, Issue 11784, 21 March 1924, Page 4

The New Zealand Times. FRIDAY, MARCH 21, 1924. SINGAPORE

The abandonment of the Singapore base is a matter of regret. A maritime Empire requires a fleet, and a fleet requires a base. Even if the fleet is one entirely of cruisers, a base is required to enable them to beep efficient. Now, for a large Empire one fleet base is not enough. For example, a base at Malta in the Mediterranean is useless to a fleet, or to cruisers, operating in the Pacific. The oversea dominions are vitally interested in the question. Left to themselves, they cannot find either a fleet or a baso. They must depend on the co-operation of Britain, which can build both fleet and base. They have agreed to cooperate for both purposes, and the agreement has been entered into by a British Government. The succeeding Government has not thought it right to ratify that agreement. If the matter remains there, the overseas will be without naval protection, and the safety of the Empire will be in jeopardy. Not to-day, not by a date that can be named. Nevertheless, the ultimate fact of the jeopardy cannot be gainsaid. That is the reason for regretting the decision to abandon the Singapore base. One must, of course, respect the British Government’s reason for this action. Mr Ramsay Macdonald, after reiterating the desire of his Government to co-operate in every possible way with the oversea dominions, and consult their wishes whenever practicable, and after declaring that the dropping of the Singapore project would not, in his opinion, put any difficulties in the way of this co-operation, announced that he feared that the building of the Singapore base might affect the Government’s foreign policy, which aims at the creation of international confidence and the limitation of armaments. Now, to speak of limitation of armaments rather than of the stoppage of all armaments above the level of police requirements, is to admit that there is some danger of war, that may at any time materialise into actual conflict. That is, of course, the precise position in which the world is placed to-day. The most optimistic admit that, before universal peace is secured, whether by measures now in contemplation, or to he devised later, the world must go through a period during which the possibility of war is serious. That is an admission that there must be a fleet and a base for the same wherever it may be most required. Part of this admission is the provision on the Estimates for the five cruisers. Part also is the recognition that the Singapore base project does not in any way violate the Washington Agreement. Part also is the recognition, in Mr Macdonald’s reference to the Commonwealth declaration, that this base is not offensive but defensive. Part of the same is his appreciative quotas tion of General Smuts’s statement that the British Government’s foreign policy is a “bold move towards an enduring peace.” Where the boldness? Clearly in the willingness to run the risk of the intermediate period of possible war. It is the boldness of leaving a flank to be protected by the strength of an idea not yet accepted. Mr Ramsay Macdonald’s care for limitation of armaments is the best reason for the establishment of the Singapore base. Otherwise the abandonment of the base is a bold policy at the risk of the oversea dominions, which may have to pay heavily the piper, to he held in abeyance by a diplomatic process by no means infallible:

Mr Massey has said, after expressing the regret felt in the Dominion at the abandonment of the Singapore project, that he somehow feels sure that it will be taken up again, even if. by another Government. Governments may come and go, hut the co-operation with the overseas goes on for ever. We like this sentiment, which has come out of the last Imperial Conference. As to the effect on the decision of the present Government, it looks as if that decision is going to be immediately challenged. The House of Commons is to be asked to ratify the agreement about Singapore, though the

Government has not to do so. The House is scarcely likely to take the ground that the making of Singapore is a menace to somebody. Japan clearly does not take it as a menace. The United States Government does not do so, neither do the people of ’the States. Neither does China. There is no menace to anybody, as Lord Curzon said in the Lords before that House voted against the Singapore abandonment. But though all the Pacific States are agreed herein, what guarantee is there of the future? Who can foresee the tribulations of the Far East, or the complications they may give rise to? The only thing positive about these complications is that they may be deadly to the oversea nations of the Empire. And, therefore, for the danger period before us, the oversea nations want the Singapore base, lacking which they will be without defence, either for their homes or their trade routes, during the time of waiting for the universal peace agreement which is the aspiration to-day of the whole world. When the question comes before the Commons, we know that the Liberals and Conservatives will support the amendment for Singapore, which means co-operation of all units of the Empire. We hope that Labour may by that time see that this is the proper, practical expression of its own views of the vital need for Imperial co-operation, and, incidentally, the ratification of the co-opera-tive agreement concerning Singapore. If Labour' fails irt this, the doom of the Labour Government is sealed.