IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

New Zealand Times, Volume L, Issue 11655, 20 October 1923, Page 12

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

PRACTICAL PROBLEMS FOR SOLUTION x BRITAIN’S FOREIGN POLICY ABRIDGED FROM “ THE ROUND TABLE”

In this series of articles it is proposed to examine some of tiie practical problems which will confront the Imperial Conference and the Economic Conference. No attempt will be made to discuss the whole agenda before the Conference. It is only with its more important features that this article is concerned.

FOREIGN POLICY

nf some importance to BtfntJi Africa. That, altio, is a matter which the Conference ought to discuss, in order that nn agreed point of view may be readied.

AND ITS VARIOUS ASPECTS. It was in 1911, niter the crisis of Agadir, that ior the first time a complete farvey of the in'.ernutional problems 01 the British C’tuuniomvealLi. was presented by the Secretary of .State ior Lureigu Affair the Imperial Conference. Lveuta thereaner, unc.er Uie dire necesyitv of war, moved rapidly, uutil by J9IS the supreme direction oi British international policy was avowedly in the hands oi the imperial War cabinet, consisting oi the head* of the Governments of the sell-governing nations that form the (. omnionweulth, and of certain other Ministers, and ot of India. Since i92d, however, events have moved almost as rapidly back' towards pre-war piaetke. Little interest has been .uken in the oversea* portions of the Commonwealth in foreign affairs, and to-day consultation about policy, by cubic and dispatch, is almost penunctory. None the less, ioreiyu policy, continues to be the nuvst important subject before the peoples of tho Commonwealth, for it is out of foreign policy that wars come, and it is only by pursuing continuously a sound ioreign policy, not by Kitting with folded hands and doing nothing, that peace can be maintained. Moreover, tho Avar has shown that it is no longer possible for any community, however remote, te remain isolates.! from international complication*. Tho world has become so small and tho nations, so inter-related, owing to the discovery of new vses for steam, electricity and oil, that the major conflicts of mankind speedily involve ail nations, first economically and then politically. it is becoming clearer every day that tho only road to lasting peace in the modern world is tii.it all peoples who claim to 6tand iii the van of human progress should actively co-operate in trying to solve menacing international problems and Avork towards the establishment of some kind o: international law and order on the earth. “A UNIVERSAL REACTION." 1 For ihe moment, however, there is a j Universal reaction from the intensive in- ! ternationui co-operation which prevailed t during amt immediately after the Avar, j thougn there are sign* that the United j States is nov beginning to think serious- I ly once more about international affairs. [ There is, however, no likelihood of any ! marked change in her policy until after J the Puvddential election of *1924. It is, j therefore, with a series of practical prob- j Jem* that the Imperial Conference will ! find itself called upon to deal. Those ' are, briefly, Europe, tho Near .East, and [ < the difficulties with the United States I over prohibition. There is no other j matter of moment, save perhaps chaos in ! China, which is dealt with elsewhere in ) this number, for the Pacific is i'or the | time being .settled by tho Washington ! treaties. j So far as Europe is concerned, this ? article wiil ;iot deol with reparations, • the Ruhr, and other current controversies, partly because they are also ; discussed in special articles, and partly i because there is a more important issue i for the Conference than what is the next stop to take in the present European tangle ( There is no doubt that there is a com j siderable divergence between Avhnt might j be called the Noav World and the Old ■ Worki point of view about the gen- : eral direction of British policy ; toward**- Europe. Thanks to twenty : miles of silver sea, Groat Brb . tain, since the loss of the Plantagenet j dominions, has never been part of any \ permanent European political system, j But also because of the geographical pro- ; pinquity she ha* never been aole to dis- i embarrass herself of its affairs. From 1 time to time conditions have arisen in j Europe, a» they did under Philip 11. of ’ Spain, under Louis XIV. of Prance, un- ; dec Napoleon, and lately under William! 11. of Germany, which threatened her! own liberty a*> well as that of Europe, j which forced her actively to intervene. ! But after every such intervention she \ has returned to her traditional policy of j c-tanding apart from the seething com- • plex of European politics. At present she is being driven onco more in this direction, though she is still striving to straighten out European chaos because of its effect upon unemployment at heme. The dominions, on the other ! hand, and India, are fur removed from Europe. They, too, are affected economically by European chaos, but, save at exceptional times, as in 1914, their political interest in Europe is, by comparison, small. It is aroused only when. European politics affect the Avellbeing of the Commonwealth as a wholeRELATIONS TO EUROFE. The most important question that the j Imperial Conference will have to con- ; fcider it> the future relations of the Bri-> tish Commonwealth of Eftirope. it can probably do little about the immediate situation over reparations or the ituhr or Russia, lor conditions change tucro from day to day-, and because they are mainly under the control of other Governments. But it cau and ought to determine quite clearly whether the British Government can accept any solution which invokes the Commonwealth in any kind of permanent political commitments in Europe. That question has never been clearly considered since 1909, the date when, tlie new German naval programme finally convinced Great Britain that the old menace from European autocracy had revived. Before the war, Great Britain’s only actual treaty obligation was to defend the neutrality of Belgium. But after 1901 there Avaa an entente cordiale with I'ranee, implying a common interest in resisting German aggression but invoking no actual commitments. On the outbreak of the u;rr tlie entente developed into the quadruple alliance between Britain. Trance, Russia, and, later, ituly. In 1919 a proposal was made and accepted for a treaty of guarantee to Franco by the British Commonwealth and the United States against unprovoked aggression by Germany. That treaty, however, lapsed with its rejection by the Senate of live United States. At one time Great joritain would probably have been willing to go on Avitli it alone—as was f/rupohed at Cannes. But the recent policy of France hu« probably d ©alloyed all chance or any such guarantee being given, and has reduced even the entente cordiale to a very slender tie. At the same time proposals are frequently made for new political combinations for the maintenance of European peace of which Great Britain is to be a member, and the idea in often put forward that, the final solution of the reparation-Uuhr controversy will take the form of an internalionul guarantee of the neutrality of the Rhineland to which (heat Britain will ho a party, to say nothing of an inter-alhed supervision of German finances. IS IT SAFE? It i«4 vital, amid these shifting sands, that we should see ideally ju-f where wo are going, and the tir.A question to bo determined is this, is any .such policy one into which the Commonwealth as a whole should enter? All international arrangements su<-h as these are do-igioo C, piewi.t war. but limy ako invoke the risk of Avar, and BriWrh commit-

ments in Europe in the past have often ended in war. Such commitments today, :u> the war showed, involve tho dominions no less than Great Britain. The dominions Avill certainly no longer give Britain a blank cheque to do the best she can. They will regard themselves as bound by no policy to which their Parliaments have not given, their assent. U, then, the solution that Great Britain should carry on with tho precedent of the guarantee treaty of 1919 and sign obligations which may involve her in the liability to go to war, while the dominions are to be left free to dissociate themselves from all the consequences? That is certainly one solution of the difficulty—the solution which, as we shall see, will end the British* •Commonwealth of Nations when the next serious international crisis arises. The other is that Great .Britain should enter into no foreign commitments to _ which the dominions are not also willing to subscribe, and vice versa, mid that British foreign policy should be one .which the whole Coinmomvealth is willing to support. That seems to ‘-‘The Round Table'” the only possible solution. But it loads far further than at first sight appears. Looking at the international situation from the Commonwealth and not merely the British standpoint, there are certain general ideas which seem to stand out and which it is 'worth while to set forth. ONE POLICY ONLY. 1. The first is that the foreign policy of the Commonwealth must be one. It cannot be a foreign policy which suits Great Britain ‘alone, or Australia, or Canada alone. It must be one which is designed to preserve the peace and security of the whole Commonwealth, and which has the intelligent support of nil its parts. Unless this is so the next serious international crisis may lay the Commonwealth in ruin. It is now a commonplace of Imperial politics that no part of the Commonwealth can be committed to Avar save by its own Parliament. That means that in any war of importance in which any nation within the Commonwealth is involved, the other members can only escape the obligations and liabilities of tlie statu* of belligerency by seceding from the Commonwealth. If, therefore, Great Britain or Canada or Australia is to become involved in disputes or commitments not approved of or accepted by the other members, it is inevitable that if Avar arose, as a- result, tho only alternative to participation in the conflict in some way Avould be a declaration of neutrality which could only be made effective by a notice of secession. THE TREATY. It is no solution that the other parts of the Commonwealth should “consent” , to Great Britain assuming obligation* j by herself. That is simply dangerous I camouflage, as can be seen by considering 1 the consequences of the treaty of guarani tee to France of 1919. This treaty proi vided that it should be binding on the j dominion* only if it were ratified by I them. In point of fact, it Avas ratified only by Australia and New Zealand. , Had it come into force, and had the •course of events given to France the right to invoke the casus foederis, what Avould have happened? Presumably, Australia j and New Zealand Avould have fulfilled | their promise. But Canada and South | Africa would have replied that they were | under no obligation to take part in the I war, for they had given notice of their ; intention not to assume the obligation, ‘ at the time, by declining to ratify the ! treaty. Yet how could they make good | their rights, and escape the consequences ! of belligerency to their nationals and i trade, save by a declaration of secession? j It is surely obvious that the precedent [of the treaty of 1919 is far too dangerous I to be repeated. For Great Britain to | enter into foreign commitments in Eu- ; rope, or any of the other dominions else- . where, to which the rest of the Common* ; wealth doe* not either consent or subj scribe, is to start a process which must ; lead to frequent violent controversy and • tension within the CommonAvealth und ‘may end in. its dieruption. If the Com- ! mon wealth is to persist it will be bei cause its policy represents the views of every part. ALL MUST HAVE A SAY. But if British foreign policy is to be truly ComnionAA*ealth policy it is essen- ! tial that in the formulation of it, the opinions and interests of the "Dominions and India should have full weight as those of Great Britain, even though Great Britain is left to undertake the major share of the responsibility for executing the policy so agreed. There is a tendency sometimes in England to think that people in London know all about foreign policy and that the do- ! minions know little or nothing, i We entirely dissent from this view, j It is probably true that Londoners are more familiar with the facts and the details. But they are, I iu consequence, liable to bo obsessed by I that knowledge. Moreover, they inevitably tend to take too European a view. They are often not ablo to see the international wood because of the European trees. (Juteddem sometimes see motft of the game, and the dominions can bring to tho t onsidoration of international problems not only an intimate knowledge of conditions in other countries, but a fresh and dispassionate outlook, which can be of inestimable value. Not the |east of the services Avhich the Imperial Confeionco can render to tho Common weal t i is to "bring some fresh nir into the corridors of Downing street and by preventing British foreign policy falling unduly under the point of view of Great Brit-air, ensure that it is one which represents the interests and has the support of the Commonwealth as a whole. A WONDERFUL COMMONWEALTH. 2. Directly, however, we consider foreign policy from I he standpoint, of iho CommonAvealth as a whole, the difficulty in the way of entering into any permanent commitments in Europe begins to appear The Commonwealth contains more people and more territory than Europe. Tt. is scattered all over tho globe. Jis frontiers are great mountains, sun-stricken deserts, and the seven seas. H. is inseparably Involved in all world problems, the problem.-; which, arc properly til i concern of Iho League of Nations. But it is not involved Avith tho infernal problems of Europe to a greater extent than with the internal problem* of any oilier continent, except in so far us they have effects external to E<uropo iI self. fudecd, it is less involved, because Europe is the only continent on v. he*c mainland it l:as not a foot of territory. It is oOTiceivuble that Great Brits*, in by herself might be induced to join some form of European alliance, though thal is contrary to her oldest tradition*. But it is certain that none of the Dominions would consent to do mo -and Iho poliov of the Commonwealth must be one whii-h rommands flu-* approval of all. ENTENTES ANT) ALLIANCES. This docs not mean, of <-our.se. that it iv not c-iMremed with European chaos, h obviously is. especially so long as that char>s n rf,ns a continuance of unomployii,in! and bad tiade. or threatens fresh wars. Bui if does .-vein I.<> mean that; flte efforts of the Cominonweullh lo coin-po-e Europr in pr-iMems shui.dd tako tho

form of the normal good offices of <4ipln- 1 macy or co-operation through the League j ol" Nalkns, and not of fresh ententes or j alliances or guarantees. The British I Commonwealth has colossal problems of I its own —the reconciliation of unity Avitli I nation l’l freedom within it.-elf, the de- | velopment of self-government in Asiastie and African territories, the bridging of the barrier of colour, ihe interpretation of .East and West to one another. It certainly will not help it to solve these problems for it to become needlessly involved in the purely internal problems of Europe as well. There seems to be a prima facie necessity from the point of view of imperial unity for n return to tho traditional policy of avoiding entanglement in what Sir Wilfrid Laurier called tho “vorlex of European militarism,” ajid to confine our efforts to promoting appeasement and reconstruction from a detached position outside. BEST FOR EUROPE. This policy also scorns to be best for Europe. The . European problem Avill never be solved by intervention from without. It must conic from unity Avitkin. The inevitable consequence of the traditional European system in breeding armaments and war lia.s repeatedly been set forth in the pages of this revioAv. It is certain that as long as the people of Europe remain divided into watertight eompeiratinonts, hating one another, jealous of one another, and determined not to co-operate on a friendly basis with one another, they wiil be devastated' by chronic war, The old sequence of competitive armaments, military alliances, the struggle for tho balance of power, and the crash of Armageddon will inevihably reappear. It Avill tier vo a no European purpose, and no British purpose, that wo should become . involved in any attompi to stabilise this complex of hates, suspicion and fears by entering into new alliances, ententes or guarantees. The real solution of ihe European problem is that its peoples should recognise that if they want peace and security it will not be got by leaning on others, but by making steady progress for themselves along the road that leads to unity. That this road of selfhelp is difficult no one can gainsay. That it is for all time impossible, no one, Avho has studied tlie union of Scots and English, of the thirteen States of the United States, of French and English in Canada, of Dutch and English in South Africa, and of Germans and French and Italians in Switzerland,'can confidently affiim. At any rate, it seems clear that the British CommonAvealth can } do morQ for Europe by helping it to- [ wards internal reconciliation and unity I than by participating in any new at- j temot to maintain peace on the basis of the ascendancy of any political group within it, or of a fresh balance of power. LEAGUE’S PROPER FUNCTION. 4 It is also worth while considering whether what is necessary for the CommonAvealth is not also necessary for the League of Nations if the league is ever lo take its true position. The proper .function of the league is to be the forum for the discussion of Avorlcl problems. There its value can be immense, for it can bring people together who otherwise would never meet, and help to lift them out Of that pureiy self-centred and nationalist point of view which is the prixno cause of international discord. But it is not (he proper function of the league to govern Europe. Nor can a world league ever succeed in doing so. Europe ought to handle its own internal problems for itself, and for the league to attempt to do the work may become a positi\-e hindrance to Europe assuming responsibility for its own affairs. Moreover, until the league is to some extent disentangled from the internal affairs •of Europe it does not seem likely that ir can ever become a league of all Nations. It is evident that the United States Avill not-join the league so long! as almost its whole work is to deal with the chronic internal disputes of , a Balknuised Europe, rvhile Germany and Russia will not join it if it is to he treated as an engine for the literal enforcement of the treaties of peace. World qi estions and European questions really fall into separate categories, though they often overlap. Once the two are disI tinguished it is likely that both Europe and tho league wiil make better progress toAvards prosperity and peace. THE PROHIBITION PROBLEM. So much for the question of the general trend of CommonAvealth foreUn policy in. its relation to Europe and the League of Nations. There remain the inte.rnational issues involved in the enforcement of prohibition, and the problem of Turkey and the Near East. As to prohibition, the problem ought not to be difficult of solution if it is handled m a reasonable and friendly temper, temperance reform, whether in the form of prohibition or not, is clearly a matter exclusively Avithin the control of every national State. The United States is clearly within its rights in passing national prohibition and in taking strong measures to enforce observance of the hi • with its own territory. It is an heroic attempt to grapple 'with a grave social problem, and, Avliether avo think the methods it has adopted Aviso or not, it is certainly not for other nations to object On the other hand, the United Stales clearlv has no right to try and impose its oAvn laAvs upon other nations or to lake technical advantage of its owu Constitution to embarrass tne legitimate of the nationals of other Powers. That is to attempt to bring about moral adA*ance by methods of autocracy, which all 'history proves have invariably failed ot their purpose But it i.s equally clear that other nations ought scrupulously to refrain from aiding and abetting thoso win arc trying by unlawful means to break down the operation of the Ihav of the :and. If foreign countries have some legitimate complaint, to make eboxit the manner in Avhich the "United States is endeavouring to force their sdiips to travel “dry” upon the high seas, instead of availing itself of reasonable precautions to prevent foreign ships disposing of liquor Avhen in American the United Slates has some legitimate ground for complaint in the persistence Avith Avhich foreign ships, and notably ships flying the British flag ami operating from British portfs in the Bahamas and olseAvherc, are engaged in transporting liquor to tlie three-mile limit to convoys, for d:**posal to bootleggers and other violators ot American law. We have always complained that France, standing u.u a straight and narrow interpretation of international laAv, lias never taken t>tep« to help us to put down tlie arms traffic in tho Persian Gulf. The people of the United stales similarly complain that they can get very little co-operation from us in their efforts to put down tho illegitimate liquor traffic which is carried on by Brit ish citizens, in British ships, and from British j>ort*s. PO-rULAR FEELING AROUSED. There arc difficulties, no doubt, in tho way. The pOAvers of any British Government over its own nationals on the high sous a-re small. It is clearly, too, Ihe primary duty oi' every nation to enforce its oivn laws for itself. But a policy of pure Laissez-tairc on the one side is only likely to encourage fanatical enforcement on tho other. The question is important not because it is likely to estrange the two Governments, but because it is the sore of issue which arouses bitter and resentful feelings in the body cf democratic opinion. There is no use ignoring the fact that there it, a good deal of popular feeling on this matter on both sides of the Atlantic. It ought not to bo allowed to develop, and tho way to prevent it from developing is for tho two Govern men ts to face the Issues and arrive at a reasonable agreement on some such lines as thoso proposed by Jyord Birkenhead as soon as possible. In this work Canada cun play a loading part. She understands tho American point of view better than wo do »Sh<* is largely a. prohibition country her.M-U. Mr Mackenzie Kin,-; might A, well lo raise Ihe question in ihe Im-p-rial Conference. T 1: it K IvY AN i > Yt Ji DI 'l' Kil MIAN KA N. The only other problem that is likely to arise is that of tlie A!edilrminvan. In it there are. two main elements. Tho fiisi is Turkey. The fundamental point for tho Imperial (,'onterem-o is not tho general tenuf: of tho peace which ’Avus

concluded on July 24th, 1923, but the future responsibilities Avhich the British ComnioiiAA'eaßh i.s to assume in connection with it. ‘ The treaty Avhich has been signed Avith Turkey contains, among others, tho following provision-. "Should the freedom of navigation of tho Straits or the security of the demilitarised zones be imperilled by a violation of the provisions relating to freedom of passage, or by a surprise attack or some act of Avar or threat of war, tho High Contracting Parties, and. in any case France, Great Britain, Ituly und Japan, acting in conjunction, will meet such violation, attack, or other act of Avar or threat of wnr, by all tlie means chut the Council of the League of Nations muy decide for this purpose,” On the general merits- of the policy of guarantee, this article cannot pretend to express an opinion. We are not sufficiently familiar Avith tho details of the local situation. But it is clear that such a guarantee ats is set out above may carry with it formidable obligations. The British Empire is one of ten High Contracting Parties to it. There is, however, as will be noticed, a saving proviso which imposes a special degree of responsibility on three of tlie -High Contracting Parties, France, Italy, und Japan and also on vfreat Britain (not the British Empire) who agree, acting in conjunction, in any case to carry out the obligations of the guarantee. The existence of the special proviso must not, however, obscure the real point for the Imperial Conference, which is, aa has been pointed out in tlie case of Europe, whether the Commonwealth, as a whole in willing to assume these obligations. If not, as the Chanak incident significantly shoAved, situations A-ery dangerous to the unity of the Commonwealth may ensue. ’there avus certainly much to bo said for our ancient tradition of mounting guard outside the Dardanelles, but avoiding commitments as far a« we could in the territory itself, [n this instance Ihe decision as to tho moans by Avhich tho guarantee is L> be enforced depends not upon the guarantors, bu; upon the Council of the .League of Nations. IvUYJ'T AND THE SUEK CANAL. Similarly with Egypt. The Egyptian question was fully discussed at tlie Conference of Prime Ministers in 1921, und there has been no considerable chanffe in the situation since, save that nn Egyptian constitution has been brought into being. But the settlement of tho relations between the constitutional Government of ISx-’vt and the British Government, especially in -regard to the Suez Canal, are of vital invariance to Australia and New Zealand and Indin, and

(To be continued.)