The New Zealand Times. MONDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1923. WORLD STABILISATION

New Zealand Times, Volume L, Issue 11436, 5 February 1923, Page 4

The New Zealand Times. MONDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1923. WORLD STABILISATION

The stern determination evinced by France in insisting upon the payment of the German reparations is very understandable when one remembers how Germany enforced tlie payment of France’s indemnity after the Francol’russian war, and when one considers tho huge indemnities that Germany would have levied upon the Allies if she had won the Great War. The Germans boasted during the war of the vast reparations that the Allies would have to pay; and if any reminder of this were needed, it is afforded by a speech delivered in the Reichstag recently by Dr Rudolph Breitscheid. Speaking on the reparations question, he said: “As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I know what the Kaiser would have demanded from his enemies if he had won the war. I have the documents to prove that he would have required of America 30,000 million dollars, of France 40,000 million dollars, and of England 60,000 million dollars. .... The German people must pay for what you Kaiser-loving Nationalists did. I speak not of the war damage, but of the unnecessary industrial destruction you war-profiteers caused that Herr Stinnes might rise to power.’’ Herr Stinnes rose to protest against such language, but Dr Breitscheid continned: “There is nothing personal iti this, Herr Stinnes; but it still remains that your group destroyed Belgian and French industries for what you could gain from their destruction.” Small wonder, then, that Belgium is supporting France in her occupation- of the Ruhr and in her insistence upon the payment of the reparations. As a member of the French Trade Mission told us the. other day, Germany destroyed in France no less than 22,900 factories—or 25 per Cent, more factories than there are houses in the whole of Wellington city and suburbs. This, besides wantonly cutting down tens of thousands of fruit-trees, and flooding and otherwise damaging the coal-mines, so as to render them unworkable. We do not know how many Belgian factories were demolished, but the number must have been very considerable indeed, and her agricultural and mining industries suffered in like proportion. A striking feature of the case, which, we may depend upon it, has not been forgotten by France and Belgium, and should' not be lost sight of by other nations, is that much of the havoc wrought on French and Belgian factories was so contrived as to “count two on a division,” as we put it in politics. For all the machinery that could he transported and made use of in German factories was systematically carried away from Belgium and France; while all that could not he taken away was so smashed up as to he utterly unusable. Thus Germany, of malice aforethought, deliberately planned to cripple France and Belgium as industrial competitors after the war. Throughout Belgium and in the occupied portion of Northern France; practically all the machinery was either smashed or stolen. That which was smashed was a direct loss to France and Belgium; while that which was carried away was not only a direct loss to France and Belgium hut a direct gain to Germany, helping her to the same extent .as it crippled her rivals, and thus in post-war competition counting doubly in Germany’s favour.

It is not to he wondered at, therefore, that, no matter what other nations may be prepared to do in the way of forgiving Germany the reparations due to them, France and Belgium are by no means disposed to forgo, their claims. Especially is this not to he wondered at when one considers that in France and Belgium the phenomenal drop in the value of the German mark is—rightly or wrongly—very generallyregarded as a shrewd tactical move on the part of Germany to feign insolvency and thus escape payment of the indemnity. By those who take this view, it is held—{l) that, while other nations have to pay in full, Germany, by forcing down the mark, lias practically repudiat -d her internal war-debt—for, with tho mark, for example, at 20,000 to the pound sterling, it will only cost her £IOOO to pay off each £1,000,000 of internal war-debt; (2) that the apparent insolvency due to the depreciation of the mark is contrived to enable Germany to get very cheaply out of her reparations difficulties; (3) that Herr Hugo Stinnes and other German industrial magnates have sent a vast amount of capital out of the country to prevent its being impounded for reparations; and (4) that when Germany’s internal debt is cleared’ off and the reparations question settled greatly to Germany’s advantage, Stinnes and his fellow-conspirators will return their capital to Germany, and, owing to the low value of the mark, will he able to increase immensely tlieir industrial holdings. Meantime, the low exchange value of the mark gives German goods an enormous advantage in the markets of the world—an advantage against which specially high tariffs afford only a very inadequate protection. While, therefore, on many grounds, the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr district is greatly to be regretted, the motives that impelled France and Belgium to take this stand are very natural and very compreliensible. In fact, so natural and so easily understandable are they, that it is well-nigh incomprehensible that the United States did not from the first realise the difficulties and dangers involved in the reparations problem, and determine from '■the outset to <\o her utmost to assist Europe in finding a speedy and an amicable solution of it.

Well might ex-President Woodrow Wilson, speaking last Armistice Day, remark on the fact that “ . . . . the United States has remained contented with the Armistice, and has not moved forward to peace. It is a very serious ■reflection (he said) that the United States, a great, regenerative nation, should remain contented with a negation, for an armistice is a. negation. It is a standstill of arms—that is all it is. It is a cessation of fighting, but we are so content with the cessation of fighting that we are even throwing our arms away.” “It is a singular circumstance (he added) that, while we subscribe to the conditions of the Armistice, we will not concur in the establishment of peace.” Then, with a flash of his old-time spirit, he declared—“that, of course, was brought about by a group in the United States Senate who preferred personal and partisan motives to the honour of their country and the peace of the world.”

Had America ratified the BCace Treaty and joined the League, there can be no doubt about it that, not only the problem of Britain’s indebtedness to the United States, but also that of all the inter-Allied war-debts, and the problem of the reparations, too, would have been settled long ago. The whole economic position of Europe and of the world at large would also doubtless have been firmly stabilised before now. Even without the aid of America, the League has done wonders towards saving Austria. At the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, held last week, all th© speakers emphasised th© fact that successful progress in the reconstruction of Austria has been mad© under th® auspices of the League. Lord Balfour described the League’s work in this regard as the greatest constructive effort so far made to extricate Europe from economic chaos; and he appealed to investors to subscribe to the Austrian loan, while, following an appeal by the Austrian Chancellor, the Italian, French, and Czeeho-Slovakian representatives announced their willingness to conclude commercial treaties with Austria.

What, then, : could not the League have done, if the United States had come in as a foundation member?