The New Zealand Times. TUESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1922. THE WASHINGTON TREATY

New Zealand Times, Volume XLIX, Issue 11295, 22 August 1922, Page 4

The New Zealand Times. TUESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1922. THE WASHINGTON TREATY

A strong unity of approval marked the acceptance by the House of Representatives of the Washington Treaty. The House rose above all party considerations, kept to the broadest line of discussion, and showed a grasp of the ideals, on the maintenance of which the peace of mankind depends. It was a most creditable debate, and most satisfactory to the people at large as represented in the House. Without a discordant note from any side, the House accepted the treaty for what it is, showing, at the same time, a thorough knowledge of its scope and achievement, as well as full appreciation of the wise way in which. the statesmen of the Powers represented at Washington had overcome the grave difficulties, once regarded as irremovable, of one of the most formidable situations in the history of the world. War was not ended at Washington either by the stroke of a pen or by the magic of a phrase. But a wide step was taken towards permanent peace for the first time in the history of mankind, and by a method which offers the only guarantee that the successive steps required to reach the much-desired end may be taken in due course. This, most certainly, because the method was the combination of reason and sacrifice which is absent from every page of the previous history of the world. By this combination the world race towards financial ruin has been ended, a very important and powerful group of nations has secured clear peace for many years, and time has been gained for the extension of the method to aTI the nations of the earth united in a compact to settle all differences by recourse to an International Court of Justice, backed by the largest possible public opinion and the smallest possible aggregate of armed force. It would be idle to say that the future presents a. certainty; it would be wrong to think that the Uncertainties it presents are hopeless; it is right to conclude that a beginning has been made of a great system of reason which offers probabilities of a peace which shall be unbreakable to the end of time. The difficulties in the way cannot be ignored. Bub the establishment of the only possible method of dealing with them, the method which combines reason and sacrifice, is equal to a proclamation that the world is at last headed in the right direction. With the working of this new system our own Dominion is very closely connected. The co-operation of the nations of the world is the essential requisite for success. Every nation represented as a unit in the general representative,, Assembly—of the character of that Assembly and Council it is not necessary to discuss yet—must speak with one voice. Obviously, for if there is internal dissension of unity, there can be no international unity. Here we get a view of the status of the oversea Dominions of the British Empire. The Empire, standing as one unit in tho international Assembly or Council, or whatever else it may be called, must speak with one voice, as a Power one and indivisible. Otherwise the strength of the Empire in international counsel will be neutralised by internal dissension. It is necessary, therefore, for the peace of the world that the status of the oversea Dominions shall not he of independent nations. But far more to the Dominions themselves is this limitation of status. For tho simple reason that independent voioes raised in contradiction must break up the Empire in due course, into units independent in status, and, at tho same time, unable to maintain their righto or the security of their place in tho world. Tho precedent of tho Treaty of Versailles was in fact bad, for it appeared to assert the independent status of the overseas.

But the precedent was as bad in international law as it was in fact; the reversal of that precedent was necessary in the interest of the world, of the British Empire, and of the oversea units of the Empire. It was reversed at Washington, where the wishes of the overseas were represented, while their voices as independent units were dumb. The precedent of Washington has killed a theory impossible and undesirable. The effect of the proceedings at Washington is momentous, for it has preserved intact the strength of the Empire as a great factor in the future of mankind, and, at the same time has assured the Imperial units the combined strength without which they are nothing. This, we trust, is now well understood by all the partners of the Empire well enough to enable them to be content with their now status as partners, not as independent Allies. The defence of the Empire is necessary to the new world now forming, the first step to that formation having been made at Washington. Its principal defence is naval—a thing of oversea power. Naturally, the question of this defence was not overlooked in our debate on the Washington Treaty. Incidentally, the question of our part in that defence was mooted, and our attitude towards it more or less fixed. The question is of our duty and of our power. Both points are clear: (1) Our duty to contribute adequately is recognised as beyond doubt; (2) our power to do so is hampered by the financial otress which just now is hampering all the world. That we do not contribute as much as we ought to the naval defence of the Empire is beyond doubt; that at present we can contribute more, but only a little, and that with a big effort, has come out in discussion plainly. How oan we best contribute? The Admiralty, alias the senior partner, has expressed very definite ideas on the subject. We are expected—in fact, directed —to assist in equipping naval bases, to maintain oil reserves for Navy ships burning oil; to provide bases, docks, depots, stores, etc.; to provide for the local protection of trade; for the storage and guns for merchant ships; and to maintain the personnel to work these guns, and to provide mobile organisation for port defences, inoiuding mine-sweeping. These matters all will require time and consideration, and these are secured by the Washington Treaty. They' cannot have justice done them, the Admiralty recognises, until the financial troubles pass. In the meantime, the Admiralty thinks weS> ought to maintain the nucleus of a sea-going squadron, to be expanded when times are better, the expansion to consist of light cruisers sind ocean-going submarines. Now, all tho other suggestions in this programme are simple enough, pointing the way of duty for such as we can afford to take. it. Moreover, they show how we can be of real assistance to the Imperial Navy, which must have bases, storages, docks, etc., and be assured that the merchant ships, to be protected, must be able, in case of emergency, to defend themselves, and that the ships by which the protecting is done can have the shelter of properly-defended harbours. But the suggestion of the nucleus and its expansion, including submarines, is different. Are the Chatham and the other vessel the nucleus the Admiralty wants? What are the numbers and capacity of. the lightcruisers of the expansion ? Why submarines in the face of the facts mentioned by the Prime Minister of the single capital ship sunk by the German submarines in the war, and of the 203 German submarines sunk, facts proving the submarine to be negligible? Further light is required on these points. And for consideration of these there will be ample time. For the general question of our duty to pay our share for the Navy, the Admiralty need feel no uneasiness about that. New Zealand will do her duty.