POSTAL APPEALS

New Zealand Times, Volume XLVII, Issue 10962, 26 July 1921, Page 7

POSTAL APPEALS

GLASSIFICATION DEFINED SPECIAL INCREMENT AND RIGHT OF APPEAL. APPEAL COURT’S DEALING. The judigment of the Court of Appeal was delivered by His Honour Mr Justice Stringer, yesterday morning, in the case that has b-ecornu known a>s the Post Office appeal case. The other members of the Court were Their Honours Mr Justice Sim. Acting-Chief ..Justice, Mr Justice Reed, and Mr Justice Adame. HISTORY OF THE APPEAL. The respondent (Percy Reginald Sutherland) is a member of the clerical division of the Post aitd Telegraph Department, constituted under the provisions o*' the Post and Telegraph Department Act. 1918, and* the appellants are the members of the Appeal 13oard established under the same Act, and acting in respect of appeals by officers of the postal branch of the department. In July last the respondent gave notice of appeal against the salary allotted to him in what he called "the current classification list." The Appeal Board, however, declined to hear and determine the appeal, on the ground that, in the circumstances, there was no right of appeal. The respondent then moved the Supreme Court for a mandamus, ordering the appellants, as such Aipcal Board, to hear and determine his appeal. In his statement of claim, the respondent alleged that, on the 30th day of April, 1920 the Secretary to the Poet and Telegraph Department (acting under No. 4 of the regulations made under the authority of the Post and Telegraph Department Aot, 1918) classified and graded» the officers of the department, ant! that, in such classification and grading, he had. been allotted a salary of «£I4G, against which h© appealed. Oh the hearing of the motion, Hls Honour the Chief Justice held that the so-called "current classification list" of the Suth day of April, 1920, waß not a classified tion of the officers of the department, within the meaning of the Post and Telegraph Department Act, 1918. from which an appeal would lie; bnt he held that there had been a determination by a superior officer of the respondent, relative to the latter's salary, in respect to which an appeal would lie, and he therefore granted an order for a mandamus.

"From that decision the present appeal is brought," taid Their Honours. "It is indisputable that, if the list of April 30th, 1920, -was a classification and grading of the office re of the department, 'within the meaning of the Act. the respondent had a right of appeal against the amount of the salary allotted to him therein,' and, consequently, it was contended by Mr'Myers, on 'behalf of the respondent, that the decision ot the learned Chief Justice, that the 'Use in question was not such a classification and grading, was wrong. It is necessary, therefore, to consider this question in the first instance. AHTHORITY FOJt GRADING. Their Honours reviewed the application of section 10 of the Post and Telegraph Department Act, 1918, and the £>rder-in-Council of July, 1919, which provided that the Secretary should proceed to classify and grade the officers of the clerical, engineering, and general divisions, such officers to be regraded at intervals of not more than five years. The classification and grading was published in the “New Zealand Gazette" of •Mar 30th, 1919, respondent being graded in class VIA. of the clerical division, at .£l4O per annum, for the year ended March 31st, 1920. He duly availed himself of the right of appeal, hut his appeal was disallowed. On April 30th, 1920, the Secretary published in the •'Gazette" a "List of officers employed in the Post and Telegraph Department on March slst, 1920.” In this list, the respondent’s salary for the year ending Majch 31st, 1921, appears as .2180, which was made Up as follows: —J 5140 as shown on the classification list of May 30th, •1919, J 825 being the annual increment to which he was entitled under the regulations, and the further special increment of JEIS granted to him by the Secretary, in exercise of the discretion conferred on him by the regulations, as _ recognition of his special merit and ability in the performance of his duties. CHIEF JUSTICE UPHELD. "In, our opinion, the learned Chief Justice was right ip 'holding that the last-mentioned list was not a classification list within the meaning of the Act and regulations, -in respect to matters contained in wluoh appeals- would lie to the Appeal Board- It os obvious that to classify and grade the officers of a department numbering between 7000 and 8000 ‘in accordance with the merits of the officers, and having regard to the character and importance of the work performed by o r to he assigned to each officer* is a work of magnitude, importance, and responsibility. Before the list was finally settled and confirmed, the Appeal Board, as we were informed on the argument, were engaged for several months In hearing, considering and determining .over a thousand appeals arising out of the list. “It is incredible that, after the work of classification and grading had thus been completed, it should he necessary or, expedient that the work should be repeated within a few months of such completion, with its consequent reopening of the flood gates of appeals; especially as the regulations apparently contemplate a revision only after the lapse of some years. We have, therefore, no hesitation In accepting, as did the Chief Justice, the evidence of the Secretary that the list of April 30th, 1920, was not’ intended to be, and was not In fact, a classification under the Act, bnt was a mere transcript of the classification of the 30th day of May, corrected in accordance with* the changes made since the issue of that list, by reason. of the deaths, resignations, dismissals, promotions, reductions, and transfers of officers, and any _ other changes made in accordance with the regulations, and was issued as a matter of convenience and in accordance with the practice prevailing In thei department for many years prior to the passing of the Act. . , ~ "So far, therefore, as the respondents claim to a mandamus was based upon an alleged refusal by the Appeal Board to hear and determine his appeaj against the salary allotted to him under a classification list, we agree with the .Chief Justice, as before stated, that it.failed. RIGHT OF AFPBAIi. On the question whether the grant by the Secretary of a special increment of £ls was a determination, from which respondent. had a right of appeal, llheir Honours held that “the language of the Act and regulations is such -as to satisfy us that the provision which enables the Secretary, when satisfied that an officer : is of special merit and ability in the performance of his duties, to grant a special increment in excess of the fixed annual increment, is one the exercise ot which was intended to be left entirely in tlie discretion of the Secretary. To hold otherwise, would, it seems to us, result in such absurdities and inconveniences as would defeat its own ends by making the provision impracticable/’ l SECRETARY’S DISCRETION. Their Honours concluded by stating that they were confirmed in the opinion that, according to the true interpretation of the regulation, the granting of special increments was intended to be left to the sole discretion of the Secretary, and was therefore not appealable. “In. arriving at this conclusion, we have assumed throughout that the regulation enabling the Secretary to grant special increments was valid as to which, although the question was not raised or discussed during the argument, vc think it right to say we entertain i considerable doubt. This is an addi- i

ttonal reaeon why the court, in the exercise ,of its discretion, should decline to grant a mandamus/' APPEAL ALLOWED. "The appeal is allowed, and judgment is to be entered for the defendants in tho Supreme Court, with costa on the middle scale, as on a claim for J 2300 andi disbursements for fees of court. The appellants arc allowed the costa of the appeal on the middle scale. Mr W. C. MacGregor, KX\ (SolicitorGeneral) appeared tor the appellants, and Mr M. Myers for the respondent.