NEW PHASE IN GERMANY

New Zealand Times, Volume XLIV, Issue 10292, 29 May 1919, Page 7

NEW PHASE IN GERMANY

CIVIL WARFARE POSSIBLE OUTCOME OP LEFTWARD TENDENCIES. Writing from Berlin in March last, a special correspondent of the London “Daily News’’ described the German revolution as entering a new phase every month. By the middle of February. with the establishment of the Ebert-Scheidemann Premiership—the vvieimar Parliament —and the Breuss Constitution, the 'revolution had revolved through three phases into reaction. It looks as. though by tho middle cl March the revolution will have entor- . its fourth phase, and a return swing v,o the leu, wuicli should bring it to the second revolution about the middle of Juno. This will correspond also with the crisis in the food shortage, and whether the present political system survives will depend on whether by that time the Western frontier is open for bread and tho Eastern frontier still closed for Bolshevism. if the external prospects are had, the internal promise better than might he supposed from what one sees and hears, There was nothing in the present Parliament or political system to give the present Government driving force and direction. Some more' direct expression ot popular discontent was indispensable. But dhe Government had, so far, success!ulty resisted all attempts to force it into progress. POLICY OF SUPPRESSION. Tho outbreaks in the coast ports and tho coal districts qf Westphalia were remote, and their unexpectedly easy repression by Gorstenberg’s flying column, if anything, confirmed the Government in a policy of coercion. The outbreaks in. Munich and the south were outside tho political orbit in which the present Government moves. The spread of the general strike from the west to Saxony, which broke Germany in two, and cut Berlin off from Weimar, was more serious, but the Maercker column succeeded in removing any danger to Weimar and In reopening communications with Berlin. The Government in no way departed from its poliev of suppressing, not only revolts, but the revolution. The general strike and street fighting in Berlin imperilled not only tne present Government, but the whole Parliamentary system. They were both consequences of tho coalition which had riven the Government a class basis and made it almost impossible for it to realise fthe revolution in regard to recognition. of the Council System and socialisation. At first party ties held the moderate mass of the Social-Democratic workmen, but as time passed and the middle-class mentality of the men in ’xrwer became more and more marked dissatisfaction with the Government and defections to., the opposition grew rapidly. Even “Vorwaerts” admitted there was cause of complaint. POCKETING THE PROFITS.

In vain did the Government poster the streets with pathetic protests that ‘'‘socialisation is already here,” and issue manifestoes pointing to its legislative achievements—Eight-Hour Day, Unemployment Benefit, Land Settlement, what we should- call “Whitley Councils” rin - coal-mining districts. War Pensions, and Repeal of war Measures. These had already been put in force provisionally by the previous Government, and did not amount to much any way. In vain did it proffiss its intention of pushing through the two bills approving in principle nationalisation of coal mines and potash deposits, for no one wanted nationalisation except as a step to socialisation. The workmen felt ’that the Government was as one put it to me, “ a revolution profiteer.” It had perverted the. purposes and pocketed the profits of the revolution. They felt that Weimar, as , another one expressed it, was only a. “burger Soviet,” and would produce ho Socialist legislation. The enemies of the Government saw, their opportunity, and exploited it in two ways without much combination or concerted action. Nothing, indeed, has been more surprising than the incapacity of the Germans to associate and organise for a political purposeThe different districts have declared their opposition so dispersedly that the Government has been able, with very small forces, to deal' with them in detail. Each district again is divided into all manner of dissentient organisations of different stages of development. In some the councils are really representative, in others they have co-opted themselves, while there are as many revolutionary forces as councils. WHY INSURGENTS FAILED.

In Berlin alon© there, are some ten different corps. A leader of one of the last insurgent. parties who held out told me during an attack by the Government troops that it was not the great disparity of numbers and munitions that had defeated him, but the incapacity of the Germans to organise. The revolutionary force worked itself out in two different movements • one led to the general strike, the other to the street fighting. The general strike was the resistance of the Workmen’s Council organisations to suppression by the middle-class Ministry. The street fighting was the resistance of, the remains of the old revolutionary forces to suppression by the new volunteer “mercenaries” of the reaction. The two developed concurrently, though with little connection.

The general strike was forced on the , reluctant Majority Socialists by the Independents, themselves propelled by the Communists. For these two latter controlled the executive committee of the Berlin Councils. But though the Majority Socialists did not oppose the general strike, they. did their best to make it a failure, and when, after three days, the Commu. nists pressed for its extension to water, gas, electricity, and food supply in order to support the fighting Spartacists the Majoritarians withdrew, and by the end of the week the strike was declared off. The Majority Socialists’ proposal for unconditional surrender was rejected, that of the Independents for surrender on conditions of amnesty accepted, and the conditions were agreed to by the Government. Thereupon the Left of the Communists, 'including the brilliant Clara Zietkon, took the opportunity df this crisis and of the party caucus (Parteitag), then sifting in Berlin,, to .secede to the Spartacists. THE LEFTWARD TENDENCY. The loss of their Left wing has, however, been more than compensated to the Indepeaddntb by the movement leftward in the ranks of the Social Democrats, the supporters of the Government. It seems likely that this

movement will have a marked effect on the Central Eat—the Council tor all Germany, which will he reconstituted by the Congress of Councils it bas now been decided to summon tor March 26th. [The meeting ot the Congress of Councils has now postponed until April Bth.—Ed. U.N.J And this leftward trend, will be accentuated by disapproval of tho action or the present Ministry in bombarding whole quarters of Berlin and shooting wholesale its political opponents, inis rapid response of the Council system to a trend in public opinion is in strong contrast to the irresponsive inertia of the Weimar Assembly, which remains representative only ot a nationalist mood, and remote from tho whole Socialist movement. . ■ ' _ The Ministry has had to give to the political pressure. Already betore the strike it indicated concessions as to socialisation and sanction of the Councils, and thoso were elaborated ana established by negotiations with missions to Weimar from the Ccntralrat and Yollzugsrat. These concessions are in principle very ’considerable, ancl much more than can ever be imposed in practical application on the Centrum supporters of the Government. The result of this crisis would therefore have been to prepare the way tor a reconstruction of the Government on a moderate' Socialist basis, with a Centrum-Conservative opposition to the Right, a Communist to the Lett. This would have represented the true balance of political power ’at present, and the fact that it would not have had a majority at Weimar would have been only a formal difficulty. FATAL SEVERITY. But this, the natural, solution has been made almost impossible by the extraordinary seventy with which the armed resistance to the Government has been 1 punished. For this seventy has made it impossible for oven the most moderate Independents to join this Government. ' This fighting was not a development ot the strike, but of tho campaign carried on by the Government with volunteer flying columns against tne revolutionary corps throughout Gormany. Of these corps, of which there are many in Berlin, the most important are the Republican Guard and the Marine Division. The former had hitherto supported tho Government, while the Marine Division of Kiel sailors _ had already been in" collision with it, in December. Tho other corfca were all more or less in opposition! and some were mere camouflage for bad characters. 9 Until these corps were dispersed the Government had no complete control of Berlin apart from the Executive Committee, and recently a first step was made towaras their suppression by the arrest ,of 60 ringleaders. The. Marine Division and the other corps then prepared for resistance, with the fSpartacist irregulars and a rabble of roughs and rascals. These were joined later by about half the Republican Guard, which had 'come into collision with tne Volunteer Corps.

THE BERLIN BATTLES.

The strikers, however, took no part lu the fighting. The strike was declared on Monday; Tuesday passed in preparations by the regulars and plunderings hy the rabble, and on Wednesday the' garrisons of Government buildings in the east control district of Berlin were attacked and Wesieged. They were hard pressed; but held out, being supplied by aeroplane until- relieved by an offensive ok the-Govern-ment's troops on Thursday afternoon. For some 1 hours a regular barrage was laid down on the Alexandorplatz and neighbouring streets, in which machineguns, field guns, and minenwerfer were freely used. The insurgents’ positions were made untenable hy aeroplane oh-; eervation and bombing. During the following days they were driven lighting through the east end into the suburbs, when the bombardments wore continued for no obvious reason ’'for several days. Firing heavy , artillery at crowded tenement houses moans_ a butcher’s bill of several thousands,' mostly women and children, and damage to property of several millions. The behaviour of the Government can only be explained by their having left the whole matter to Noske, who in turn left it to his military advisers, Majors Giles and Hammerstein, and these were agents only of the militarist reactionary; faction. This faction intended to exploit the crisis by terrorising the revolutionary and even the, reform parties hy wholesale shootings and bombardments. For this purpose atrocities were Invented as a pretext for reprisals and for recruiting and raising the pay of a 'volunteer army that could be used for reaction.

The Government could have kept order of a Ssorf through the revolutionary corpa if_ it had kept in touch with the revolutionary councils; but it fought the corps with flying columns of under-trained, over-armed boys, and it fought the councils with its patohedup majority of old Parliamentary hands and party hacks. The result has been civil war and a Government that declares war on any section of its people, oven if it defeats them, deserves short shrift itself.