PROGRESS OF THE ARMISTICE

New Zealand Times, Volume XLIV, Issue 10207, 18 February 1919, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE ARMISTICE

Regarding the Armistice itself, the important tfiing is that it hu been renewed for an indefinite period on terms dictated by the Allies. These have not been published, with the exception of a danse stopping the German campaign against Poland, and assigning a definite boundary to the eastward of which no German troops will be allowed to advance. This, so far ae can be seen, is the clause that really matters. It peremptorily stops the German progress in the old direction of Eastern extension and exploitxnont. The reply of the Allies to that was the proposal to establish the old Polish Kingdom athwart the course of German ambition. Germany rejoined by raising a volunteer army for the conquest of the new Poland. After this army began to show, its discipline got bad, and its recruitment began to shrink. But the Allies take no chances. Whatever the value of the reports from the East, the best thing to do is to stop all advance to the East. This has been imposed by the terms renewing the Armistice, and wo may regard the danger on that side as suppressed.

The immediate consequence is that the Poles are being approached by the Allies to work out their own salvation on linos to suit the Allied programme of “Poland a Buffer State.” Much has been made, for pro-German reasons, of the clash between the two Polish parties, respectively Jed by Paderewski and Pisludski. They consisted of men who had on the one part sided with Russia after the famous Homo Rule Proclamation of tho Grand Duke Nicholas, and on tho other had boon in revolt against Russia. Bilt after all had been said, it appeared to be in reality nothing more than a territorial difference, one party wanting more territory for Poland from Lithuania and Courland than the other. As tho lenders have met and taken to peaceful discussion, this cause of division might not he fatal

to Polish unity. A deeper-seated difficulty is the antagonism between the Polish landowners and tho Polish peasants. Here, again, tho difficulty is not insuperable, for a surrender of sufficient lands to settle the peasant discontent ought not, in view of the unique opportunity of starting Poland in history once more on the national piano, with some prospect of the renewal of the glories and achievements of her splendid people, to be difficult. Some tact and knowledge on the part of the Allied deputation sent to Poland ought to ensure an equitable settlement agreeable all round.

Sir Joseph Ward was wise enough to decline appointment to tho delegation, the offer of which was a high compliment. That he has the tact necessary for successful negotiation all who know him will agree. On the other hand, no one can blame him for not having that intimate acquaintance with all the phases of the Polish question, without which the success of negotiation is impossible.

Tho renewal of the Armistice has not, so far as wo aro informed in tho cables, caused any comment in Germany. It is a fact very suggestive of tho German weakness after defeat. When the German armies, after overrunning Poland, Courland, Lithuania, and Yolhynia, failed to secure a decision, despite their tremendous artillery superiority and their huge infantry phalanx, Lord Kitchener declared very aptly that they had shot their bolt. And so it proved. Three years later, however, when they were being driven but of France and Belgium by the rapid, compelling generalship of Marshal Foch, their collapse was far worse. No less an authority than yon Hindenbnrg measured its extent for the Reichstag, as it sat bluntly gazing at the terms of the Armistice. “If these termsn” said he, in his wire from the front, “are not accepted, I shall be forced to capitulate, with all the armies.”

This explains tho silent acceptance of the order, “Hands off!” with respect to Poland. The latest reports, moreover, are to the effect that the German armies are demobilising rapidly, and will shortly, to a large extent, belong to past history. As showing how tire Western campaign broke their spirit, we have the fact that the voluntary recruiting for the army of Poland had got to a very low ebb in a very short space of time. As that army, in fact, would never have reached the intended dimensions, tho German Government must be glad of an excuse for hot persevering with the project. » • #

Against this conclusion, we have a report to-day of the springing up of an energetic propaganda by the old Military Party of Germany for the reconstruction of the German armies. But this talk fails to hide the fact that the appeal of the Government, to the demobilised veterans of the war to conquer Poland had failed when Marshal Foch’s order was received tb stop all advances to the eastward. Tho propaganda may, however, be taken, a sign that the Military Party is quite prepared to circumvent the limitation of armed forces to be presented at the Peace Conference. It has before it the success of a similar effort in Napoleon’s time; and that, together with this reported outburst of warlike propaganda, should make the Allies care-ful-in-their, dealings with beaten Germany. - i. * * *

The German President (Ebert) and tho new Chancellor of the Republic (Schiedemann) very frankly admit that though they fear the terms impending at the Conference, they regard a renewal of the war as impossible. Herr Erzberger’s is the only voice in Germany that calls for a renewal of hostilities as the alternative to the acceptance of the Pence terms. The others declare for refusing to sign, and leaving the Allies to deal with tho consequence, which will take tho shape, of a disorganised, disgruntled, and chaotic Germany. Such talk, with three million Allied troops in strategic possession of Germany, is mere wind, just as much as the warlike declaration of Herr Erzberger. But as none of the Germans express contrition for the past, and all dc’ri 1 ’ 1 - re for entering tho League of Nations for their own purposes, it behoves the Allies, we repeat, to he careful m their dealings with Germany.

. The French have no doubts about the matter. They want a military guarantee for their Eastern frontier, and they require an assurance that the -German vote in the United States will not he used to give Germany a big position on th© League. The latter may ho an over-cautious proceeding. But the fact that France has suffered terribly from her tigrish neighbour, who, moreover, is not a bit sorry for his conduct, cannot be gainsaid. In this there is trouble ahead for the Conference, more especially as the weakness of the coercive methods proposed for the League of Nations is made evident by the publication of its clauses. The sum of the matter is that whereas the Allies are setting up the Longue for the sake of the world, the Germans are willing to enter it for the purpose of giving Germany another chance. * • *

Mr Bonar Law’s announcement that Britain intends to demand not only reparation but also the cost of the war, is reassuring. The amount of the aggregate and the. manner of enforcing payment of the same, _ are now being considered by a Commission. * * *

For the rest of the points of the situation, there is no certainty at present. The Mandatory principle for the treatment of the German ex-coloniesis being viewed with -something like growing suspicion. Professor Oman publishes now proofs of the responsibility of Germany for the war, or which the most striking is the story of the bogus sheet of the ‘Lokal Anzeiger” announcing the German mobilisation, and tho purposed delay of the Russian Ambassadors warning to his Government of the bogus nature of this provocation to Russia, to act m a manner to give Germany a pretext for declaring war. Mr Churchill has repeated the statement —with all the responsibility of his office of War Minister that there is a shortage of 64,000 British prisoners. Tho Germans deny that there are any secret camps of prisoners, and’ are assisting in the search for that great lost legion. But why should there be any such los , s? ,^ a " is the main thing which may load to a very severe reckoning.