CAUSE OF BRITISH FAILURE

New Zealand Times, Volume XLIII, Issue 10138, 28 November 1918, Page 5

CAUSE OF BRITISH FAILURE

LANDED AT WRONG PLACE.

INTERVIEW WITH GERMAN GENERAL. By Telegraph—Press Association —Copyright Australian and N.Z. Cable Association. LONDON, November 26. Air Ward Price (war correspondent), who is now at Constantinople, interviewed General Liman von Sanders (Director of the Turkish Armies), who said he found the British a brave and chivalrous enemy, both at the Dardanelles and in Palestine. He telegraphed von LudendorfE in August that unless he received reinforcements nothing could prevent a debacle. Ihe Turkish weakness was due to sending all available reserves to Azerbaijan, in Persia, for the conquest of the Caucasus, despite German protests. Discussing British strategy at the Dardanelles, General von Sanders said a naval attack on the Straits could not have succeeded owing to the mines. . .. , , “I proposed,” he said, to flood the Straits broadcast with mines. Ihe function of the forts was simply to protect the minefields from interference. If I had been attacking the Dardanelles I would not have landed at Cape Helles or at Anzac. I would have made the principal landing on the coast of Asia Minor, off Tenedos. Such a landing would give a conyement base close at hand, while two days’ march would have brought the Allies to the rear of the Dardanelles forts, which can only fire seaward. At the same time I should have landed on the neck of Gallipoli close to the Bulair lines. “So strongly did I expect that you would choose these places that when I took command months before the landing I posted two ot my six divisions opposite Tenedos, two on the Peninsula, and two at Bulair. “With regard to the Suvla landing, I would have preferred to land between Anzac and Helles, where the Peninsula is narrower and the Turks could have been attacked from the rear.

“The landing at Suvla might have succeeded if hard pressed, as there were only two battalions of Turkish gendarmes, two squadrons of cavalry, and two batteries of old guns to oppose it during the first twenty-four hours. If'the, British-troops had pushed inland with several columns, some would have made a good position on the heights.” General von Sanders said he hurried up a division by a forced march. Another critical moment was when the push was made for Chunuk Bair. Ho rushed up a division from the Asiatic side, which would have been blown to pieces by tho British guns if they had arrived halft an” hour 1 later. There were only three battalions left on the Asiatic side, where there was great anxiety lest there should be a fresh British landing. It was also touch-and-go at Kirechkeuy, on the north aide of Suvla Bay, where the Allies attacked three days after landing. General von Sanders expected the withdrawal after Lord Kitchener’s visit. “I entirely agreed with the wisdom of the decision,” he said. “Tho Turks were constantly being reinforced, and at the end I had twentyone divisions. The withdrawal was extremely well carried out. The concealment devices at> Suvla were most effective. Our • patrols on the last night sighted red flares on the beach, and thought for a while that fresh troops were being landed. When the news came that the British positions were empty I galloped from headquarters to .organise a pursuit, but the Turkish telephones were so bad that I was unsuccessful. The Turks, advancing in the fog, stumbled on the British landmines and had heavy losses. Ninety mines were found on the front of a single division.”

General von Sanders said that he saw preparations for the evacuation of Holies, but was unable to guess the date.