THE LAST RESERVES

New Zealand Times, Volume XLIII, Issue 9998, 15 June 1918, Page 10

THE LAST RESERVES

WHO WILL HOLD THEM ? VITAL FACTOR TOUCH MAY ( DECIDE THE WAR. (From Our Speoial Correspondent.) LONDON, April 30. • Tiie general conclusion drawn from the course of the fighting in Flanders is that thero is nothing to alter the view tlhat the Germans are deliberately setting themselves to wear dawn and destroy the British ATiny. That object is being countered by General Foci's action in sending French troops up to the North, though we are assured that the Allied Commander-in-Chief has so ■far employed only a small proportion of these reserves to hold up the- German attacks. All the indications are, indeed, that General Foch is holding ■his line with a, minimuia of nien witn tae full consciousness that the fighting we are now watching may go on all through the summer, and that in the end it will be a question of who iiolds the last reserves. The policy is one that involves certain sacrifices, amongst which must be reckoned the loss of Mont Kemmel. which, if it pan be exploited, will undoubtedly embarrass our position in the Yipves salient. Kemmel Hill, which is covered with woods, stands rather out in front end rather apart from that main ridge of hills which has been accurately described as constituting the backbone of our defence in this area. Jt commands the rear of the positions wo hold in the salient and the hill is the highest ground in all that lowlying country. From its summit you command fl, view stretching away to "the coast, and except that we are very much stronger m men and material now than we were then, the position now present, ed on the Flanders front would constitute the most serious menace there has been, to the Channel ports since those early days of the war when the thin khaki line of our old "Contemptibles" withstood the shock of overwhelming masses of German troops. THE CHANNEL POETS.

Happily thero is no reason to suppose that even a withdrawal from the Ypres salient would involve tho fall of the Uhannol ports. Even Dunkirk itself might still be saved. It is only .About ten miles from Calais, and if it fell the entrance to that hntrbour would, of course, be commanded by the enemy's guns. .And though the Straits of Dover would not be denied to the use of our merchant shipping, the zone would be rendered decidedly unhealthy. We should still be able to maintain our submarine barrage across the entrance to the Channel, but even this would be i. matter of increasing difficulty. It may be assumed, therefore, that General Foeh is not at all disposed to regard the German menace to the coast as in any sense of minor importance. Any considerable retirement in this area, moreover, would affect the natural communications of the Allies, the importance of Hazebrouck being frequently emphasised of late, for thTough this junction runs the main railway connecting Dunkirk in the north with Amiens ana Paris in the south. It may be, of comse, that relief lines are in existence of which the general public has not 'been informed. The laying down of these relief lines is quite a usual military precaution, the adoption of which by the Germans has frequently falsified calculation.

We are perhaps a little prone to imagine that, railways known to be in existence before the war constitute the only means of rapid communication available'to the enemy. The flying men on both sides might perhaps bo able to tell a very different story when they return from their reconnaissances nnd their photographs would possibly mate the ponderous deductions of some of the critics appear just a little foolish. Bailways continue to play an enormously important part in warfare, but the masses of men now working behind the lines of each army are so numerous that relijf lines can be laid down with,, quite extraordinary Taipidity. THE STBTJGGLE FOB AMIENS.

Our natural concentration on the fighting in Glanders ought not, however, to blind us to the fact that the area there, vital though it may be. as covering tho road to the Channel ports, ia yet of secondary importance compared with the maintenance of our line in front of Amens. ■ Much of the violence of the Gorman attacks south of Ypres may unquestionably be attributed to von Hindenburtr's desire to force General Foch to divert divisions from the southern to the northern battle front. The consequence-, if we fell into this trap, might well prove fatal to the Allied cause. A big retirement in Flanders might have embarrassing consequences on our sea communications through the Straits of Dover, but the Allied armies would still remain intact and would, still present an unbroken front to the enemy. ■ The situation would be far different if tho Germans were to break through at Amiens, and pressing on to Abbeville wero to separate to British aTmies in the north from, the French armies iu the south. That, indeed, would represent for von Hindenburg a (strategical victory of the first importance. The menace on the Somme is far more serious than any menace can be in the north. It is on the Somme front also that the main German armies are still massed, and where we must expect this great battle or series of battles to be fought out to a final decision. The struggle east of Amiens may blaze up afresh at any moment, and tho set-back the Germans have experienced in losing Yillers-Bre-tonneux after it had fallen into thoir hands can be regarded as only a local incident in the giarantic struggle that is impending. The precise area in which the Germans will attack is, of course, to a great extent in doubt. It will occasion no surprise, however, if the blow shotild fall between Arras and Amiens. The British line to the north of the Somme has resisted all tho efforts of the Germans to bend it back. Such retirements ,is have been made have been merely to conform with the position south of the river. Von Hindenburg is keenly alive to the danger that would threaten his right flank if the Allies wore to launch a counter-offensive here while he was bonding all his energies against Amiens. He must also get more elbow room, in, the north before he can safely press for-* ward against Amiens. THE MAIN" EFFORT. That the Somme front is, and is likely to continue, the scene of the main German effort may, I think, be confidently expected. There are suggestions in some quarters that von Hindenburg has indefinitely postponed a resumption of the drive against Amiens in order to exploit to the utmost his successes in Flanders. It is even hinted that he is diverting divisions from tho southern to tho northern battlefield. This last is probable enough, but even if ho has boon driven to this expedient, ho probably counts on foroing tho Allied Command to divert troops also to the northern front. In any case the numbers employed in the Flandors fighting speak for themselves. In tho great battle on "Monday, when the Germans sought to press still further tho advantage gained by the capture of Mont Kemrnel, no fewer than thirteen divisions were employed on a ten mile front. This represents a very big accumulation of troops in this area, hut it ought not to bo forgotten that tn (he first stage of the fighting on the Sommo there was engaged from -first to

last something like one hundred divisions. Wo shall therefore require clearer proof of a change of plan than is yet available before we accept the suggestion that German opportunism has been carried to the extreme length of abandoning the main offensive becaueo it so happens that the operation in the secondary theatre of the war holds out rather greater promiso of a definite success. ENEMY'S WAR WEARINESS.

In the meantime evidence accumulates that the heavy casualties the Germans have sustained is causing considerable searching of heart in the Fatherland. The comments of some of (ho enemy newspapers oh this matter and the outspoken criticisms voiced in the Reichstag show that the failure of the militarists to achieve all they promised is,-having a very depressing effect on public opinion. Such successes as have been g-aiued have up to the present been merely tactical, tjhough on the Somme the strategical results were very nearly, but not quite, secured. The Germans have sained ground; the> have, driven us from certain positions; they havo taken prisoners and guns; but they have a*s yet achieved no change in the strategical situation, though we have reliable evidence that they expected to do so within a fortnight of the commencement of the offensive on the Scanme. These facts get out in Germany as well as in this country, ami war-weariness may soon become as pronounced in Berlin as it is_ in Vienna, la Austria thero is a distinct slowing down of .preparation foi carrying oi. the war. It is quito possible, and indeed probable, that the Austriaus may be induced to resume the .offensive conditions permit of a renewal of operation* on that front. But they assuredly nave no stomach for assisting Germany in the Western theatre of the war. Austrian artillery has b_een sent to von irindenburg's assistance, but that just about represents the extent of the aid that is being given.