CAMBRAI REPULSE

New Zealand Times, Volume XLIII, Issue 9958, 30 April 1918, Page 2

CAMBRAI REPULSE

REASONS FOR THE SET-BACK ■ T POINTS FROM SEE 'DOUGLAS HAIG’S DISPATCH, From Our Special Cox-respondent. LONDON; 1 March 6. Most people long, ago camo.rto tho conclusion that the failure of *our thrust at Cambrai last November, was attributable to ■ the fact -that. no one took the' tanks yeiy ; seriously. ■ Sir Douglas),Haig’s .' dispatetf;, (issued tonight) shows, that this .popular explanation of, our failure must bo revised. Tho; British dispositions appear to have teen as complete as the circumstances■jf tho moment permitted, and it was not through ;aWy .waxjt of foresight that wo were unable to exploit the early juccees tho tanks attained. If any very large force had been concentrated behind the Cambrai front surprise Would have been impossible, and surprise was tho essence of success so far as the- tanks • were' concerned. Moreover, .Sir .Douglas Haig leads us to understand that ho had no great reserves available to draw upon. His armies had 'been' 1 "fighting'' strenuously all through the summer, only part of the losses had-lV.'en“replaced, and 1 , ag he rather pointedly remarked, ‘‘many, re-cently-ariived drafts, still tar from'being fully trained, avere included in tho ranks of . the, armies.”

Knowing the limitations of Sir Donglas BCaig’s resources it is. amazing that the authorities at Home should ever hare countenanced the ringing, of bells in London simply on the' 4®sh(isli *of the early'sutAfees'which the tanks Attained; Recognising the risks of;the enterprise; Sir ’ Douglas' Haig- Seems Ho hare hesitated to the lost about ordering an advance, and ho seefns to: havebeen influenced in some degree by the; necessity of creating a-diversion on-be-half of, our hard-pressed The Oambroi thrust succeeded . this if it failed in some other, particulars. THE SET-BACK. Sir Douglas Haig deals rather .generally .-.■.with the circumstances,' leading up to our evacuation of tho ground -•which wag won.,. It is clear that the 'Germans effected a local surprise on 'fho TBfitish'figlit, and nothing hut the splendid gallantry of our war-worn reserves prevented a serious disaster. Orders which afterwards fell into our hands showed that the Germans were working on a very hold and ambitious plan, which aimed at nothing less than the capture and destruction Of. the British forces in. tho Gambraf salient.' All they actually achieved was,,. the recovery of,a fow square miles of. country, for oven their own guns which they recovered were put out of action before they were left behind. ■ Nevertheless, there are omissions from tho dispatch in the form of least in which it is presented to the public which are rather striking and somewhat unsatisfactory. People are complaining. of a quite unnecessary lack,.of..candpur.in the paragraphs-.en-umerating-the results of the - fighting. Full particulars- are given about the - ' number of prisoners and guns which we captured, but nothing is said about the number of British guns and British prisoners taken by tho enemy, though it is known that the former considerably exceeded our own captures. Why there should be this ’reserve about facts with wh'kh 1 thtr-enc- 1 my is necessarily perfectly well . acquainted is very difficult to determine, unless it bo one more-illustration of the incurable tendency ,of the official mind ; to present only the bright side of, the_ picture. ' _ ,' ' ’ •' ' Sir Dougins Haig at least shoWs no" disposition to withhold duo credit to the enemy when it is 1 deserved.’ On the contrary, he" makes ‘ jrointed 1 ' reference to the gallantry-of a Gorman officer at Flesquiercs, where many of the hits upon our tanks were obtained by a German artillery- officer < who remained alone at. his battery Hind served a field gun single-handed -until killed at his" post,;“-The‘ greatpbravery ofthi s - offlcer.,H Sin Douglas-, Haig writes, “aroused the admiration of all ranks.” A’ LESSON FOR OURSELVES.'

Heading between,, the lines, of the dispatch the only .conclusion ...to bo drawn, is .that,,, the._, setback' wp sustained wasv.dpe r tp,.a. certain. loss of moral .(to,' which nil,', troops are liable) on the British right, Sir Douglas Haig’s ' dispositions appear to have been absolutely . correct, and oven to have tiooh'rjustified by what occurred. He pxpepted the .brunt of the enemy’s coUntbr-aftacks to'fall in the north, at~ Bourlon, and in the east. . That * is where they actually did fall;’ and though tho Germans came on in'wave after'wave failed. 1w " .. But in the’’SoutliJ where tho attack was comparatively feehle, it succeeded,and the indications hro that tho.result was as: much a'.'surprise to the enemy as to our owmraenr-"Sir Douglas Haig tolls us that” in the Gonnelieu sector tho swiftness with which tho advance of the enemy’s infantry, followed tho opening of his bombardment appears to have overwhelmed- our tl-bbpin J almost , beforo.-they ■had'.Toalised rftitsefe itho attack' had- begun, .Ho st o :itl ii y-ad v an-,-cing barrage gave warning, of tho rap-»-proach of tho assaulting columns, and the Gormans crept forward covered by an early morning mist, and assisted’ by a great number of- low-flyihg atottf-’’ pianos, which rained machine-gun Ifire into our infantry. ■" ■ ■ , I J Ur ? risoS this kind are always difficult to provide against, and tho fact is one which wo ought to take to heart at the present moment. For if tho Germans are to meet with' any reel- success on tho Western front this spring, it is by surprise alone that they can hope .to achieve it. It is satisfactory to . know that during tho last three months we have been showing ourselves alive to this danger, and have taken steps to make our defenseo preparations very much more thor-ough-than they ever wore before.

The last paragraph makes the failure of the Fifth Army in the subsequent groat Gorman offensive difficult to understand. In view of such preparation as is here indicated, the official explanation will bo awaited with interest.—Ft! “N./.T.”