PROGRESS OF THE WAR

New Zealand Times, Volume XLIII, Issue 9900, 20 February 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

In Germany the reception of the Austrian protest against the renewal of war with Russia will be regarded as a corroboration of the saying that it is the unexpected which always happens. That is especially true of Germany, because in Germany nothing is expected except what never happens. It will now, however, dawn on the Teutonic mind that the Austrian Government and people are sick of the war and anxious for a really honourable peace. If ever a thing was plainly said, it is this thing which the Austrian press is saying in every possible key of journalism. One paper goes so far as to say that Austria is virtually out of the war, and about to lot President Wilson engineer a separate peace. AH hopes aro on Count Czerniu to get this done. This represents a consummation, devoutly to he desired, of course. But Count Czernin has not yet get to know President Wilson and the American people behind him. Austria is a party to the disgraceful third partition of Poland, and the German seizure of Russian territories. Austria also, holds many States in brutal subjection. On those Austria will, if we know the President,' have to do the right thing, conforming to the President’s announced peace terms, which are opposed by the action of Austria.

There is, however, no reason whatever why Austria should not . throw over the German power which forced her into the war and has failed to pay the price promised. Austria has no interests in Belgium and Franco; no reason for subscribing to the German, doctrine of “Mittel Europa” ; nothing to gain by carrying on the war, and every reason to try and improve her position which is precarious, as a ruler of nations. If Austria were torn out of the Central Alliance every Austrian would be loudly glad of the blow. What precisely may bo the value to ho placed on these press evidences of Austrian desire to back out, .one thing at present seems clear. It is that the attitude of Austria is probably going to hamper (the German exploitation o.f Russia very greatly.

The French estimate of the German losses during the war enables the military position to be rather better understood. A loss of 4,225,000, of which 2.500.000 aro dead, implies a tremendous weakening. The estimate of 4.800.000 for the present effectives being added to the losses we get nine millions as the total German effort, or about one in seven of the population of, say, sixty-three millions. As the utmost effort compatible with any hope of strong fighting is 10 per cent., the figures show the approach of exhaustion. It is not a time to exactly welcome the defection of Austria, or undertake a large offensive ' against Russia, with vast possibilities of guerrilla warfare, or look with equanimity on the growing forces of America. Nor is it a time to regard a drive in the West with anything like comfortable certainty. A drive, fo have any chance, must have a great preponderance of force behind it. This estimate puts the whole German forces at 4,800,000. They cannot be all in the West. Between the Russian possibilities and the growing, difficulties on the Italian front, there cannot he less than a million Germans to he deducted for those positions, and possibly a million. and a half. Taking off half a million for garrisons and communications, there is a balance left for the West of at the outside three millions. But the British and French between them must have four millions, with reserves to draw upon, and the Americans cannot have less than half a million, and growing every day more. Thus we have four and a half millions ready to reply to a drive of three millions. How loud must the Kaiser yell “Paris” before the Hindenburg-Ludondorff drive prevails?

If at this juncture the straightforward diplomacy of President AVilson can prise Austria out of the alliance of the Central Powers, it will not require even a ghost to teach the Teutonic mind how to spell ruin. • • • One can, by reason of these considerations, regard the staff crisis with a certain improved composure. But as the Prime Minister has been prevented by a bad cold from making his promised explanation to the House, there is no fresh fuel to burn in the fire of discussion under the boiler of understanding which gives off the strong steam of clear explanation. We know, however, that General Sir W, Robertson has accepted the Eastern Command, andl therefore remains in the service at hand in case of emergency. Moreover, the command, is by no means in the category indicated by the sneering member who interjected, “Why not the command of the Boy Scouts?” There are very large forces in the Eastern Command, and there is danger—not pressing, hut with eventualities before it—of invasion for which there must be a general and complicated plan requiring much skilful arrangement to ensure smooth running in the event of emergency. Wo ■ cannot help deploring the withdrawal of the General who was said to have stepped) worthily into the shoes of Kitchener. But we must make the best of it.

We may. at the same time, look back to see what has been done during the war in the way of co-operation without any formal. co-ordination of command. Wo discussed yesterday how the British at Mens would have been enabled to improve their'position ifl there had been a co-ordinated command. We find on further examination that practically General Joffre commanded) without compelling power, but effectively enough. The delay in informing the British Marshal of the retreat of the French Army (the sth) to his right, was due to the fact that General Joffre himself was not aware of it until later. General Larenzac, commanding the Fifth Army, had been given the general idea of the Commander-in-Chief and left to his own discretion for the details of handling the army under his command accordingly. _ His discretion proved faulty, and his army, on which reliance had been placed for a long and powerful stand, was quickly overwhelmed. Before the retreat had gone far Larenzac was superseded by D’Esperey, who look the Fifth Army to the Marne and did very fine work with it there. The point, however, commenting on De Souza’s presentment and comment on the facts (in his book "Germany in Defeat”), is that in the vast armies of modern war very extensive discretion must be left to army and corps commanders, who are neces-sa’-’ly beyond the reach of detail control.

After Mens the British General, we again remark, asked for help from Sordet’s cavalry. The whole truth is

that Sordet, who was then operating on French’s right, and really had great difficulty, with his horses knocked up by some very heavy work, extending over several days, was destined to take post on French’s left, great masses of von Khiek’s cavalry having appeared in that direction as precursors of the great Gorman flanking movement. The point is that here nothing would have been different under a formally coordinated command. Later on in the retreat, the sudden appearance (very welcome, it was) of General d’Amade’s large army on tho left of Smith-Dor-rien’s Second Corps in tho Valley of the Somme, was according to tho French Commander-in-Cliiof’s plan. The impression has been encouraged that tho British Army saved the retreat as far as the Somme Valley, aud conclusions have been drawn about the need for a co-ordinated command. But tho fact is that there was a central command which ordered the retreat generally, according to whoso plans tho British were sometimes holding the loft with a bold sufficiently dominating for the safe passing of the armies, and sometimes saved as on tho Somme by tho arrival of strong forces on tho left. The same thing can be said of the days immediately preceding and succeeding the battles of Mens and Le Cateau. For example, there is the Sordet incident as above cited. And there are the operations of French territorials far to tho left in those same days, assisted by French cavalry and stiffened by first-line troops, which hampered von Kluck’s advance, to the easing of his pressure on the British he was striving might and main to cut off. Still later, at Ypros, the French reinforcements helped to save the day, but they were sent by General Joffre as soon as was possible. There was no delay from tho want of co-ordinated command.

In the Italian adventure the other day, there was co-operation of the best and quickest. As soon as the Italian front was smashed in, the Allies hurried up men and guns and munitions without delay. They did more, for while the enemy was driving desperately with all his resources to destroy the Italian armies, the British delivered a great blow at the German West front at Cambrai, ‘and the French delivered another in the Aisne sector, and kept things going in lively fashion from the Aisne to the Meuse and beyond.

No man can say that co-ordination of command is not nccesasry. But in thafe.ee of these facts no one can deny that a great deal of co-ordination has been managed throughout the war on the side of the Allies with very good effect. Therefore it is a little difficult to understand exactly what has been done in tho way of giving the co-ordination a character more stable than mere good understanding between the generals and the different armies. When Mr Lloyd George makes his explanation we shall probably see further below the surface of things. One thing, at all events, is evident now. There is no newspaper chattering about a revolt of the generals. That idiotic exhibition seems to have gone out like a candle in a draught.

The Russian position gets worse. Anarchy, unloosed by tho Bolsheviks, is growing more murderous the more their ineptitude for government is developed It is a curious fact, moreover, that these men, too highly virtuous to proceed with the war against the enemy, who has done their country incalculable harm, and is openly preparing for treacherously and fraudulently annexing portions and exploiting the balance—too highly virtuous and war weary to fight tho common enemy—are waging war against their fellow-citizens and spreading massacre and murder to prevent the rule of the Democracy and set up the domination of a class which has demonstrated its inability to exercise the function of government which it has usurped.

Th o end of the armistice is report, ed to have been promptly followed by Dio German invasion of Livonia and Bsthoma. If this-is true it means the first step m an advance on Roval and Retro grad. At the same time the Ukraine forces and General Alexieff’s forces are reported to bo getting the upper band of the Bolsheviks. There ia no word of any Austrian protest against the renewal of hostilities in the north. The Bolshevik cause in Finland seems to bo losing ground. The Bolshevik decree repudiating all the Russian obligations is reported to bo very thorough. The debts, however, will remain after tho Bolsheviks have gone out.

From the West the French report repulsing another attempt of the enemy to recover his lost ground in the Champagne. Also they report very violent artillery work in the Verdun sector.