WHAT OF RUSSIA?

New Zealand Times, Volume XLII, Issue 9756, 4 September 1917, Page 6

WHAT OF RUSSIA?

Moscow has f.een and heard the great Conference assembled for the purpose of setting the country in some kind of order. Before the Conference all were agreed that the final constitutional settlement would come from the hands of the Constituent Assembly. But though very good arrangements were being made for the election of that body to meet at the earliest in November, there was a general doubt whether all the elements of tho Revolution could be held together until that meeting. Already the military side has been paralysed, and the question was wheie would the evil go, precipitating the Revolution into ruin and leaving the country dominated by Prussian bayonets, a ready prey for the reactionaries of Czardom. Western Europe, and especially Britain, being very badly served by the “Corps Journalistique” in Petrograd to have clear wows of the situation, oscillated between the pacifists and the reactionaries from day to day. Ihc only Russian opinion of that of tho Russian envoy at Washington, seemed unable to penetrate from America to Europe. That opinion, given freely and in language clear and convincing, was to the enect that after all there is in the Russian situation, complicated as it appears to be, only ono thing that matters. It is the democratic instinct of the nation which maintains its respect tor majority rule, and .will accept a majority vote at any moment with loyal completeness. The envoy’s conclusion was that there will be differences till the hour of deois.on, but that after that hour there will be general acceptance of ‘ the verdict of tho constitutionally chosen representatives. This statement is, so rai as the spirit of the nation is concerned, borne out by the results of the Moscow Conference. That was brought about really to help the Provisional Government over the per.otl of transition which seemed to be getting more dangerous from day to uayWhen the Oamerence'met, the air in its vicinity grow sulphurous, and foi a time the look of things gave the weak-kneed cause for groaa.ng. But tho Conference sat quietly through its appointed period, Heard what everybody had to say—just like the tranquillising focus it was intended to be —and has decided with firmness Its decision has two ■ points. Tho nation must unite in complete concentration to win the war, and it must establish a- strong centralised power. The' programme is greatness in a small compass. It is the programme which brought France’out 01 Die turmoil of a far more chaotic Revolution, on the ono hand healing the enemy at all points, on the other establishing a central government, the strength of which holds France together to-day. In order that this may be done, the Conference gave its unanimoiis support to the Provisional Government. The democratic instinct of the nation may be relied on to accept and support the decision of the Conference.

The result is not surprising. Wo have only to remember the firmness with' which ■ M. Kerensky handled the conference at its opening. He was there to obtain the national confidence for the Provisional Government; neither he nor his colleagues would tolerate any resistance to their authority; the safety of Russia required that determination. The conference accepted that attitude of the Government at the time without a murmur. The question of the armies and their discipline arose at once and the discussion produced the revelations of General Korniloff and General Alcxmif. Those were followed bv acceptance -of thendemands. One point of difference remained. It was indicated by General Korniloif’s insistence on the return to office (as assistant Minister for War) ot M. Savonkoff. who had resigned in consequence of his treatment by the Prime Minister. That point was settled by the withdrawal of the resignation, and as the conference broke un the announcement was made that the 'Minister would at onco deal with organisation behind the lines, as the General-m-Ohief would do in the lines themselves. The Moscow Conference, then, has cleared the air; the Provisional Government is secure till the establishment of the Constitution (probab 1 y Republican) of Russia by the Constituent Assembly. In the meantime it is understood that the nation concentrates its strength on winning the war, the Government being given all powers necessary to effect that purpose. ft is also understood that the Constitution about to be drawn up and adopted bv the representatives of the pep-ole of Russia must be a strong central Government. In appearance, at all events, Russia has never been so firm and unanimous since the Czar abdicated. It is the first time since that event that these two points-—the prosecution of the war and the general character of the now Constitution—have been settled. If the reality is according to the appearances, everything will now be plain sailing for a movement unique in histoiy, alike in its danger of destruction and in the comprehensiveness of its character. The Allies of Russia have at this moment in the turn of the Russian fortunes done a supremely wise tiling. They have left the whole question of their relations with Russia entirely in the hands of President Wilson. The spectacle of this simple Republican gentleman taking charge of the whole vast foreign business of the country of the Romanoff family, the last stronghold of irresponsible despotism, has its dramatic side. But, however intense that side may be, the practical side is vastly more important. The reasons for the delegation to President Wilson are obvious. Britain, Prance, and Italy have had dealings with the House of Romanoffs in the war, which are sure, in various matters, to lead to misunderstandings which, with President Wilson in soir> communication with Russia, are ’impossible. It is reasonable, of course, that the greatest democracy in the world should meet in closest communion with the newest, which may be of even greater size. But the othei reason for the close communion is better. Moreover, the European partners in the Alliance have been somewhat obsessed by the Stockholm Conference, against which the President of the United States and the head ol organised Labour in America both pronounced with definite refusal. With J,he hands of these Powers in the daily exchange with Russia there might positively be danger of a premature peace. That is impossible from ihe American side, after the President’s great answer to the Vatican proposals. Moreover, there is a directness of purpose and a conoentra-

tion of effort and a solidity of sense about our American Ally which arc wanting in the other members of the Entente. For all of which reasons, plus the safety of ■ the great cause, the American President has been put Into the right relations with Russia.