PROGRESS OF THE WAR

New Zealand Times, Volume XLII, Issue 9621, 29 March 1917, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The pressure of the Allies against the new German lino has moved forward appreciably, without precipitating the expected great battle. 1 The British have captured two more villages, apparently without fighting, Equancourt and Longavesnes, which are points of a straight line, from Beaumetz to Roisel. Correspondents may later fill out the story with details of fighting. But as it stands the report simply means that tho British line is quite straight to the junction with the French in tho neighbourhood- of St. Quentin.

The front of the French section has been more or less heavily engaged, n-ith the result that the French line is defined from east of Roupy to the Somme, the outstanding points being Roupy, Essigny and Bernay. South of the Oise they have obtained a great success in very difficult country. The '‘massif” of St. Gobain, a high plateau, n-ith its sides seamed by ravines, the whole carrying forest, rises in the corner formed by the Oise and the Ailetto rivers; and across the the great plateau between that river and the Aisne, the plateau on which the German strength rallied after its defeat at the Marne- The French have attacked the “massif” of St. Gobain from the valleys of the Oise and the Ailetto, and they have won quite onehalf of it, for they are at Servais, on the north-western corner; at Coucy, in the midst of the southern face; at Folemhray and several other villages in the rough, wooded country across tho centre.

This is tho attack which the German report describes as an “encircling movement,” before which the German troops gave way. It w r as an attack on two sides of tho “massif,” and therefore rightly described ns encircling. Thov fell back because they were enfiladed and commanded by the rush of the French advance. Tho enemyreports that his retirement brought the encircling movement to failure. But he does not explain how. The French hold the southern half of tho “massif,” and are encroaching, not slowly, in the northern. This is not failure. It is clearly the gaining of the objective of the combined movement. Trusting to the strength of his position tho enemy is finding himself being quickly forced out of it.

Tho French advance further south on the Aisne plateau must presently feel the success of tho St. Gobain, for the possession on St. Gobain must compel the withdrawal of the German line to the lino between Laon and Craonne. Tho French report, as a matter of fact, chronicles a benefit already in the capture of several positions. It begins to look as if the French will force back the new German lino from St. Quentin to the Aisne, .probably as far as Berry-au-Bac, capturing St. Quentin, Laon and Craonne. Tho steady advance of tho British line north of St. Quentin — Roisel to Beaumctz —past tho points named to-day, is sure not to he far behind. It is possible that the whole of the new German line may retreat further without the expected great battle.

The British blockade has been described in the Commons by -Lord Robert Cecil in most satisfactory terms. He reports that the oversea trade of Germany has been completely stopped—the trade that for so many months of the war went through neutral ports. At first, as we can all remember, this blockade made little if any difference to Germany. Wo remember also its gradual tightening up, to a growing accompaniment of German abusive accusation against us of violating international law. The German Government, in fact, made this blockade the excuse for their piracy, and their press kept up a long campaign of jeremiads to that effect. These in their turn were supported by an accompaniment of food riots in Germany. The reports of the riots worn discredited at first, hut they persisted, and Lord Robert Cecil now declares that the tightening of our blockade has blocked tho whole oversea

trade with Germany, through the neutral porta. and that he can no longer refuse to believe the reports ot tho food riots-

The other pars of the German supplies from neutral countries, those which go by land, presented a nitindifficult problem. The British Govern, ment attacked that problem by making trade arrangements with the neutrals, and these he now reports have divert, ed a very large proportion of the food supplies to Britain. The result ts considerable scarcity of foodstuffs ann the almost total cessation of war material for Germany. Tho British blockade, then, of Germany is very much more effective than the undersea piracy of Germany.

The announcement is satisfactory, and all the more so as it has been lone delaved, because the delay indicates that tho Blockade Minister has made sure of his ground. It may ot may not throw light on the reason for the recently-announced closing of the port of Wilhelmshaven. But it does supply a reason why the German High Sea Fleet should do its duty to the Fatherland by coining out in an attempt to raise the British blockade. It makes it plain that our blockade is strangling Germany, and that makes it plain*”that tho German public must bo looking to the High Sea Fleet to justify its existence. The Blockade Minister’s statement also supplies food for reflection. In this way; Many writers hold that the British I’leet ought to go in to attack tiie Gorman, partly to bo able to destroy tho homo bases of the submarine campaign, and partly to prevent the German fleet from being a valuable Gorman asset at the end of tho war. Those point out, in completing then case, that until the Gorman fleet is destroyed, the victory over Germany will bo incomplete, for the German navai strength created for disputing the command of the sea will be unimpaired.

The question here raised is exceedingly difficult. How difficult may he realised by tho fate of tho attack of the combined fleets on tho Dardanelles; forts, which failed with absolute completion. There the enemy had nothing but his forts and his mines, and he won. But in attacking tho German High Sea Fleet ours will have forts and mines—both on a bigger scale- - and a great fleet to contend with. Un the oilier hand, it is the business of enterprising commanders to deviso means of winning against all sorts of adverse conditions. It is not for laymen to dogmatise in such- case. We mention tho matter in order to draw attention to the Blockade Ministers statement that the British blockaoo is now really doing its appointed work of strangling the enemy. Xu that respect we have an immense advantage over, the German blockade. Whether that advantage does or does not diminish the force of tho argument requiring our Fleet to go in to the attack of the High Sea Fleet, is a question for the experts to decide. That tho advantage discredits the supineness of the German Fleet, is beyond doubt. And this may throw light on the closing of Wilhelmshaven. •» * «

There are rumours of German invasion of Britain, which the ■ Admiralty ended by denial. But their existence shows that there is some disquiet on account of the-supreme need for a forward German naval policy. Moreover, the British armies in France are increasing their very powerful pressure against the Germans in. the West. Military experts declare that great things may be expected in the way of a German disaster, and the opinion linds an echo behind all the bombast of the official and semi-official Gorman publications. The German command knows quite well that the best ivay, perhaps the only way, to prevent disaster on the West at the hands of the Allies is to cut the sea communications of the British armies. Never was reason stronger for the risking of a great fleet in perilous enterprise. The issue of the High Sea Meet would he a great blow for victory, not only justifiable, but imperative. Therefore wo . cannot get rid of the impression that tho closing of Wilhelmshaven may have very much behind it. Every rule of war and every sentiment of patriotism calls the German fleet out. Whether it will obey the call—we can only wait and see.

The sensational item from Russia is tho arrest of General Ivanoff at Kieff. No reasons are given and no particulars. But the name is sufficient. Ivanoff was the second of the great quartette who made the conquest of Galicia in August and September of 1915. Eusski. Ivanoff, Brusilolf and Demetrieff commanded' the armies, tho first being the chief, under the genera] command of tho Grand Luke. Later Ivanoff succeeded Russki, who was retired under the pretence of being invalided. and when the blow fell at the crossing of the Donajec it was Ivanoff who failed to send supports to Demetrieff, whose strength was very inferior to the enemy, who was aware of the enemy’s vast concentration in his front, reported it, and asked for reinforceincnts. The reason given for not acceding to the demand was that it never reached the commanding general Ivanoff. The reflection that Ivanoff was responsible for the weakness of tho Douajeo front, and was aware of the accumulating strength of the enemy, was at the time very uncomfortable. The heroic resistance of Dometrieff’s men after tho Donaicc crossing, which held up Mackensen for some days, inflicting great losses on the troops of his attack, accentuated the delay in sending supports to avert the breaking of tho line. That disaster was prevented by the heroism of Demetrioff, and the extraordinary skill of Brusiloff, who commanded the Russian line in the Carpathians, and took prompt advantage of Demetrieff’s brief stand.

Undoubtedly these two saved the campaign at the outset. In the winter, after the great retreat into Russia, Tvanoff, who remained in command of the southern Russian armies, made a strong forward movement with Brusiloff, and hy vigorous attacks compelled the Germans to end their advance. When tho spring came it was Brusiloff who commanded: it was Brusiloff who achieved the tremendous series of victories against the Austrians, which brought the Russian line through Bnkowina and established it in the wooded Carpathians. But the name of [vanoff was not mentioned again in any reports of the campaign. His arrest at Kieff, now announced, seems to fit tiie events of the campaign which opened so badly on the Donajec. It certainly suggests that the weedingmit process with probabilities of punishment, which has sot in, is going to bo very thorough. Unfortunately it also suggests that the unity of tho higher ranks of the Russian armies is not as complete as we have been led to suppose-

Another somewhat disquieting fact is the continuance of the divided authority, tinder which the Provisional Government is obliged to seek the approval of the Council for every important step it contemplates. This may be only an apparent sign of disquiet, on the general principle that division of authority is a bad thing. On the other hand, after such a tremendous upheaval, one can understand the need for some check on the suddenlyformed new Government. It is plainly feared that the Council of Workmen apd Soldiers prefers the establishment of a Republic to the prosecution of the war. It has, however, to reckon with the army, which has clearly given its allegiance to the Provisional Government for the prosecution of the war. The enemy is, of course, using every effort to discredit the war party in Russia, tho> latest move being the distribution of proclamations denouncing the deposition of the Czar as a purely Britannic move for the continuance of the war. But this looks a continuance of the inveterate German misunderstanding of the character of the people subjected to German propaganda. It is an extension of the ignorance which depended on rebellions all over tbe British Empire, and on the gratuitous assumption that the exhaustion of Prance would have given tbe enemy an easy victory at Verdun. The Russian army and the Russian people must, at any rate, be perfectly aware of the reasons that brought about the revolution ana the downfall of the Imperial House. To tell them that they have been forced into revolution by a foreign Power for its own purposes is the acme of absurdity.

On the whole, however, the Russian situation is not clearing as fast as is desirable in the interest of. tho victory of the democratic nations. To regard that as fatal would be to underrate the forces that produced the revolution. Nevertheless, the Russian situation makes it very imperative to secure rapid victory on the West front.

The submarine piracy, which lias been deliberately destroying neutral ships, contrary to the law of nations, and .sinking relief ships, knowing perfectly well their mission, has markedly included hospital ships in its programme of unwarned destruction. The torpedoing of the Asturias hospital ship takes this piracy to, the lowest depths of frightfulness. It is on a par with the murder of wounded men on the battltfield and in hospitals, which has been so abundantly proved against the German armies. The increase of war talk in America synchronises with this outrage. But what the world wants, and what the American word is pledged to, is the entry of America mto the war.