WAR NEWS LETTER

New Zealand Times, Volume XLII, Issue 9613, 20 March 1917, Page 2

WAR NEWS LETTER

THE NEW OFFENSIVE MANOEUVRING FOR THE FIRST BLOYV. From Our Special Correspondent. LONDON, January 25. The position of anyone who writes about the war at the present moment is not an enviable one. Either he knows too much or he knows too little. . In the former case he feels constrained to write on any subject but tho plans which lie knows to bo in contemplation, lest anything he might say should convey a uselul hint to the enemy. Perhaps the lot of the man who knows nothing at all is the happier of the two. but even he may unwittingly blunder .on .the truth aud throw, a beam -of light on the dark places of the-Yvar._ - Nevertheless German as well as British newspapers are at this moment full of ■ speculation as to what is going to happen on the Western front in the course of the next few, weeks, and, as is usual in_ such circumstances, the jade Humour is exceedingly busy. As it happens the stories which arc current are less mischievous than. they might be because tho plans of the belligerents are necessarily dependent on contingencies which even the military leaders in the field - can hardly foresee at present. It may be assumed that when the spring offensive opens both sides will strive to get in the first blow, and to reap the advantages which the first blow invariably confers. Hut we can only guess at the enemy’s plans in this particular, and there is happily good ground for believing that the Germans ire equally ignorant of the Allied intentions. The attempt of the German destroyer flotilla to scuttle out of Zeebrugge is a little noteworthy, because, in view of the heavy guns mounted on tho Belgian coast, it is not quite easy to accept the story that the Germans were afraid of their ships becoming icebound and so falling a prey to British monitors. But the dash of .the German destroyers from Zeebrugge is the only hint we have received yet of what is working at the back of Von Hmden burg’s mind. THROUGH GERMAN EY T ES.

The uncertainty of the enemy as to what is going to happen is betrayed in an article written by the military correspondent of the “Frankfurter Zeitung.” This article, gives away little or no information, but it quite admirably sums up the outlook as it must present itself to German eyes. The writer is of opinion that “the taking over of parts of tho French front (on the Somme) by-the English Army, .which is some 2,000,000 strong, permits the inference that French forces are to he released. These released forces, strengthened by new formations, will presumably take the offensive between the English right wing and the Swiss frontier. . But the decision ns to where this offensive will militarily be most appropriate we leave to the French General Staff. This French offensive is being prepared by reconnaissances which in some oases are of quite a vigorous kind, and by ‘retaining’ feelers along our front, while we, for the matter of that, proceed in exactly the same way.” The writer in the‘ “Frankfurter Zed timg” draws tho natural conclusion that tho Russians'will co-operate with the Allied offensive in the YVest as soon,-'as the "weather permits , of ' the, movement of the Russian armies, and his comments on the part which our Eastern Ally is destined to play are also well iworth.' quoting: “The situation in the interior of a country,” he ‘writes, “has in the world war of today become much more important for strategy than it was in the 19th century, and so it may be assumed ■ that the behaviour ot the. Russian supreme command will react upon tho general feeling of tho country. That, however, bv no means signifies a weakening of t!io war. leadership; probably it signifies., on tho contrary, a desperate accentuation of the effort for a tangible success. The Russian offensives, which made their appearance at the New- Year at Riga, in the neighbourhood of Smorgon, seem, however, in spite of the employment of large numbers of troops, to he still in the nature of big reconnaissances. At tip same time the public is comforted by the promise of a great joint naval offensive with England.”

FEELING FOR THE YVBAK PLACE. This German writer tears the heart out of the problem which confronts tho military commanders when ha speaks of the “feelers” which are being, and will be, put out to discover

the tv oak spot in the opposing frontFor it is at this weak spot, when it is found, that the really decisive blow will ultimately have to bo struck. It may be some time before it is discovered- It may be expected to develop gradually as offensives directed against other points along the enemy’s front compels the Germans to draw reinforcements from sectors which do not appear at the' moment to bo in any imminent danger. For this reason it would be altogether a mistake to expect that any brilliant results will immediately attend the Allied offensive in the spring. Just as was the case on the Somme, there may be many weeks of fierce and apparently unproductive fighting before there are any material’ results to show. But the confident belief is that before the summer is far advanced a complete break through will bo achieved, and then at last we shall see the German hordes being rolled back on to their own frontier.

We have heard a great deal in the past about the defensive lines which the Germans have in reserve, and upon which thousands of workmen have been engaged in perfecting during the two and a half years the war has been in progress. But short of tho natural defensive lino of the Rhine itself we may safely assume that none of these defensive positions are comparable in, strength with tho present fighting lino which it will be our first business to pierce. There is, of course, always a possibility that the Germans may decide to take time by the forelock and shorten their lines in tho West in view of their weakening reserves of man power. ' There is no hint of this at present unless the movement of German destroyers from Zeobrugge may be so construed. But though a shortening of the enemy’s lines in tho West may hot be probable' it is just as well to bear in mind that the enemy’s morale would be less shaken by, voluntary retirement than it would be by an enforced retreat. A DISTINCTION WITH A DIFFERENCE.

Even if the hest hopes aro realised and the enemy should be driven, right back on to the line of the Rhine before the campaign wears to a close, it does not, of course, follow that immediate peace would ensue. Mr Lloyd George’s speech at the Guildhall ip support of the War Loan has been responsible for some misapprehension on this point’. But Mr Lloyd George himself has been misunderstood. He spoke of ‘‘Victory in 1917," not of “Peace in 1917.” There is a distinction wjth .a difference. We all hope that-; the coming great offensive will ho decisive in a military sense, but there is no certainty that Germany will immediately hold up her hands. She may elect to hold on for another few mp'nths, for if her food supplies hold out through the coming summer the new harvest in the autumn will at least release her from anxiety, on the food question at any rate until the early summer of 1918. Tne Allied peace terms as laid dpwn in the Note to the United States, though they are not vindictive, are sufficiently stiff to make it certain that the governing classes in Germany will fight on to the very , last in the hope that the financial and economic strain imposed on the Allies may induce them to moderate their demands. All this, of course, takes no account of the ,possibility that internal,! pressure- may force the hands of the authorities in Berlin and compel them to capitulate. But this is a contingency qn which it is not safe-to place any reliance. The Geranan civilian population, like the German army itself, is well disciplined, and it is a rather noteworthy fact, to which more than one writer has home testimony,. that as the Geranan people become weakened by reduced food rations their tendency is to become more amenable rather than Jess amenable to tbo dictates of those in authority.