PROGRESS OF THE WAR

New Zealand Times, Volume XL, Issue 9172, 12 October 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The fall of Belgrade proclaims the reality and importance of the AustroGerman assault'on Serbia. Not that tho Serbians wore beaten out of the place! by storm, but. that tho extent of the attack made it undesirable to waste strength in defending a town which, though the capital, is of no strategic value whatever. In fact, the Government has been at Nish from the .earliest days of the ; war, and, moreover, Belgarde was in the hands of the Austrians during the last invasion without in any way influencing the course of the campaign. In this respect, Belgrade ranks with Warsaw, Brussels, and Lemberg, the fall of which places mattered nothing ■to the strategy °f the campaign in which they were abandoned. Tho evacuation of Belgrade simply means the avoidance, of useless slaughter and preventive devastation. . The German accounts mention stormings ■ by the troops of various generals named, but these reports, in the absence of any corroboration, only remind us of similar reports at various periods of the campaign which turned out to he really reports of troops’■ marching in after troops had marched out. The fall of tho city, however, has its significance, ‘ It means that the invasion is on a scale so large that the capital had to be abandoned in a strategic scheme, designed- for resisting the enemy further in;the interior in positions of greater advantage. Later reports show there was morn fighting, but this fact docs not disturb these conclusions. . It only shows that the Germans had to fight to make good their retreat.

The names of the, German commanders—von Mackensen and von Gallwitz

—which occur frequently in the reports of the operations, prove that considerable forces have been transferred from the East front, where those officers have been operating for some months. That corroborates the statement of the Petrograd correspondent, reported yesterday, that there were abundant proofs of -withdrawals of troops by the enemy from the Eastern front tor use elsewhere. Another proof of the magnitude of the Austro-German effort is the detail of the arrangements for crossing the boundary rivers. These show there were large concentrations of troops at several points, with powerful artillery and pontoon trains. . The enemy advanced in great force on his whole front. As the German report has it, tho Serbians were unable to resist. They seem to have fought gallantly, but they could not follow tho enemy’s example of great strength everywhere,, and they had to fall back. But they have resisted well enough to force the enemy to show his strength, and they are not being hurried in their march for theip ground. Thus the curtain has been lifted on a very serious new phase in the campaign. Yesterday we suspected the fall of Belgrade and the possibility that the crossing? would „be everywhere forced. To-day the question is beyond doubt.

There is great jubilation in Germany, and writers proclaim that Belgrade is a fine base for the new vast Oriental campaign “Indiawards.” This is probably flamboyancy indulged for the sake of rousing public opinion which, the Western defeats and tho Russian revival are beginning to dishearten. Tho War-Party-is in effect posing as having the power to make good oh both fronts, while dealing a smashing blow at the enemy in a new and vital place. The Eastern campaign has been long in contemplation, as - many signs “have proved to the onlooker,-who could read them. Of these, none were so strong a? the wholesale capture of Bulgaria, which Dr Dillon points out to-day as the one thing .which was not realised -bv the Entente Powers . until King Ferdinand was compelled to_■ throw-off the mask. Ho wore it until the Entente diplomacy obtained .the Serbian consent to 1 the Bulgarian terms. When that consent was made pfiblic it waj, generally thought that the Balloon tingle must end in favour of the Entente. Then ensued a hitch which nobody seemed to understand, and the hitch continued until suddenly the mobilisation of .the Bulgarian.army-was announced. Then the Bulgarian mask was off.'and the, Entente realised- the position.

Tho position was then very much more serious than appeared on the surface. There was far more in it- than the German capture of Bulgaria, That had been suspected so far hack as February, when tho Gorman loan W as announced; tho arrangement with Turkey -deepened the suspicion, as we pointed out at the time; the mobilisation made,the suspicion certainty, and the appointment of tho Austro-German officers doubled this certainty. But Greece was in the toils at the same time, and the progress of. the German diplomacy was revealed by the division in the Chamber-the other day. Though it had been suspected since the resignation of Vemzolos, and after his return with tjio popular mandate, few suspected its extent until .the aforesaid division. Among those tow, luckily, were the diplomatists of the Entente Powers.

Those had seen through the German plot when Bulgaria, threw, off the mask, and they had abandoned diplomacy for force, Germany, relying on the Russian, defeats and the delay of the Dardanelles .operations as the levers for moving tho Balkan States over to the Anstrp-German side, decided that tho time was ripe for tho start of the, great expedition eastwards, and ordered King Ferdinand to throw off the mask. The move was late decidedly, because the successful offensive of the Allies in, the West and the Russian, recovery were very near .the decision* Too late to withdraw,. Germany forced Bulgaria to show her. hand. At that - .point the Allies sent an army to Salonika.

A. portion of the British press has taken the occasion tor making a furious attack on the Entente diplomacy-and the British Foreign Minister especially, for want of perspicacity in the Balkan trouble., .In this unpatriotic) and moat improper course, this disgraceful portion of the British press is alone. Right or wrong, the press should at such a crisis he silent. ■ It is a time for tho utmost strength of a united" resistance to a most formidable attack. No amount of writing will stop the advance of a single German or Austrian soldier into Serbia. If criticism and condemnation are necessary,, the - proper time will be after the last German and Austrian'soldier has been driven-back over tho Danube. , -

-But was the diplomacy, after all, so far wrong? It is easy to bo wise after the event. The character of the Bulgarian leaders was well enough known to make it appear quite likely that they might, on sufficient inducement turn against their German masters. The Entente diplomacy obtained an inducement amply sufficient, according to the Bulgarian protestations often repeated, and then Bulgaria threw off the mapfci Not merely* because Germany offered better tornih, "but because the, strength of Germany in the East and the weakness of the Allies at tho Dardanelles, and the quiescence of the Allies on the West front—things for which the diplomatists in Sofia, Athens, and Bucharest were in no degree responsibleconvinced Bulgaria that-the Germans were likely to win. The Entente diplomatists did not have as good a hand to play in tho game as Germany. ■ That they have lost only Bulgaria, of the three Balkan States, is something.. That they prevented the capture of all three by. Germany is everything. Considering the nature, of the Balkan tangle, and the uncertain appearances on the war fronts —so easy for inspiring distrust "in the neutral breast—the successful prevention of a Balkan coalition on tho German side is almost amazing. Certainly it is enough to justify a charge of treason against the section of the press which is denouncing the diplomacy which achieved it.,

The enemy has, however, started his expedition. He has taken the risk of his two great fronts, and he is plunged into the thick of another great enterprise. This ho is conducting with a vigour and power worthy of the occasion-. On that point no one appears to bo under any delusion. It was so obvious when the extent of bis offensive against Serbia "was realised that, as we pointed out " yesterday, the pressing vital need for the Allies is to rush every available man, ©very gun, and

every shell to the Serbian front. The same thing is being said to-day by the press in Paris and London. In Italy good advice is given besides, to unify commands and co-ordinate all plans. If Italy, in addition, would send an army of a quarter to half a million of men, it would be better. That would he better than weakening the Western and Eastern fronts, which, in all probability, is one of the chief objects of the German expedition. Children may bo amused with the cry of “ Indiawards,” and with the threat of “Egypt and tlio Suez Canal.” But the serious weakening of the Allied forces on the West is worth more to the Germans than the crying of all the names on the maps of Asia and, Africa,

Mr Amery points out that German victory in Serbia would throw into Turkey munitions enough to equip vast armies of Turks, now drilling under German officers, all good fighting mate-' rial. He urges that these multitudes would. make up for the exhaustion of the German man power, and he has a vision of a combination of Turkish' soldiers with German guns making the universal conquest which Germany has failed to achieve. But it is doubtful if Germany can make more . munitipiu} than shewants for her two big fronts, now assailed so fiercely by armies growing daily stronger in munitions. Moreover, no Power which has not the command of the sea- could approach Egypt in force sufficient to Seriously menace the Suez Canal. ‘ Talk like,Mr Amery’s is panic nonsense. But the danger of Serbian defeat is real, and the possibility of, its being followed; by a strong Austro-German. advance into European Turkey is very strong. Wo have no right, to take a gloomy, pessimistic view even of that contingency. We must face it like men. We must be as brave about it as our men who would have to face it in the Dardanelles.

But the Austro-German expedition has not yet beaten the Serbian armies. Yesterday -we estimated that those might be helped by anything from 50,000 to 100,000 Allied troops now on the ground, to say nothing of the numbers that may presently arrive', that we may add are sti-re to he rushed into Serbia. A report is to hand to-day that the Bulgarian army is expected to move in a couple of days, its chief, having proceeded to the frontier to set it going. a. We take leave to doubt. It is true that from what-has transpired it is clear the Bulgarians will obey the orders of Berlin; and Berlin ip sure to appreciate the value of ’ theßulgarian army massed on the flank of the Allies' communications. Bulgaria is, moreover, wo repeat,, at war, as its Minis-. ter .'said on leaving Paris. But the Bulgaria command has to face twocontingencies. The Bulgarian army may hesitate, - for the war is not popular, and the Government is denounced by a very strong section of-the Bulgarian; people, well led, -as having sold the cohnirv •to Germany - rfor - .fighting against the. Slav cause, {secondly; tho first step made by tho Bulgarian army to the :north will bring into tho field against - it rthe Greek army,- which : is massed on the frontier ready 'for the emergency. * -

-, ■" ■■ mm ■■■r.o On the other side of Bulgaria tho Roumanian army cannot bo neglected, It is not mobilised, and" Germany has threatened that its mobilisation will be regarded as an act-of war, All-the same, Roumania has refused passage for munitions to - Turkey' and Bulgaria. So that Roumania has not yet been got over to the . German aide. • Moreover, the army of General Ivanoff is forging slowly ,hut - surely ; ahead against the Austrians in its front, and homo of hjs troops—of his southern wing—are today reported as haying forced their way into Biikovinu, probably tho first fruits of the ten hours’ bombardment which is reported to have shaken the Austrian front. It appears, already, as... the -withdrawal of troops ; has weakened this part of the Austrian front. In view of these events, the possibility of Roumania • striking into the fmht on the side of the Entente is hot remote. But there is no word ,of the Roumanian army mobilising. However, the presence of the Greek army may ' he" regarded for the moment as likelv to prevent tho Bulgarian army from, moving against Serbia.

Of course 'the" Turkish factor has to bo considered...’ The Turks have been generally supposed to -have men enough to :throw weight into tho scale.' - It is true that they have used their best troops in the- Gallipoli . PeninsulaThat these are not too well; supplied there is now matter of notoriety. At any rate Lord * Kitchener s belief that it is so is entitled’to weight. Moreover; the reports from Constantinople have long pointed to lack of sufficient equipment, and the Russian Black Sea squadron has seriously affected the supply of - coal-in ■ Constantinople. In this connection the repeated insistent demands of Germany on ' Roumania for the passage of munitions for Turkey confirm the. view that the Turkish armies ■ are seriously lacking in equipment for a campaign. Into this mass of evidence, the absence' of'all’ men-" tion of Turkish, troops in , the present Balkan crisis, in that country of persistent rumours, fits in with almost completing effect. There does seem reason for believing that the Turks are unable to put _ any strength into the field in Bulgaria. Indeed, there is much in the theory. that one of the objects of the Serbian invasion is to force sufficient equipment through to make the Turkish army of Roumclia a reality. Troops there are, no doubt, for garrisoning Adfianople and other places, but that the Turks can put an army 'into the' field strong enough to help a decision in -Bulgaria and Serbia may fairly, oh tho whole . be doubted, until, at all events, the receipt of further information on the subject. ’ "

Greece may he depended upon, we think, to move if Bulgaria moves. Of that the Alligs are in a position to take, care. But the point, is not without its uncertainties. The navy can exercise; compelling effect if necessary, hut much must depend on the strength the Allies cim'put into the field. It is another reason for rushing every available man, and gun, and shell into Serbia. Such is the form the Balkan tangle has now taken. It has to be cut by the sword, and a few days will show what the sword is going to do with it.

While tiho Balkan ,position.behind the Serbian army is important, the main interest is' with the Serbian army,, of course- That army, with the support of the Allied troops, is bound-to give battle before long. It will not do so close to the, frontier, where the enemy enjoys the utmost facilities; of communication. It will do so only in country where the enemy :is. without the nhinterrupted supply which is his chief

strength. Necessarily he "will have to move slowly in order to arrive on the field of decisive battle with full striking power, and the slower he is the more time will the AU'S-s have for bringing up troops to <\isugthen the battleline against him. His defeat will settle the matter, his victory will act on the Balkan tangle in the Serbian rear by forcing decision on Greece and Roumania. ' If these Powers fail to stop him, he will reach Turkey and give equipped life to the Turkish armies.

On the Western and Eastern fronts, things do not look well for him. On the former, the reports, which are for the most part a repetition, with slightly fuller details, of the reports yesterday, show decisive defeats of all the enemy attempts to regain his lost ground. Some of them show a decisive new advantage on the French side in the Tahure section. On’ the Russian front, very fierce fighting is reported all along the line, with considerable advantage to the Russians in the southern section, and, as above noted, an advance into Bukowina, near the Roumanian ‘border.

These things give weight to the warning a German paper has had the courage to print, plainly stating the danger of the Eastern expedition, as a task undertaken beyond the limits of prudence and above the strength of the Austro-Gcrirwn military system under the circumstances of the immense campaign already on its hands. This critic of his own household tells the Kaiser that ho is pursuing a will-o’-the-wisp in the Balkans, while his armies are being pounded hard on the East and West fronts. Indeed, there is no denying that the piercing of the Western line, which is drawing nearer day hjj. day, would bring’ very serious disaster-to the German arms.