PROGRESS OF THE WAR

New Zealand Times, Volume XL, Issue 9096, 15 July 1915, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

“A warning note,” “The Times” Petrograd correspondent reports this morning, “has been sounded in military circles against premature jubilation.” The statement is not surprising. On the contrary, yesterday’s news prepared for it, by shewing clearly that after their victory • over the Austrian Grand Duke on tho Vistula and their stoppage of the German general on the Bug, the Russians had settled down to consolidate their new positions, and were sparring lightly with tho German general’s attempts to reconnoitre them. However, as the correspondent prefaces his story with the statement that “the defeat of the Austrian Archduke ameliorates tho situation in the Lublin district,” we must first accept that admission of light in darkness with satisfaction The fact that the enemy’s tremendous advance has been stopped remains , This is important, as the diminution of confidence caused by his advance was considerable and widespread.

What it was when Europe imagined the Russians might turn aftei fifty miles of retreat, convening the lino of the Wisioka into a base for the recovery of Western Galicia, we can judge by the efforts of tho military writers in onr mail files, to reassure public opinion. What it must have been, after the fifty miles of retreat went over the century, and both Przemysl and Lemberg had fallen back into the enemy’s hands, we can easily imagine. When only a small slip of Galicia remained to tho Russians, and one enemy in full march on Russian territory was proclaiming his objectives to be Lublin, Ivangorod, and Warsaw, and another *was moving in grim silence on the great Russian depot of BfestLitovsk and the magnificent central hospital of the Russian army at Rovno, in front of that place—one of the finest in the world at the present day—serving the multitudes of wounded from all the Russian European fronts, it * requires no imagination to realise the relief caused by the disaster to the first and tbe stoppage enforced on the march of the other. Men had scarcely realised the stupendous fact that the Russians had been swept off the Carpathian crests and ejected from Galicia, and the menace of disastrous invasion to Hungary absolutely ended, when they were locking on at a swift and apparently irresistible advance of the enemy on Warsaw. A huge, . encircling force of him seemed to materialise in the north for descent on Warsaw from that quarter, the closing of the rest of the circle round the doomed city seemed to be announced in letters of fire all along tbe Narew front, and the air was filled daily with reports of retreats, prisoners in vast

numbers, and military booty of greau variety and value. The relief to the situation by the stoppage of the swift advance must be very groat. * * * But the situation, the military in Petrograd are careful to point out, through this correspondent, is still difficult The central fact is that the enemy holds 1000 miles of front, and has only failed on a section of forty miles. What is more, his failure is not a failure to held—it is only a failure to advance —and he has actually been invited to sit down and dig himself well in. The invitation is tne example of the Russian armies which have stopped his rush. • * • For the moment, then, there is no talk of recovery of the province lost, or the ascendancy of invasion wren.cn--ed away. The thing which stares us in the face is a waiting period, more or less long, while the Russian supply of munitions is brought up to the right pitch of supply. The lack of ’munitions caused the disaster, and the supply now, though enough for a stand, is not sufficient for the offensive. • * * The news of the defeat of von Linsingen at Kamionka, on the Bug, brings a ray of cheering light. But for the damper from Petrograd, it would encourage the belief that the Russians are trying to break the Austrian Galician lino for the purpose of striking at von Mackensen’s rear, further down the Bug. But that warning limits the conclusion to be drawn from the new victory. The object, so fanas can be seen at the moment, is to prevent the Austrians from getting further north. The troops that gave the check were brought up from the south-east, that is, not from tho side of the Russian reserves, but from the Russian lino of the Gmta-Lipa. An attack made in consequence of a transfer from one part of the line to another never means a deliberate attempt at the strategy of breaking through. » « « It .is, of course, well to bear in mind that the Russians are not likely to publish their plans. But there is reason for believing that for the moment they have no intention of doing more than stopping the enemy’s advance east of the Vistula and towards Kieff. The Petrograd warning against premature jubilation lays great stress on the great length of the line on which the enemy is operating. And the point is emphasised by a report this morning that, the enemy is mass-, ing troops at Thorn for a vigorous offensive from the north. That seems to be a strain of the German resources, but the Germans have been straining their resources a ‘good deal, and they seem to be able to afford it. On the whole line the Russian strategy seems to have: quite enough to do. to hold its own. Their line has remained unbroken, and that is, under the circumstances, a great deal. * , • * ‘ Will that give the Germans the opportunity to detach, large forces westward to strike another blow for breaking through? It is supposed by many military critics that this is what they will do. Having discovered that their bold bid for victory in the East has failed to break the Russian line, they will leave their lines strongly enough held to resist the advance of the Russians, not yet supplied for any great enterprise, and transfer great forces to tho west. The news from Petrograd seems to give them the opportunity they so desire. * «f • , But are thqy likely to desire to take the offensive in strength on the west? It is, so far as the information at general disposal goes, inconceivable that Germany , can muster again for a piercing assault any such vast strength as it hurled at Ypres in the great days of October and November- But that is not the governing factor of the situation. The governing factor . is the gradual creep forward at many points of the western Allies against the German line. The reports have been making monotonous reading, except on a few occasions, when the brilliant assaults of the British at Neuve Chapelle and Festubert burst into view, and the French at Souchez, Neuvilie, Noyon, in the Argonne, in Alsace, and the Woeuvre. On these occasions the work was as bright and vivid as any episode of war can be. . ■ * * • But what does it all mean, this play of attack and counter-attack, of small gains and losses, that on that vast line of 500 miles look microscopic? The answer to those who have followed the operations is simple enough. The Allies have been (1) improving the positions made by stress of war, (2) testing the strength of the enemy by attacking him at various points, (3) gaining points of vantage from which they command his positions and his communications, imposing delay on his counter-manoeuvres in case of a general attack. In short, tho Allies have been preparing the line for a grand assault, one or more for that matter, and they stand now ready to make it with impenetrable mask of many feints hiding their serious effort. Probably very little is wanting but the huge accumulation of the munition supply, which is rapidly getting ready. * » « . Obviously, however, this state of things cannot go on indefinitely. The enemy knows perfectly well the general scheme which is being worked, though of the details ho can, of course, form hut a vague idea. But he knows ’ enough to understand the necessity for a strong attempt to cut things short by a strong offensive. He was unable to do .this effectually by his engagements in Galicia. But, having brought these, not to the victory he desired —and it is no doubt a grievous disappointment to him tbat he failed to break that stubborn, wellbandied Russian line—but to a conclusion which gives him a breathing space, with much territory to his credit, ho has now the time to descend on 'the creeping tactics which are threatening to wear out the life of his Western line. It is therefore now quite likely that he will turn his attention to the West with considerable strength. • • • Of his power to do so it is useless to talk, ■ because it is impossible to analyse and compute his strength. The best observers have tried and are trying, but none of them have been able to give ns any forecast that has stood the test of experience. He has fust made an effort in the East, which can only he called prodigious. It has paid him handsomely, because he . ha* thrown back-a very serious invasion of his territory, with-at least considerable postponement. It stands to reason that after that effort—which is the last of a series of great efforts—he cannot be as strong as he was in the beginning. But as no one has

ever come near to guessing the greatness of the strength of his colossal instrument of war, no one can now guess what power remains behind its still terrific machinery. The wisest course is to regard his strength as still gigantic.

Of his motives, compelling motives, for a great western assault now that he has the opportunity—that is indeed the main point of the Petrograd news today, the point that compels readjustment of all judgments of probable action —there is not the same-vagueness. One we have dealt with, namely, the need for stopping the careful tactics of an enemy now strong enough to strike and growing from day to day stronger. It is possible that all the tumours from Dutch sources of vast concentrations preparing have been groundless so far as the actual facts were concerned. Bi,t that they pointed to possibilities under favourable circumstances, there can be no doubt. The eastern circumstances have become favourable. That removes one bar to the obvious policy of coming down hard on the West.

There is another spur, the spur of financial stress. The other day the Kaiser, announcing the end of the war for October, seemed to have said a mad thing. To-day the story, perhaps well grounded, of his interview with prominent bankers, supplies his apparent madness; with a method. They told him, according to this story, that failing an early end of the war, the bankruptcy of Germany is sure. Hero is a spur of compelling desperation, of which the point may be said to have already been driven into the sides of his resolution by the fall of the great German shipping interests announced the . other day. He has hurled back the Russian menace. H!e must now leap at the western barrier. The breach of that barrier may force a peace safe and honourable, and possibly substantial with some of the gains he still holds of his tremendous efforts of war.

Will his leap at the Western harrier be forestalled? We may be sure that there are keen eyes fixed on the enemy. Joffre, French, Foch, Pan, Maudhny, Castelnau, Haigh, Smith-Dorrien, these are close observers and great tacticians, and Kitchener and the ' War Minister of France are as keen and farseeing. They are in the confidence of the Bussian staff, and they know well the sharpness of the spurs driving the German energy to desperate effort. The chiefs of the Western Allies are, we may be sure, quit© alive to the projects of the German staff. Will they forestall the German attack in the West, or will they wait for it in, the hope of beating it back and delivering their blow at the beaten and exhausted enemy? In the one ease they will decide that though the opportunity they are creating is not as favourable as they have planned, it may never be more favourable- In the other, they will have to risk the danger of defeat that accompanies every great operation of war, and they must know how very narrow,was their escape from defeat in some of the battles their troops fought so well., What their decision will be we cannot pretend to know. All that we can say with sure confidence from the study of the situation is that the turn of affairs on the East front makes it exceedingly pz’obable that great events are at hand on the Western.

On the Gallipoli Peninsula the repulse of the Turks has been followed by ay, slight advance of the Allied position on the left before Krithia._ But the strength of the Turkish position has been revealed. It is invulnerable on either flank, its contour makes the cooperation of the fleet guns difficult, its only point of weakness is the centre, a saddle between the main crest of Achi Baba, and a smaller hill in the direction of the Aegean, and commanded by gunfire from both. The work of reduction must therefore he slow. When more men are landed the problem will bo easier* At present the Australasian army holds the iiillsl of Sari Bair, near Gaba Tepe, separated by.a narrow valley from the Pasha Dagh ridge ’which, crossing the peninsula, commands the Narrows. That army is a nuisance to the Turks, for it commands the road aforesaid by which their supplies reach their southern position. Whether the Pasha Dagh is fortified by the Turks, there is ho information to determine. If it is not a strong force landed at Gaba Tepe proceeding by the Sari Bair position could carry it against the Turks who hold it, now keeping the Australians in check. In that case Achi Baba would fall quickly, for it is commanded by the crests of the Pasha Dagh. This, or the failure of the Turkish which there is much talk and no ,£*gn —seem to offer the only prospects ot - the capture of the Turkish mam position. Until this part of the peninsula is conquered, the Dardanelles cannot be forced.

The popular indignation in America caused by the German reply seems to have risen to fever heat, which will no doubt be increased by the discovery of a great German conspiracy to destroy ail the freight steamers trading with Britain. Momentous decisions seem to be approaching in that quarter.

During the annual conference of the New Zealand Council of Agriculture, Dr C. , J. Reakes, D.V.Sc., M.R.C.V.S. (director of the livestock and meat division, Department of Agriculture), addressed the members on the subject of “Remounts and Artillery Horses.” When war broke out, he said, many people thought that there would be a difficulty in obtaining horses of the right type for the expeditionary; force. He himself was sure of the numbers, but was doubtful of the quality. A poor stamp of horse had been brought into territorial camps by the men. But he was glad to say that up to the present he had been able to get all the good horses required. The best were those that went away with the first force. Nearly 4000 horses Were bought or given m three weeks, and were greatly admired when' they reached Egypt. The Farmers’ Union had assisted greatly in the supply of artillery horses —those useful for general purposes on a farm. The natural patriotic spirit of the people, the failure of the Australian market, and the high price of horse feed had conduced to this satisfactory result. Though the horses were good, there was a lack of uniformity of type owing to promiscuity of breeding. The influence of trotting blood was very noticeable, and trotting horses were not required for military purposes. The Clydesdale and the thoroughbred were what was required for the army. It was true, said the doctor, that cavalry was not needed much in the oresent'trench war of Europe, bat it .was conceivable that a war mightcome in which conditions -would be similar to those in South Africa, a war of mounted men. Horses should be bred with this in view, and India would [always supply a market.