ACT OR OFFENCE ?

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXIX, Issue 8784, 14 July 1914, Page 9

ACT OR OFFENCE ?

ALLEGED SEDITION APPEAL BY WILLIAM THOMAS YOUNG. The appeal, ou points of law, against the conviction of William Thomas Young, president of the Federation of Labour, on the charge of sedition, for which ho stood two trials, was heard in the Appeal Court yesterday, before Tneir Honours the Chief Justice (Sir Robert Stout), Mr Justice Denniston, Mr Justice Edwards, Mr Justice Cooper, and Mr Justice Stringer,

Mr T. M. Wjlford, with Mr P. JO’Regan, appeared in support of tho appeal, and the Solicitor-General (Mr J. W. Salmond, K.C.) for the Crown. At the first trial, the jury were unablo to agree. The second trial was held before Mr Justice Honking and a jury of twelve on May 16th. The charge was as follows: That on Sunday, October 26th, 1913', at the Basin Reserve, in the presence of a large crowd of Wellington waterside workers then on strike and others, in making a speech to tho crowd, bo did utter certain seditious words, to wit: —“I want to say that special constables are being called for; a number of them were marched to the Newtown depot last night. I want to say this, that if the police force of this country are going to be utilised—l know tho individual police don’t want to be used for the purpose—but if the authorities of this country are going to use them to suppress the working class, t will undertake—we will undertake—to mass in this city of Wellington 10,000 or 16,000 armed men ready to protect themselves as armed men. If we have got to fight "the police force and the military, it has got to be done in style and effectually. It is a very easy matter indeed. There are ten or fifteen thousand men in support of you and to protect you against the baton of tho police authorities. If the employers are not prepared to act in a conciliatory spirit, and if they put on scabs to work cargo, there will pot be a ship leaving this port, and if needs be there will not be a wharf for scabs to work on. Don’t you he afraid of them. If I have got to incite the multitude, I will incite them; and in a proper manner,” or words to the like effect.

In answer to the charge, Mr Wilford entered a plea of ‘‘previous conviction,” and placed the following contentions before the court:

1. That the prisoner has been law.fully convicted of: the crime charged in the count or counts to which such plea is pleadecl. 2. That he has been previously convicted of the same offence with which he is now charged. 3. That the magistrate has convicted and sentenced the accused to a period of three months with hard labour for the speech which now forms the subject of a sedition charge. 4. That the evidence upon which the magistrate convicted the prisoner is the'same evidence which is to be preferred by the Crown at the present trial.

5. On the authority of "In re Simpson,” no man in a British country shall bo imperilled twice for the same offence.

His Honour allowed the case to proceed, and the jury returned a verdict of “guilty,” with a strong recommendation to mercy. Sentence was deferred, pending the derision of the Appeal Court on the legal points raised by Mr Wilford, and the prisoner was allowed out on his own hail. DIFFERENT FROM HOLLAND’S CASE.

In arguing before the Court of Appeal yesterday, Mr Wilford said that the case had to be distinguished from that of Bex v. Holland, which was decided by the court. ' The first difference was that in Holland’s case the plea was “previous' acquittal,” while in this it was “previous conviction,” the accused in this case having bf.'n actually convicted and punished, the sentence being that he should servo three months’ hard laour and be hound over to keep the peace for twelve months. The second difference was that in Holland's case the previous trial—for inciting to resist the police—only concerned part of a speech, and certainly only had reference to one of two speeches delivered by him. In Young’s case, the conviction for inciting to resist the police was determined upon the whole of the speech in question, though particular words were stressed. It was, no doubt, settled law, from what the court had said in Holland’s case, that a single speech might contain language in different parts which might constitute different offences. Counsel contended that in the present case the language was, so to speak, “all of a piece”—all of a kind. Ho contended that the striking out of a single sentence in a speech, if that speech were all of a piece, made no difference to the matter l . It was plain from the evidence of Mr W. G. Riddell, S.M., before the Supreme Court, that Young was convicted (of inciting) on his 'whole speech, and not on the words which were struck out when ho was indicted in the Supreme Court.

Mr Justine Denniston remarked that he had never heard of a magistrate being called to give evidence as to the grounds of his decision. Mr Wilford also contended that evidence had been wrongly admitted, in that evidence was given in the Supreme Court as to trouble bn the wharf and wrongful acts by strikers which occurred 1 days before Young’s speech, the evidence also showing that Young was not present at the disturbances.

Mr O’Eegan said that the question for the court was, would the defence be good in common law? All common law defences were expressly preserved by section 40 of the Crimes Act, and ft was a well-known rule of the common law that a man should not be put in peril twice on the same offence. The words '-.'Harfrcd in +his case were clearly seditions. They also amounted to an incitement to resist the pob’oe. The Crown to elect upon whiob charee it would proceed. but could not proceed on both. A VERY DIFFERENT PRINCIPLE.

The Solicitor-General, 'in replying, admitted that no person could be convicted and punished twice for the same offence, but stated that counsel for the appellant had substituted for that, principle the very different principle that no one could he conwintcH r — 11

ties to uphold his contention that when one act constituted .two offences, a person could be convicted twice. He stated! that what the punishment ought to be must depend very much on the circumstances. Young had already been punished for the same act, but for a different offence. Mr Salmond also supported the right of the Crown to call evidence as to the conditions existing prior to the speech. The court reserved its decision.