The New Zealand Times. MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1913. LORD LOREBURN’S APPEAL

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXVII, Issue 8525, 15 September 1913, Page 6

The New Zealand Times. MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1913. LORD LOREBURN’S APPEAL

One of the strangest things possible, surely, is the appeal made by Lord Loreburn for a settlement of the question of Homo Rule for Ireland “by consent.” Naturally the first thought on its perusal is of the belief in the highest places as to the trouble in the North of Ireland. It has long been oridout that those who live close to tho Ulster danger—which lias waxed very noisy of late—think loss of it than those living far away. But how the Government looked at it was the question most interesting to the public of Great Britain and the Empire. We have now some reason for believing that an ex-member at all events oi the Government scouts all idea of civil war in Ireland, but considers that there may ho bloodshed and disturbances greater than any—short of civil war—encountered in our times. If this appeal had met with the approval of tho Government, then it would follow, of course, that this view of . tho seriousness of tho crisis is tho view of tho Government. But it is difficult to believe that a proposition which really offers to givo up Welsh Disestablishment ;n return for peaceful acceptance of Home Rule could have had the agreement of, say, Mr Lloyd George, whose rise in tho world of orators began with his campaignings against the ascendancy of the Welsh Church. The chances are that the appeal is simply a well-meant attempt made by a very worthy gentleman independent of his former colleagues to throw oil on waters which ho regards as very troubled. As a peace-maker, the noble Lord deserves every respect and consideration. As a statesman wo may judge of his capacity by the use made by an opponent of the Government of his well-meant indiscretion. “The Times’’ pounced upon him with the statement that it is tho first time in history that a Liberal statesman has admitted publicly that the policy applied to a question of extreme difficulty is absolutely hopeless. There is, ot course, on the face of it, no such admission. To contend that there is is to twist the words with malice prepense. But the danger ought to have been obvious of such warping criticism at such a time. That he faced it as he did was a grave indiscretion on the part of Lord Loreburn. An ex-' Lord Chancellor ought to have known better. This is not the first admission on the part of high authority of tho dangerous state of things in Ulster. There have been several—as, for example, the warnings given so severely to Sir Edward Carson and his, misguided friends by the Prime Minister the House of Commons of the very serious consequences possibly likely to follow their very tmprinciped conduct. As nothing seems to have been done to chock the preparations avowedly made for civil war, one is driven to the conclusion that the Government has, while asserting tho principle of their disorderly action and condemning it, never feared the degree of its application. This is evidently not realised abroad, for tbo reference of some of the prominent newspapers of Germany to the license given to sedition of speech and of preparation for oiril war is tho language of absolute and shocked amazement. Those who support the •‘Lord of War” cannot understand how Sir Edward Carson, and the other leaders of Ulster violence are not stowed carefully away in a fortress meditating on the wickedness of rebellion and getting reconciled to its adequate punishment. Tho only possible explanation is that tho British Government does not think that these manifestations can possibly end in civil war. It is not an unnatural conclusion regarding a country like Ulster, which is equally divided on the great question of Home Rule, with even a majority of one of its Parliamentary representatives in favour of the Bill and tho policy of which tho Bill is the central part. Those who have read attentively tho pithy sketches of “Toby, M.P.” have been struck with tho general tolerance they reveal towards Sir Edward Carson. They have gathered an impression that he is for the Commons at large only Carson, eccentric, violent, well-mean-ing, quite utterly impracticable, and at tho same time utterly unlikely to bo taken seriously by ( anyone with anything to lose. One gets the idea of a man very much respected and liked, and not to be taken seriously in the matter of his constitutional eccentricities. Possibly that may bo the explanation of the toleration afforded him by tho Government. The treatment of tho industrial riots in Dublin lias been referred to os inconsistent in this connection; but there have been Belfast industrial riots, too, and these have been put down with quite as much respect for the law. Which justifies us in holding that there is no inconsistency of the kind complained of. There is much rejoicing over Lord Loreburn’s appeal as a sign of weakness in the Liberal camp. It is not the first sign, as all know who have followed the phases of this great constitutional crisis. It has long been known that there are Liberals even in the Gnvrnmnt, if not in the _ Cabinet, who fear that this Irish business w’T kill the Government by reason of tho grave consequences. Hence, this appeal is not a thing to he astonished at. Moreover, it is perfectly natural •hat there should he much ' weakness. The policy of the Government is one -.f r-reat strength and resolution, in ’he face of crest apparent risks. Por.nnranee .with this combination has ‘forced it to its present point of auoonss, Bnt there never was a great noßcv in hislorr —political, diplomatic or military—which did not encourage a ‘omloncy to timidity in the hmirti of “s adherents. Hcnrv t . struck at nmn of this sort, wb n n before Agiucourt he ordered all those who had no

stomach for the tremendous fight before them to leave the field. It is one of these who has rushed to the front with an appeal, but we must not conclude, therefore, that the strong men who are leading the party are faltering. Their characters and the success hitherto of their policy forbid such conclusion. What would that conclusion mean s’ Nothing less than abandonment of the policy so strenuously carried 50 far, a suspension ant) disregard of tho law made with such travail, an invitation to men who threaten rebellion against tho law to dictate tho terms of surrender to the victorious majority, a readiness to surrender a policy of justice to men who admit its justice but profess to wait only for the popular assent to that justice, and this in the face of the popular assent three times obtained. These are impossibilities for the strong men at the head of tho British Government. That there is weakness where there always must be weakness is true enough. But that this matters to tho general result of things is quite unthinkable.