The N.Z. Times TUESDAY, APRIL 14, 1908. COOPERATIVE DEFENCE.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXX, Issue 6494, 14 April 1908, Page 4

The N.Z. Times

TUESDAY, APRIL 14, 1908. COOPERATIVE DEFENCE.

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If, as the late Lord Tennyson remarked, the Empire’s Navy is its “all in all,” there seems to be little for the Empire’s military forces to do. As far as the outer Empire is concerned, the British Navy is certainly not likely to give us complete protection from any enemy that may cast longing eyes and long-range shells at us. It is at last definitely understood that the Empire will no longer play at soldiering, and that brains aro of more use behind a gun than the brightest of uniforms. There have been “scares” lately, but on the whole Australasia intr Australian waters because of Australian defences are in a chronic state of jumble, and that the, forces are dissatisfied. It has even boon said that the American fleet has been invited into Australian waters because Australian fears (1 Japanese aggression. New Zealand, recognising her vulnerability, has made what preparations 'she may for military reforms, and it is threatened that should the military manoeuvres, so soon to be commenced, fail in effectiveness, volunteering will go to the wall and compulsory service he submitted, the only system, by she way, that means the fullest protection, and the only one that is fair. Depending as we undoubtedly do on the Navy as regards aggression by sea, it is curious that we arc not to I*3 helped by the Navy in the large-siw-d Easter manoeuvres to be immediately begun. In these Easter manoeuvres, supposition is the basis of all operations. The officer in charge of the coast defences has to suppose that the supposititious enemy will attack his forts. Although he is expected to preconceive every kind of strategy, ho will orobably be unable to suppose with sufficient reality those things that a foe (who might be as clever as himself) would dish up as a complete surprise. In short, without the co-operation of a naval squadron which might be expected to act as a clever enemy would, his best work cannot give results on which he may base conclusions useful in showing him exactly where he succeeded and where ho failed. It is fairly certain that no enemy coming by sea would attack by night with largo warships. This method would be too costly in ammunition. Cruisers and torpedo attacks would possibly be tho means taken in reducing Wellington and its defences. An astute enemy would try less to reduce forts than to harass shipping operations by sinking hulks, barring harbours, capturing merchant ships, and generally making things unpleasant for the inhabitants of a city and the country at tho back. With an attacking naval force that exists only on paper, the intended manoeuvres resolve themselves into merely military defence. We hear so much of the possibility that tho arena of war will be the Pacific in the future

that it remains a mystery why the scheme of defence does not include the co-operation of navy and military forces at manoeuvres in these waters. Such manoeuvres, short of actual warfare, are tho only method of testing the value of defence. Branch Navy Leagues, which are supposed to have other uses than those which will pass school children and ladies’ parties aboard warships more or less obsolete, might bestir themselves over tho matter of real defence. It cannot definitely be ascertained whether the rank and filo of the forces which will take part in the Easter manoeuvres understand that the repelling of an invader by sea is what they are about to undertake, that a Blue or a Red or a Green invading force would have to heat the navy first to get ashore at Paremata or Pahautanui or elsewhere, and that therefore the supposition that such a fore© of the enemy has landed is also a supposition that Wellington after Easter will bo in the hands of the enemy. After all the point is that a force must not land, and to ensure this the navy must not be absent. And there is no navy; not oven a supposititious navy; nor an apology for a supposititious navy.