WHAT IS A STRIKE?

New Zealand Times, Volume XXX, Issue 6492, 11 April 1908, Page 9

WHAT IS A STRIKE?

JIB SKEBRETT’S OPINION. AT VARIANCE WITH THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL. By request of the Now Zealand Employers’ Federation, Mr 0. P- Skorrqtb, 1C.0., has given an opinion on section 15- of tho Industrial Conciliation Act Amendment Act, 1905. Xt is as follows : Section 15 of tho Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1905, makes it an offence for any industrial union nr worker to—‘ (L propose a strike, (2) strike, (3) take part in a strike, (4) aid or abet a strike or movement intended to produce a strike. The question is, what is the meaning of tho word “ strike,” and whether the offence is complete on the men leaving work, so that no one can be punished for aiding or abetting a strike unless ancih aiding or abetting takes place prior to the men leaving work in concert or what may bo colloquially termed tho commencement of the strike. The expression "strike ” is well known. It is used in very many mercantile contracts. Xt MEANS A REFUSAL

by a body of workmen in concert to work for their employers in consequence of either a refusal by the employers of tho workmen’s demands for an increase or tho refusal by the work-* men to accept a diminution of wages when proposed by their employers, or to enforce some demand by tho workers connected with their employment. In ordinary language a strike continues so long as the concerted refusal to work continues, and a strike is said t) end when tho men have resumed their work. In the "King v. Park, &t, L.T., 889, Chief Baron Kelly, in his judgment, refers to tho end of the strike as tho time when the men resume work. As his Honor Mr Justice Sim said in his judgment in the Blackball case, the words "a strikein section 15 were used by tho Legislature in their ordinary sense and in the ordinary sense a strike is

A CONTINUING ACT, and subsists so long ns concerted refusal to work is maintained. It seems clear that the Legislature was awaro that it was using the expression in this sense, for in subsection 5, which relates to tho procedure under section 15, a strike or a lock-out is referred to as "taking place.’’ dearly a look-out by is likewise a continuing act. and subsists so long as employers refuse to employ their workmen.

I agree that a worker can bo punished for striking as soon as the men leave work in concert, because ho comes within the very expression of the “ statute," a worker who " shall strike/’ Here the verb is used.. But, clearly, the substantive, “ a strike,”

INVOLVES CONTINUITY. A strike subsists so long as the workers continue in concert to refuse to work, and ends when the strikers resume work. Tho fact that no penalty is provided for the continuance of tho strike does not. in my opinion, affect the matter. The fine imposed is the punishment for the act of striking, but taking part in a strike or lock-out is also punishable. Clearly, where the taking part ip a strike is proved by tho act of striking the offender cannot be punished twice for the same act. But the fact that one fine only can imposed in respect of tho act of striking

CANNOT PREVENT that which . follows from the act _ of striking, i.e., a strike, from _ being 'what it is in substance —a continuing thing. PUNISHMENT OP STRIKERS.

Tho second question is as to whether industrial unions or individuals are liable to punishment for aiding or abetting ■ a strike by passing resolutions of* sympathy with the workers in their shrike, or by donating money to the union who are engaged m the strike in order to provide funds to enable the strike to be continued. It is apparently thought that the act of aiding or abetting MUST BE PREVIOUS to the strike and that as the workers n nd the union ran be punished directly they have struck a person cannot be said to aid or abet a strike who subsequently to the commencement of the strike aids or encourages it. In my opinion this suggestion is unfounded; nor dees the doctrine of the orimmal law relating to principals and accessories help the construction of the statute. The offenoe does not consist in aiding or abetting a person nx pereons in the of a crime. Section 15 creates a substantive offence; aiding or abetting a strike; a continuing movement or operationand the solo question is: -Is there an aiding or encouragement of the strike? If there is, ihen the OFFENCE IS COMMITTED > even though at tho time of the aiding or abetting the strike had commenced and the strikers had been punished for their offence. Any other construction would render the statute almost entirely inoperative. I am of opinion, therefore, that unions who pass resolutions encouraging the continuance of the strike and unions who dJonate their funds to the union engaged in a strike for tho purpose of aiding the strike are liable to punishment under section 15 as aiders and abettors of the strike.

WHO JCA? PROCEED? Tho next question is, who may proceed to punish" an offence committed under section 15? That section provides that an offender may be proceeded against in the same manner as if it or he were guilty of a breach of an award, and sub-section (6) provides that such a summons may he served in tbe same manner in which summonses may be in connection with the enforcement of an award. Under section 101 if a breach, of an award is committed tho Inspector of Awards or any party to an award may apply to' the Court for the enforcement of the award. It appears to me, therefore, that either tho Inspector of Awards or any party to the award which regulates the employment of the workers who liavo struck may apply for tho punishment of the offenders under section 15 of the Act bv proceedings similar to those prescribed for enforcing an award. t may add that in my opinion neither tho words “Industrial Union” nor “any worker” used in section 15 are limited to tho particular trade or calling in which tho strike has occurred. I can see no reason either in tho statutory definition of worker in the principal act Or in section 15 for reading ip such a limitation-