The N.Z. Times (PUBLISHED DAILY). SATURDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1904. RUSSIAN REFORM.

New Zealand Times, Volume LXXVII, Issue 5474, 31 December 1904, Page 4

The N.Z. Times

(PUBLISHED DAILY). SATURDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1904. RUSSIAN REFORM.

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When Prince Mirski explained his inconsistency the other day in declaring against the plana of the reformers, on the ground of the immaturity of Russia politically, he only repeated what every observer has said from the earliest times of the reform movement in the Empire of the White Czar. The latest of these, the very capable observer who wrote the story of the “ Real Siberia,” struck that as the keynote of all the remarks he had to make about the granting of constitutional government to the people of Russia. To him, after what he had seen, it was quite clear that the immaturity, politically, of the Russian people made them unfit for anything but the very smallest measure of selfgovernment, as the beginning of a gradual development. On the other hand, nothing could be clearer than the fact that the Russian Empire imperatively requires a large measure of reform. It is not possible without the very worst consequences to continue to allow men the power of life and death over their fellows without form of law or check of publicity. In Russia it has been stated by more than one authority recently that hundreds are every year sent to execution at the order of a Minister who is responsible to no one for his acts, and that it is the same in oases of exile, with the differenoe that the local authorities have also a right of deportation whenever they imagine that the safety of their country, or of their class, or of themselves, requires such treatment. The existing method of dealing with the national grievances, which are undoubted, is a thousand tiroes worse than the disease itself, and as much worse than any form of constitution, no matter how crudely it may work out in practice. The leading note in the Russian situation is

that the present practice is the worst absolutely of all practices possible. It follows that any change whatever must bo for the better. At the same time, to say that this ought to be the best spur possible for reform is much like saying that confusion worse confounded is better than simple confusion. This is the Russian paradox, and accounts for the extraordinary outburst of the demand from the thinking part of Russia for some Lightening of the grievous and intolerable burdens of the body politic. It accounts also for the vast variety of the opinions unfolded to the Czar by the advisers of that perplexed monarch. At the last Council of the Empire the Minister of Justice thought that the Czar was not legally entitled to upset the existing programme; the Minister of the Interior insisted that tho present situation could not ho prolonged without danger; tho Minister of Finance thought that reform on popular lines must restrict tho financial freedom of tho Czar; tho Procurator of the Holy Synod, the Torqucmada of the Russian Empire, gravely reminded tho Czar that he was not only head of tho State, but head of the Church also, and followed up tho stroke by assuring his Majesty that if he weakened his secular power his religious prestige would inevitably go by the hoard; the able and uncompromising Do Witto applied to the Imperial mind tho antidote 'of quickly urging that if it became known that, legally and in a religious sense, tho Czar was unable to grant reforms, a portion of the people would resort to force ; tho most of tho Ministers seemed to agree that the Czar ought to maintain a certain proportion of the autocracy, for tho use of which he is responsible only to God and his conscience. It is recorded that the Council had a sitting much like one of the all-night sittings of a colonial representative body, while all Europe looked on wondering whether tho last of the groat European autocracies was in the agonies of death. Tho Czar at last, goaded to madness of irresolution, broke up the Council, exclaiming that he felt ho must transfer his empire to his son with all its privileges unimpaired. It is an evasive and weak plea, which ought to settle tho controversy for all time as to whether the Ozar is or is not tho strong man that a certain reviewer (a creature of unbounded fancy and ill-regulated imagination, apparently) recently declared him to ho. It may be true that, owing to the political immaturity of tho mass of tho Russian people, tho principle of autocracy is necessary for tho safety of whatever reform may bo determined upon. But tho autocrat must be great in every way required by the administration of the State. France was not less chaotic at tho advent of the first Napoleon than is Russia now, and had anyone els© but that great master of men and of Statecraft undertaken the task of building up that wild country to a decent selfrespecting level, Franco would probably have remained to the present day the worst example of anarchy ever presented by modern times. Unhappily for the Russian people, tho Czar is not in any sense a Napoleon. It is not much that his people want. The irreducible minimum was modestly put by the Municipal Council of Mosscow the other day:—{!) Legal protection of the subject against official caprice; (2) repeal of exceptional laws; (8) freedom of conscience, creed, press, and meeting; (4) definite embodiment of these reforms in a Constitution with the aid of freely elected representatives; (5) establishment of public control over the Government. Tho last is, in Russia, at present impossible, for tho simple reason that the people understand nothing about governments or the methods of controlling them. That is where the autocracy comes in; but not being an autocracy of talent, and not being assisted by anything better than a pack of unscrupulous, hungry officials, the autocracy is powerless for good in presence of the most magnificent of all conceivable opportunities. It is attempting fair promises, and baa put forward a programme which must depend entirely for its success on the manner it is worked. Opinions appear to bo divided in Europe about its chances. One journal hopes that De Witte may be the first of the advisors-in-chief of the Czar under tho new programme; another talks about tho new leaven without seeming to hope to see it working; another frankly sees in the Imperial decree the return of the pendulum to the old bad ways; many declare tho decree to be double faced, an exhortation to an aspiring people, and at the same time a curse; even the critics of Franco declare that the time has gone by for more promises.

All this, so far as the press of Europe is concerned, is purely an academical exercise. The thing to know is how will the Russian reformers “take their gruel.” For Ah© first time in their history they have been outspoken, and for the first time are they in appreciable numbers before their sovereign, respectful but determined. A great war in which they feel no interest is draining the blood of the nation and drying up the springs of the national industry as well. These things aggravate the existing evils a hundredfold; and the awkward fact is that these evils are unendurable. There are in the Russian situation all the elements of vast cataclysm. Autocracy has failed to maintain the national comfort—failed by reason of the most monstrous peculation and treachery and self-seeking. Instead of retiring before the storm of outraged humanity, it promises and threatens at the same time, after confessing its inability to devise a remedy of any kind whatever. “How long, O Lord, how long?” will be the cry of the reformers; and the only answer that seems to commend itself is “until the troops of the Czar refuse to fire upon the people whom the Czar is no longer worthy to govern.” With a great war on hand, a .ruined finance, and trade in stagnation, all rushing political discontent up to fever heat, the'Russian position is terrible indeed.